

Europe

Fully revised, updated and extended to include the momentous developments of 2020, this fourth edition of Peter Rietbergen's highly acclaimed *Europe: A Cultural History* is a major and original contribution to the study of Europe.

The book examines the structures of culture in this part of Eurasia from the beginnings of human settlement on to the genesis of agricultural society, of greater polities, of urban systems, and the slow transitions that resulted in a (post-)industrial society and the individualistic mass culture of the present. Using both economic and sociopolitical analytical concepts, the volume outlines cultural continuity and change in Europe through the lenses of literature, the arts, science, technology and music, to show the continent's ever-changing identities. In a highly readable style, it expertly contextualizes such diverse and wide-ranging topics as Celtic society, the Roman legal system, the oppositions between 'elite' and 'popular' culture in pre-industrial Europe, Michelangelo's world-view, the interaction between the Enlightenment and Romanticism, the growth of a society of time and money, the appeal of fascism and other totalitarian ideologies, and the ways the songs of Sting express late twentieth-century thinking. Structured both chronologically and thematically, the text is distinctive in the attention consistently paid to the many ways Europe has been formed through its contacts with non-European cultures, especially those of Asia and the Americas.

This edition concludes with an epilogue that discusses the ways Europe's recent past – including the long-term efforts at further unification, and the various forms of opposition against it – has been both interpreted and misinterpreted; the importance of globalization; and the major challenges facing Europe in the present, amongst which are the consequences of the pandemic of 2020. With a wide selection of illustrations, maps, excerpts from primary sources and even lyrics from contemporary songs to support its arguments, the text remains the definitive cultural history of Europe for both the general reader and students of European history and culture.

Peter Rietbergen is Emeritus Professor of Cultural History at Radboud University, Nijmegen, in the Netherlands. He is author of 15 monographs, including *Europe's India* (2007); *Rome and the World – the World in Rome: The Politics of International Culture, 1861–2011* (2012); and the best-selling *Short History of the Netherlands* (1993, and ten revised editions till 2018), which has also been translated into Dutch, German and Japanese.

Praise for the previous edition:

'Europe: A Cultural History does not just provide an accessible and lively account of European cultural thought and practice from prehistory to the present; more importantly, it also offers a sustained reflection on what the idea of "Europe" has meant to different people at different times. Peter Rietbergen's book is a superb one-volume introduction to European cultural history.'

Paul Stock, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK

'Peter Rietbergen's fluently written book is an insightful account of the cultural history of Europe, its multiple cultural identities and its continuously changing webs of significance. Rietbergen draws on an impressive array of source material to examine the transformation of Europe from its earliest developments to the challenges it today confronts. Europe: A Cultural History is highly recommended reading for students and researchers of European culture and its history.'

Hannu Salmi, University of Turku, Finland

'This book remains a reliable, stimulating and readable guide to many aspects of European cultural history. It is Peter Rietbergen's own idiosyncratic selection of material and ideas, and it provides us with an original and entertaining take on an immense spread of material.'

Michael Wintle, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

'Nuanced, non-teleological and critically distinguishing, yet comprehensive and remarkably readable, Rietbergen's history of European culture will be an unavoidable reference point for any serious debate on its topic for years to come.'

Bertel Nygaard, Aarhus University, Denmark

'Peter Rietbergen presents a book which is unlike the standard textbooks on the cultural history of Europe. Instead of just summing up names, dates and facts, it offers the reader a provocative personal reflection on the incredibly rich and highly varied contents of the European heritage. It will serve as an eye-opener for all those students who aspire to look beyond the main narrative into the primary sources of Western thought. Therefore, this book can be an invaluable tool in higher education.'

Henk Kern, Leiden University, The Netherlands

Europe

A Cultural History

Fourth Edition

Peter Rietbergen

Fourth edition published 2021
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN

and by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2021 Peter Rietbergen

The right of Peter Rietbergen to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

First edition published by Routledge 1998
Third edition published by Routledge 2015

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A catalog record has been requested for this book

ISBN: 978-1-138-32611-8 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-138-32614-9 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-0-429-45003-7 (ebk)

Typeset in Bembo
by River Editorial Ltd, Devon, UK

Contents

<i>List of figures</i>	xiii
<i>List of maps</i>	xvii
<i>Preface to the fourth edition</i>	xix
Prologue: Europe – a present with a past	xxiii
Europe: on the problems of writing a (cultural) history	xxiii
Europe: a name, a hope – a reality?	xxv
Europe: the quest for ‘European-ness’	xxxii
Europe: old Europe, new Europe, old borders, new borders	xxxvi
About the authorial condition	xxxix
About choices: the scope and structure of this book	xl
About the use(s) of this book	liii
About the 2020 edition of this book	liv
Acknowledgements	lv
PART I	
Continuity and change: new ways of surviving	1
1 Before ‘Europe’: towards an agricultural and sedentary society	3
Beginnings in Africa and the eastern Mediterranean, or the non-European origins of culture in Europe	3
The advent of agriculture, temple and state	9
Invasion, conquest and change: the first Eurasian wave	15
BABYLON, THE SEVENTEETH CENTURY BC: THE LAW CODE OF HAMMURÁPI	18
Beginnings in Europe: after the last Ice Age	20
Invasion, conquest and change: the second Eurasian wave	23
A ‘marginal’ culture? Trade and communication in Phoenicia	24
A ‘marginal’ culture? Democracy and its limitations in Greece	25
A ‘marginal’ culture? Tribal society in Celtic Europe	35

The ‘birth of Europe’ and the Greek ‘world-view’, or how to define one’s own culture	37
The world of Alexander the Great	39
Dossier: the human body	43
2 Rome and its empire: the effects and limits of cultural integration	50
Between the Alps and the Mediterranean, between the Etruscan and the Greek worlds: the expansion of the early Romans	50
From an informal to a formal empire	54
ROME, THE SECOND CENTURY AD: A LEGAL SYSTEM, A LEGAL SOCIETY – THE ROMAN CONTRIBUTION	60
Roman culture	63
The Roman Empire and the worlds beyond	65
Dossier: the rule of law	71
3 An empire lost – an empire won? Christianity and the Roman Empire	78
Developments within the Jewish world: the genesis of Christianity	78
From Jews – and Gentiles – to Christians: the role of Jesus of Nazareth and his followers	81
Religions in the Roman Empire	88
A sect of ‘hopeless outlaws’	89
CARTHAGE, AD 180: ARGUMENTS AGAINST AND FOR THE RELIGION OF THE CHRISTIANS	91
Towards an empire Roman as well as Christian	93
Rome and its neighbours in the fourth and fifth centuries AD: ‘decline and fall’? The division and loss of the political empire – the survival of the cultural empire	97
Empire and language	104
Dossier: charity and/or solidarity?	105
PART II	
Continuity and change: new forms of belief	113
4 Towards one religion for all	115
The Christian world-view: the survival of Classical culture within the context of Christianity and Europe	115
MOUNT SINAI, AD 547: KOSMAS EXPLAIN THE CHRISTIAN COSMOGRAPHY	116
One religion for all: the fusion of Christianity and Europe	122

The rise of a new empire: Frankish statecraft and Christian arguments	125
Culture and cohesion: the role of ideology and education in the shaping of Carolingian Europe, or the ‘First Renaissance’?	129
The impact of monasteries	134
Dossier: Charlemagne: the Father of Europe?	136

5 Three worlds around the Inner Sea: Orthodox Christendom, Islam and Catholic Christendom 142

Confrontation and contact from the sixth century onwards	142
The world of the patriarch, or: Orthodox Christendom	142
The world of the prophet, or: ‘the House of Islam’	146
The world of the Pope, or: Roman, Catholic Christendom	153
The Crusades: Catholic Christendom versus Islam and Orthodox Christendom	155
CLERMONT, 26 NOVEMBER 1095: POPE URBAN II CALLS FOR A CRUSADE	157
Dossier: Islam in Europe	162

6 One world, many traditions: elite culture and popular cultures: cosmopolitan norms and regional variations 166

Europe’s ‘feudal’ polities	166
The Church and the early states	170
Economic and technological change and the early states	172
Stronger states – stronger rulers?	177
The towns and the early states	179
A Christian world or a world of Christian nations?	185
Elite culture and popular cultures: cosmopolitan norms and regional variations	191
LONDON, AD 1378: GEOFFREY CHAUCER DESCRIBES HIS WORLD	196
The importance of the universities	199
Dossier: democracy?	206

Interlude: the worlds of Europe, c.1400–1800 215

A world of villages	216
A world of towns	223
Two worlds?	228

PART III

Continuity and change: new ways of looking at man and the world 237

7 A new society: Europe's changing views of man 239

- The survival of Classical culture and the beginnings of Humanism 239
- The loss of Byzantium – the gain of Europe: the further development of Humanism in Italy 241
- From Humanism to the Renaissance in Italy 247
- ROME, AD 1538: MICHELANGELO ANALYSES ITALIAN ART 250
- Humanism and the Renaissance: Italy and beyond 253
- Dossier: European music 257

8 A new society: Europe as a wider world 264

- Economic and technological change and the definitive formation of the 'modern' state 264
- From manuscript to typescript 267
- Gunpowder and compass 271
- THE HAGUE, AD 1625: HUGO GROTIUS EXPOUNDS 'THE LAW OF NATIONS' 274
- Church and state: the break-up of religious unity 276
- Unity and diversity: printing as a cultural revolution 281
- Printing, reading and the schools: education for the masses? 290
- Europe and its frontiers: nation-feeling and cultural self-definition 297
- Dossier: capitalism 298

9 A new society: Europe and the wider world since the fifteenth century 307

- The 'old' world and the 'older' world 307
- The old world and the new 314
- The 'Columbian exchange' 318
- AUGSBURG, MADRID, PARIS, THE EARLY SIXTEENTH CENTURY: OPINIONS ON THE CONQUEST OF AMERICA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 324
- Images of America and mirrors of Europe 326
- Further cultural consequences of European expansion 334
- Dossier: Europe's wider world 341

10 A new society: migration, travel and the diffusion and integration of culture in Europe 349

- Migration, travel and culture 349
- Non-voluntary travel: the cultural significance of migrations 350
- Three types of cultural travel 353

	The business trip: merchants and bankers	353
	The diplomatic trip: ambassadors and politicians	357
	The educational trip: students, scholars and artists	361
	ROME, WINTER 1644-5: JOHN EVELYN VISITS THE ETERNAL CITY	367
	The practice of travel	369
	To travel or not to travel?	372
	Travel as an element in growing cosmopolitanism and cultural integration	374
	Dossier: The Church of Rome	375
11	A new society: the ‘Republic of Letters’ as a virtual and virtuous world against a divided world	382
	The Republic of Letters: a quest for harmony	382
	The Republic of Letters and the ideal of tolerance: theory and practice	384
	FRANCE, CHATEAU MONTAIGNE, NEAR BORDEAUX, AD 1580: MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE ON EUROPE AND ‘THE OTHER’	384
	The Republic of Letters and its enemies: national cultural policies, or the political uses of culture	389
	The Republic of Letters, or how to communicate in an invisible institution	392
	The Republic of Letters and the ‘inter-traffic of the mind’: three examples	395
	Dossier: paradise	399
12	A new society: from Humanism to the Enlightenment	406
	Humanism and empiricism between ‘ratio’ and ‘revelatio’	406
	From (scientific) empiricism to new visions of man and society	410
	LONDON, 1620, PARIS, 1637: FRANCIS BACON AND RENÉ DESCARTES, VIEWS ON THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD	413
	From Humanism to Enlightenment: a long dawn	415
	Enlightenment and Romanticism: poles apart?	424
	Dossier: cosmos, nature, man	431
PART IV		
	Continuity and change: new forms of consumption and communication	439
13	Europe’s revolutions: freedom and consumption for all?	441
	Material culture and conspicuous consumption: consumer change until the end of the eighteenth century	441

Production and reproduction: economic and demographic change until the end of the eighteenth century	446
Social and cultural change: the convergence of elites until the end of the eighteenth century	439
Two revolutions: one political, one economic, both cultural	452
PARIS, 27 AUGUST 1789: THE CULTURAL IMPORTANCE OF THE 'DÉCLARATION DES DROITS DE L'HOMME ET DU CITOYEN'	457
Urban, industrial culture: the regulation and consumption of time	466
Dossier: machines	470
14 Progress and its discontents: nationalism, economic growth and the question of cultural certainties	477
The two revolutions and their aftermath	477
Elements of nationalism: political culture in the nineteenth century	481
New elites, new mechanisms of cultural diffusion, new manifestations of culture	485
BASLE, THE MIDDLE OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: JACOB BURCKHARDT (1818–97) CRITICIZES CONTEMPORARY CULTURE	500
Money and time, goods and leisure: towards a consumer culture	503
Dossier: <i>War and Peace</i>	505
15 Europe and the other worlds	512
Europe and its expanding world	512
Europe and Latin America: a severed relationship?	512
North America as a vision of freedom	515
A variety of perceptions: capitalism and consumerism, freedom and slavery, progress and decadence	518
NEW YORK, 1909: HERBERT CROLY (1869–1930) INTERPRETS 'THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE'	520
Europe and America – a cultural symbiosis, or: the growth of the 'Western World'	522
To the 'heart of darkness': Europe and Africa	523
The 'old' world and the 'older' world: Europe and Asia	526
Dossier: humankind	537
16 The 'decline of the occident' – the loss of a dream? from the mid-nineteenth to the early twentieth century	543
The sciences and society: positivism ...	543
BERLIN, 1877: HEINRICH STEPHAN REJOICES IN THE FIRST GERMAN TELEPHONE SERVICE	545

Europe in hiding, Europe surviving	553
A growing sense of <i>fin de siècle</i> : between optimism and pessimism	558
The sciences and society: relativism ...	560
A world at war? Europe at war!	563
Dossier: who am I?	565
17 From a dream shattered to a dream revived?	572
Continued pessimism	572
The preconditions of another war ...	576
Europe: a world after two World Wars	581
A culture of time versus money	585
From 'familyman' to 'salaryman' – from group identity to individual identity?	592
Towards a youth-oriented middle-class mass culture	595
EUROPE, LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE MESSAGES OF POPULAR MUSIC	602
Science and society	605
Migration and contemporary Europe	612
Dossier: European-ness?	613
Epilogue: Europe – a present with a past, a present with a future?	622
A present with a past? On the necessity of history education	623
New dimensions of identity – towards a unified Europe?	630
New dimensions of identity – towards a complex multiculturalism?	643
New dimensions of identity – towards an anonymous, mediatized mass culture?	650
From the present to the future	657
<i>Index</i>	661



Taylor & Francis

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

Figures

0.1 View of the ‘Museum Island’ on Berlin’s Spree River	xxx
1.1 Cave painting at Niaux, France, dated c.20,000–10,000 BC	8
1.2 Limestone statue of the scribe Heti with a papyrus scroll, c.3–2000 BC	14
1.3 Bronze chariot from a seventh-century BC grave at Strettweg, Styria	22
2.1 Scene from a funerary monument found at Neumagen, Germany, dated c.AD 190	58
2.2 Mosaic of Empress Theodora, wife of Justinian, dated sixth century, from the church of San Vitale, Ravenna, Italy	58
2.3 A page from an early printed tradition of Justinian’s Law Code	73
2.4 A session of the ‘Reichskammergericht’, the ‘supreme court’ of the Holy Roman Empire	74
3.1 Shrine dedicated to the service of Mithras, located under the Christian church of San Clemente, Rome	85
3.2 Fresco depicting ‘a meal of fraternal love’, found in one of the Roman catacombs	86
3.3 View of the housing provided by the Fugger banking family for the poor of Augsburg	106
3.4 The ‘Hotel des Invalides’ in Paris	109
4.1 Germanic limestone tombstone, from the eighth century, from Alskog Tjangvide on the island of Gotland, Sweden	122
4.2 Charlemagne receiving the oath of fidelity from one of his nobles	137
5.1 Fifteenth-century fresco cycle in the church at Briançon, France	156
6.1 Water-driven flour-mill on the bank of the River Vltava at Prague, in a colour-wash, pen-drawing by the Dutch artist Roelant Savery, c.1610	174
6.2 The teaching of theology at the Sorbonne, from a fifteenth- century French manuscript	200
6.3 A Germanic law-giving assembly as represented on the column of Marcus Aurelius in Rome (AD 193)	207
6.4 Louis XVI taken captive and interrogated by the democratically elected members of France’s new national assembly	210

6.5 Anonymous engraving showing various aspects of agricultural labour, 1502	217
6.6 An illustration from the <i>De re metallica</i> of Georg Agricola, 1556	219
7.1 A Roman mosaic allegedly depicting Plato's Academy, at the National Museum of Naples	244
7.2 London's Royal Albert Hall	261
8.1 The first stock exchange of Amsterdam	300
8.2 The first (1867) edition of Karl Marx's <i>Das Kapital</i>	303
9.1 Eighteenth-century engraving showing the observatory for astronomical research of the Jesuit mission in Peking	323
9.2 The Belém Tower	342
9.3 The first European image of a rhinoceros, as drawn and engraved/printed by Albrecht Dürer	343
10.1 Jacob Fugger, the Augsburg banker, and his chief accountant, Matthäus Schwarz, depicted in the Fuggers' headquarters in 1516	356
10.2 A reconstruction of 'old' St Peter's: the basilica built by Emperor Constantine in the fourth century over the tomb of the 'first of the Apostles'	376
10.3 An eighteenth-century engraving showing the colonnades erected in front of 'new' St Peter's in the seventeenth century	378
11.1 Engraving showing people watching heretics and witches being burned in a straw hut, depicted in a text on criminal law and procedure, the <i>Cautio Criminalis</i> of 1632	384
11.2 Plan of the town of Karlsruhe in the eighteenth century	401
11.3 London in 1872, as seen by the French artist Gustave Doré	403
12.1 Water-driven organ/automata devised by the learned Jesuit Athanasius Kircher	411
12.2 Eighteenth-century print making fun of science, in a vision of an air-borne world	412
12.3 Engraved portrait of Erasmus Darwin	432
12.4 Erasmus Darwin's ground-breaking <i>Zoönomia</i> (1796)	435
13.1 The first German railway between Nuremberg and Fürth, in a contemporary engraving, 1835	462
13.2 A view of the Krupp firm's factories at Essen, Germany, in an engraving of c.1860	468
13.3 A schematic representation of one of the first Newcomen engines	472
13.4 The first electronic, digital and programmable computer, used during the Second World War to break German codes	474
14.1 Lithograph showing the Parisian 'Au Bon Marché', the great department store, c.1870	501
14.2 A page of the manuscript of Tolstoy's <i>War and Peace</i>	506
14.3 The battle at the village of Borodino (1812)	507
15.1 An early representation of the earth on Martin Behaim's famous 1491–3 'earth apple', or globe	538

16.1 Late nineteenth-century lithograph of a Parisian telephone exchange	544
16.2 Engraved representation of the 'Hall of the French Machines' at the 'Exposition Universelle' held at Paris in 1878	547
16.3 Engraving showing how machines in the family home could free women of heavy household chores	548
16.4 Sigmund Freud with a number of other famous European and American practitioners of early psychoanalysis	569
17.1 Scene of destruction after the riots in Clichy-sous-Bois, 2005	618



Taylor & Francis

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

Maps

1.1 Migrations in western Eurasia, third to first millennium BC	17
1.2 Extent of Greek influence in the ancient Mediterranean world, c.400–300 BC	42
2.1 Roman Empire in AD 211	59
6.1 Linguistic boundaries, c. AD1200 (with eleventh- and twelfth-century pilgrimage routes)	195
9.1 European expansion at the end of the Middle Ages to c.1540	311
10.1 Agencies and commercial interests of the Fugger trading and banking house, c.1500	355
15.1 Major spheres of European cultural influence, c.1800	531



Taylor & Francis

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

Preface to the fourth edition

Over the past 20 years, people have responded variously to the previous three editions of this book. Whereas there have been many encouraging and even laudatory reactions and reviews, some critics have suggested that my interpretation of Europe as a culture was, perhaps, a bit idiosyncratic. But how could it be otherwise? Or, rather: why do I, why do we, need the past anyway?

The original meaning of the Greek verb 'historein' was 'to inquire'. Hence, a 'historia' was a text – usually a narrative – presenting knowledge about people, events and things acquired by investigation. Indeed, even nowadays, both in French and in German, the terms 'histoire' and 'Geschichte' may still refer to a tale of something that happened only a minute ago. Only in the fifteenth century did 'histoire' and 'history' also, and primarily, become the narrative of knowledge acquired of people, events and things past.

Reversing a famous warning often but wrongly attributed to Sigmund Freud (1856–1939), one may argue that a person who is not interested in his own past and, indeed, in *the* past will be a good-for-nothing, because, to paraphrase Robin Collingwood (1889–1943), history is the foundation of self-knowledge.¹

But why should we try to know something about the history of such a huge and, to many, ill-defined space as is Europe? One may consider the very pertinent remark made in the 1980s by the British politician George Walden, who told his readers that: 'a country losing touch with its own history is like an old man losing his glasses, a distressing sight, at once vulnerable, unsure and easily disoriented'. Though he was referring to Great Britain, people living in other parts of Europe would do well to extend that message to their own compatriots and, indeed, to Europe at large.²

Yet, obviously, Europe is not a given entity with fixed attributes, but essentially a changing concept and, hence, an ongoing realization as well as an interpretation. A geographical map and the many assumptions and choices behind it are an interpretation, because people thus describe as well as circumscribe the space they inhabit, perhaps even ascribing to it a shared identity. A community is an interpretation, because people attribute to the sociocultural group they feel they belong to certain characteristics, which

supposedly create cohesion and identity. All culture is interpretation, since it is the tangible, readable and visible form people give to their thoughts about the nature that nurtures them, about themselves and about the people around them. All of these – spaces, bodies, communities, cultures – are essentially subject to the dynamic of time, to the alteration that comes with its relentless passing.

In his famous 1917 talk about ‘scholarship as a profession (and a vocation)’, one of the twentieth century’s most creative historians, Max Weber (1864–1920), argued that scholars, including, and I should perhaps stress, especially scholars who somehow deal with the human past, should always be aware of themselves as being part of a specific present, in terms of time, location, community and indeed culture. All of these condition the questions they ask. Moreover, with their answers they also will contribute to the needs of that present, their present: their time, location, community and culture.³ In that sense, man, who creates history, is, himself, a creature of history. Writing about the past, he is always doing so in the present, wherein everything that can be written about already is history, since even things which happened an infinitesimal amount of time ago are past, and cannot but be interpreted as such.

Following Weber’s exhortation, I will not disguise the many realities – both challenges and restrictions – of my ‘standing-place’, as he called it. I, the person who has authored this book, am a man, born in Europe at the beginning of the seemingly secure second half of the twentieth century, but writing in the crisis-filled first decades of the twenty-first century, a scholar moreover politically inclined towards social democracy, and with a decided interest in the continuing complex role(s) of religion(s) in culture and in the interaction between Europe and other world cultures. Nor should I myself forget – or forget to mention to my readers – that I am writing as a citizen of a nation, the Dutch one, the larger part of which for several decades professed itself to be ‘pro-European’, though, in recent years, many of my compatriots have started to feel doubts about that erstwhile stance. Et cetera.

Yet, in the end, as all proper historians do, I have striven to present an interpretation of culture in Europe that represents the consensus of at least part of the scholarly community about the value of what has been searched for, found, analysed and interpreted.

To better understand Europe’s history, it is, in a book like this, helpful to return to specific sites, to seek out what memories, what stories and histories have been associated with them, to better understand that however general history is, it is, at the same time, local. Visiting sites all over Europe, each one of them forced me to consider not only how much the people living there now owe to their past but, also, to what extent, generation after generation, sometimes century after century, these people have changed and, consequently, have reshaped their world and their tales of its past. To somehow bring to life that reality, throughout the book I also have added a series of essays, or ‘dossiers’, describing and analysing cultural phenomena that, I feel,

are evoked by a special location but in a more general way bring to life ideas and actions that have contributed to the Europe we now know. Thus, each of the 17 chapters is now illustrated with an item from this 'Europe Dossier'.

Last, but not least, new elements also include a longish paragraph in the Prologue discussing another of Max Weber's texts, written nearly a century ago, in which he describes the cultural manifestations he felt to be typical of Europe; phenomena that made it unique: a set of 'touchstones of European-ness', that is to say. They have helped me both to sharpen some of my own analyses and interpretations throughout the text, as well as to select some of the themes connected to the locations that have led me to write the 'dossiers' at the end of each chapter. For though nowadays we may no longer agree that such manifestations of culture as, for example, polyphonic and large-scale orchestral music, or Gothic and Renaissance architecture, with the weight-bearing vault and the cupola, really are uniquely European, or should even be considered major identifying features of European culture, yet the very existence of Weber's list has forced me to think about the many elements that, perhaps, do deserve to be so characterized.

Of course, when necessary bibliographic references have been added, and mistakes have been rectified, insofar as I am aware of them.

Finally, and inevitably in view of the time that has passed since I last revisited and revised the book, I have reconsidered the Epilogue, for I have had to ask myself whether the Europe I saw unfolding more than 20 years ago still is the Europe that now seems to be evolving.

Peter Rietbergen,
Institute of Historical Research,
Radboud University,
Nijmegen, the Netherlands,
July 2020

Notes

- 1 R. Collingwood, *The Idea of History*, Oxford 1956, 10. One should note that this very perceptive study was posthumously compiled from earlier versions and from Collingwood's various manuscripts.
- 2 G. Walden, *The Sunday Times*, 20 December 1986.
- 3 M. Weber, *Wissenschaft als Beruf*, Munich 1919, 1921.



Taylor & Francis

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

Prologue

Europe – a present with a past

Es irrt der Mensch, so lang er strebt.

We err as long as we strive.

God, in the ‘Prologue’ to Goethe’s *Faust I*¹

This history of ‘culture in Europe’, parts of which, as is my claim, also became or, to put it better, still are becoming ‘European culture’, is told as a story, a narrative, chronologically presented in 17 chapters, and Epilogue. Specifically the Epilogue is a text that, I have to confess, was the most difficult to write because, inevitably, it deals with the recent past and, even, the present, the first two decades of the twenty-first century, that are characterized by turbulent politics and, on a deeper level, by profound cultural changes that may even shatter the dreams of many Europeans of the past generations. But precisely because ‘Europe’ is an ongoing process, I felt I could not very well end my book around the turn of the millennium; to make sense of developments such as the ones we witness now is a historian’s job, too, because, of course, they are rooted in the past as well.

I also have chosen to introduce the 17 chapters with this Prologue. Of course, readers may decide to leave it for what it is: not part of the narrative proper – the sorry lot of many prologues. But while everyone is free to skip it, I would like to stress its importance. For in it, I argue and explain a number of themes that by their very nature can have no place in a chronological story, but yet are essential to an understanding not only of European history but, also, of the considerations that have led to this book, and that, consequently, determine its structure.

Europe: on the problems of writing a (cultural) history

What is culture? Definitions abound. Indeed, many dozens of monographs, and many hundreds of articles address the question. I propose to use a relatively simple, threefold definition.

Despite all varieties of time and place, all humans, including those who have lived and live in the world called Europe, always have had to deal with

nature, using it as a source of food, shelter and energy but also battling against its sometimes inimical, even destructive forces. Thus, from the very beginning, in satisfying his needs man has created 'culture' by, somehow, altering 'nature'. Indeed, though till the 1970s almost everyone thought that especially climate was, despite its periodical variations, the one immutable constant in man's life, we now know that we have changed, altered it, too – perhaps even irrevocably so.

Then, of course, all humans have needed to create forms of cooperation, of society, beyond the primordial parent-child family: clan, village, town, state, but, also: religious communities, social organizations, political parties, sports' clubs, trade unions, et cetera. Only in and through functioning in these contexts can a person ever feel that he or she has an identity. Last, but not least, humans have invented means of representing not only their physical surroundings and their society, but also their own role(s) therein in such a way that the accumulated knowledge of these realities – all of which partly or wholly of their own making – give them a mental framework that help them to comprehend the world they create and hand down that knowledge to following generations. To do so, people have developed speech, language, writing. They have stored that knowledge in texts that (re-)present images and ideas. In all these acts of communication, they inevitably yet again change, alter their views and their handling of nature and of society.

Taken together, these three aspects of human action constitute culture. Or should we rather use the term civilization?

Actually, to explain the distinction is not simple. Culture definitely is the older term, having been used already by authors in ancient Rome to denote the entirety of man's actions – especially in relation to the manifold forms of mastering nature. The concept of civilization is of far more recent vintage. It is an eighteenth-century French noun, formed from the older adjective 'civilisé', civilized, which was used as an alternative for 'poli', polite, polished – hence, for example, in Dutch 'beschaafd', or 'shaven', i.e. smooth, polished, as against 'ruw', raw, rough. Referring to such older concepts as civility, or the Italian 'civiltà' – the culture of a 'civitas', a town, where people knew how to behave, because they were not rustics or, even worse, barbarians – the new noun, too, came to signify certain aspects of culture, but perhaps the more superficial ones rather than the essence.

But in German, 'Kultur' – together with the concept of 'Bildung', as man's intellectual as well as physical formation through education – still was considered to denote something of a more complex and indeed higher-ordered quality than 'Zivilisation', the latter seen as no more than a veneer, a polish. Yet, in France it was 'civilisation' that prevailed, to indicate the 'high' culture of the French elite who aspired to lead the rest of Europe. That notion then spread to other countries, being understood as the cosmopolitan, refined way of life of which seventeenth-century France had set the example.

Consequently, when in 1879 the English anthropologist E.B. Tylor published his famous *Primitive Culture*, about the life of the native Americans,

he specifically chose his title to challenge the distinction between civilization and culture. He felt that ‘civilization’ had become a word used to express European superiority, a hierarchical and, indeed, exclusive term. For him, culture was a more neutral, and certainly more inclusive concept. While I do feel he was right, yet the two terms increasingly have become equivalent.

Europe: a name, a hope – a reality?

As I wrote, culture is lived and, indeed, experienced as an identity on various levels: of the individual, the family, the clan, the tribe; of the street or the neighbourhood; of the peer group; of the village, the town, the region, the nation or the state. And, perhaps uniquely but also very problematically so, it is lived and experienced on the level of ‘Europe’. For while, during the past millennia, Africans, native Americans and Asians mostly have not identified themselves as such – and even now often do not – for many centuries already people living in the geographical entity called ‘Europe’ have developed the notion of a specific, hence European culture, and identity.

The question of why the word, the name and, even more so, the concept of ‘Europe’ was coined at all leads to another one: namely, when it was first used; why; and by whom? What was its content, then and in later ages, and for whom and in what way was it a living reality?

Since the seventh century BC, the Greek-speaking people in the eastern Mediterranean started using the name to denote a geographic region – albeit one only vaguely defined – that included their own, specific habitat, which they referred to as ‘Hellas’. To give this geographical Europe a cultural meaning, they ‘personalized’ it: people were told ‘Europe’ had been an Asian princess abducted by Zeus, which suggested that the world of the Greeks had taken something essential from the otherwise inimical, allegedly barbarian world of Asia.

Over the past more than 2,500 years, all regions north and west of ‘Hellas’ successively have been geographically subsumed under the name Europe, that thus came to describe the entire western part of the Eurasian landmass. Indeed, though, geographically speaking, it was not a continent, it yet was presented as such – as a world with a specific identity. For its inhabitants ‘filled’ their continent with content, with notions about their culture, though these notions continuously changed. For every identity, whether personal or collective, results from contrasts with other persons or groups. If the relationship with these persons or groups changes, their identities will, inevitably, change, too. To put it otherwise, every identity is fluid, rather than fixed: a construction that adapts to the constellation wherein it exists.²

Thus, beyond its geographic definition, the world named Europe is the result of people’s hopes about a humane world, and through those hopes, that have been expressed metaphorically in images and words that encode concepts and emotions, it has become, in some ways, a reality: Europe is not a defined space, but a space that has defined itself.³ Therefore, Europe now is

a more or less strongly felt bond between those living in it. It is situated in that sphere of tension which links dream to deed, thinking to doing. But by that very token, it also has always been, and still is an excluding criterion, used by those who want to distinguish themselves from other, outside worlds perceived as alien, foreign, threatening: Asia, Africa, America; or Islam; or dictatorships; or failed states; or terrorism, et cetera.

Yet, for almost 1,500 years, the shared culture in the world geographically called Europe mostly was articulated in the concept 'Christianitas', 'Christendom'. Only from the fifteenth century onwards did 'Europe' really take its place, not only to encompass the geographical region but also the culture associated with it.

Yet, only during the years following the Second World War, a number of politicians – mainly economists and lawyers – attempted to bring to full fruition what they, interpretively and sometimes manipulatively, presented as the 'idea of Europe', hoping to provide an identity and, hence, a cause for the people who had survived the world's worst war, ever. They wanted forever to suppress the danger of the European states once more destroying themselves with their own arms – for both the Second and the First so-called World Wars were, after all, wars inflicted by European nations upon themselves and, worse, upon the wider world.

To give this idea the strength of legitimacy and, even, inevitability, it once more was presented as the outcome of a long historical tradition.⁴ Europe was defined as a community with features distinctly its own, of which all Europeans were part: a supremely humane 'civilization' that by its very moral strength would survive, through the elimination of the devastating interstate rivalry of the previous centuries. Creating further economic growth, only, was not enough, for as Jacques Delors, then president of the European Commission, wrote in 1996: 'You don't fall in love with the common market: you need something else'.⁵ To put it otherwise, to facilitate the acceptance of what these men felt to be a political-military necessity, they yet tried to give it an ideological foundation. Earlier generations only had managed to convey their notions of Europe to restricted strata of society: the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie. Now, through mass communication and education, the 'idea of Europe' was held up as an ideal to all its peoples, urging them to give up some of their proudly-felt but potentially always dangerous national identity and independence, and to realize, instead, a form of cohesion that would ensure peace and prosperity.

In short, insofar as a European consciousness, a European identity exists among the majority of the peoples living in geographical Europe – which according to many, is debatable – it is a consciousness of recent vintage. Yet, the fact that the 'idea of Europe' has been voiced explicitly either as the instrument of a political elite – as, for example, the elite of nineteenth-century Prussia, who, in the museums they established in Berlin, wanted to create a basis for their own national identity and, consequently, power – and/or as an ideal community, a utopia for all, does not mean that, in the course

of time, it has not become a reality of sorts, first for these European elites and, during the last century, for far larger groups. As Friedrich Nietzsche wrote: 'Ein Traum, ewig wiederholt [kann] durchaus als Wirklichkeit empfunden und beurteilt werden' – 'The continuous repetition of a dream may well turn it into a reality felt and judged'.⁶

Indeed, attempting not only to initiate but also accelerate the process of European integration and, perhaps even, unification, in the twentieth- and twenty-first-century politicians – who, in 1957, established the European Economic Community which in 1993 became the European Union and which was given a constitution in 2007/2009 – have embarked upon a course whose manifold consequences have reached, and still are reaching, much further than in any previous period, pitting a belief in the necessity of an increasingly integrated European world against the tenacity of older local, regional and national allegiances.

Precisely the problems created by the contrast between these two views constitutes one of the major issues confronting the peoples of Europe in the present. For nothing about the genesis of the culture we call European is 'natural', logical, pre-conditioned. What continuities there are, are balanced by as many changes that, in the end, make it impossible to describe present-day European culture in terms of a linear process with an inevitable outcome. Certainly at the beginning of what most people term European history, i.e. well before the fifth and sixth centuries, when Europe ceased to be only a part of the previous, far larger, Mediterranean cultural world, little that was achieved in this geographical region was 'typically European'.

During many millennia, the entire world was made up of agrarian civilizations: those of the Americas and of sub-Saharan Africa, of Islam, of Hindu India, of China and Japan, of South-East Asia and Polynesia – and those of Europe.

In their sociopolitical structures and, in the widest sense, their culture, the peoples in Europe were by and large undistinguishable from those of other 'oikoumenai'. My argument is, that only during the past five centuries, very slowly a culture has developed in what we call Europe that has not only become different from other civilizations but also has changed large parts of the world. To put it otherwise, only recently, in a situation that was entirely contingent, many of Europe's long-time unremarkable features came together remarkably to create a civilization that was at that time unique: a world characterized by the transformation of an agrarian into an industrial culture and society, a world that, for better or for worse – according to one's perspective – also came to dominate most of the non-European 'oikoumenai': economically, politically and culturally.

This transformation first became manifest in the fifteenth century. It accelerated in the late eighteenth century and, as only now we begin to see, came to an end again in the late twentieth century. By that time, however – and through the processes of cultural appropriation mentioned above –

Europe had gained characteristics as well as a cohesion most of the other worlds (still) lack.

But what, then, is Europe if we cannot attribute to it the specious security of a distinct geographical entity, and if its culture is not a 'natural fact' either? As I indicated above, if anything, Europe is a political and cultural concept, constantly invented but, also, experienced in 'real time', always by an intellectual elite, first, and then, to a greater or lesser extent, by larger groups, specifically whenever there was or is need for a more precise definition of this world at the western edge of Eurasia.

Therefore, the question is, when was such a definition or is needed? Obviously, mostly in moments or periods of change, of crisis, even. Then, people become self-reflective and describe their own identity – an identity that, though not always based on 'hard cultural facts', in that very process yet does become such a fact.

The above process can be illustrated through the analysis of one particular, very revealing case of cultural policy and, indeed, identity-building.

In 1999, UNESCO put the so-called 'Museumsinsel' of Berlin on the world's cultural heritage list. Yet, in thus rightly honouring one of Europe's most impressive museum complexes, situated in the heart of the German capital on an island in the Spree River, the UNESCO managers probably did not realize they were actually endorsing a fascinating vision of history that is closely related to the development of European culture as an idea, as a self-image.

Already in 1830, the first museum on the island had opened its doors. On the façade of a severely Classicist building created by Prussia's leading architect, Karl Friedrich Schinkel, the visitors read the following inscription: 'Studio antiquitatis omnigenae et artium liberalium' – 'for the study of the origins of all people and of the free arts'. The 'Altes Museum', as it is now called, was created to house the antiquities collected by Prussian monarchs as well as private persons in, mostly, ancient Greece, as well as in Egypt and the Near East. Obviously, these regions, both culturally and geographically, were only marginally related to nineteenth-century Germany or, even, Europe, if at all. Yet, in those decades, many Europeans pondering and wondering about their roots, after the chaos of the Napoleonic period, felt that, at least partly, these lay in those very regions. Their reasoning was complex.

They saw their own time as, in a sense, the epitome of human achievement – not least because, during those decades, most European polities were in a state of political, economic and social upheaval while, at the same time, transforming themselves into global empires. However, to create a new identity that would explain those changes and that new political and economic power, they 'appropriated' earlier cultures, arguing these contained elements that, or so they wanted to believe, had prefigured and contributed to Europe's contemporary dominance. Both in this and, soon, in other, even more recent Berlin museums, Europe was presented as the world's ultimate civilization also because it was steeped in, and, indeed, was

the rightful heir of a millennial tradition that, as archaeologists and philologists told the visitors, originated in ancient Egypt as well as Mesopotamia, and, of course, in ancient Greece and Rome.

To visually bring this message home, in the vestibule of the 'Altes Museum' a cycle of huge frescoes depicted the history of mankind, beginning with man's linguistic dispersion after the destruction of the Tower of Babel as described in the first book of the Old Testament. Moreover, viewing the many exhibits that – as in so many other museums created in Europe during that period – were presented in a very persuasive (chrono-)logical but therefore also ideological sequence, the public should think of themselves as the final product of the traditions embodied therein. Thus, Berlin's artistic and intellectual establishment sought to link their own world to ancient Greece, and more specifically to Periclean Athens during the fifth century BC – the world, or so they thought, of the perfectly-proportioned men and women who had represented themselves in gleaming white marble statues; a world characterized by the kind of democracy that a number of European states were now institutionalizing, and by a humane philosophy the intellectual elite of Europe felt to be uniquely theirs. In short, ancient Athens was presented as the cradle of all that was beautiful and noble in contemporary Europe.⁷ 'Antiquity', as another term for the civilization of the Greeks, became 'classical': the origin as well as the continuing, and preferred example of what made Europe a great culture.⁸

In thus constructing history as a process of cultural continuity, nineteenth-century Europeans were actively creating a past that suited their present. Though empirically at least partly false, by the very fact of its creation this continuity became, in another sense, true. For as the American poet Ezra Pound once remarked: 'Not what happened, but what is remembered is significant'.

In 1841, King Friedrich Wilhelm IV of Prussia decided the entire Spree Island should be dedicated to the Arts and the Humanities. Expeditions to Egypt⁹ enlarged the kingdom's collections of ancient Near Eastern art and artefacts. The King himself left an inscription on the great pyramid of Giza to record Prussia's and, therefore, Europe's cultural appropriation of the civilization of pharaonic Egypt. No wonder that in Berlin a 'Neues Museum' was opened, to exhibit the shiploads of artefacts taken from these regions by German archaeologists. Again, the message of continuity was preached to the visitors the very moment they entered the building: the gigantic frescoed decoration that covered the walls of the so-called 'Fatherland Hall' connected, in a convoluted way, the history of ancient Egypt to ancient Norse epics such as the *Edda*, which told the history of the early Germanic peoples – or so they thought – and then brought that history to the sixteenth century, to the time that, according to German historians, their nation had started growing.

In the 1860s, a third museum was built on the Spree Island, to house the Prussian state's growing picture collection. The building itself, however, once



Figure 0.1 View of the ‘Museum Island’ on Berlin’s Spree River, with the temple-like structure built from designs by Friedrich August Stüler between 1862 and 1876 to house the new German National Gallery. It stands amidst a number of other magnificent museum buildings, such as the ‘Altes Museum’, the Pergamon Museum, the Bode Museum, etc. The entire complex was obviously meant to convey the idea that the German capital was, in a sense, Athens reborn on the banks of the River Spree, with this ‘Acropolis of the Arts’ enabling Europeans to study their civilization from its beginnings to their own times. When, by 2020, the rebuilding of the former imperial palace will be completed, the museum-complex will have doubled in size.

Source: Centre for Art-historical Documentation/Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands

more illustrates the underlying idea of Germany's, and Europe's cultural continuity. The '(Alte) Nationalgalerie' is obviously modelled on the Parthenon, the temple of the goddess Pallas Athena that crowns the Athens Acropolis. Inside the museum, continuity is the message, too, for around the monumental stairwell a huge frieze runs, depicting the 'great men' of German culture.¹⁰ But it takes the notion of 'German' very broadly indeed. For the German tribes who, according to the accepted view of history, originally laid the foundations of the states that, by the 1870s – when the museum was opened – merged into the new German Empire, had no direct links to the Graeco-Roman world. Yet, in this building, dedicated 'To German Art' according to the huge inscription on its façade, the inventors of this tradition again spun the line of civilization from their own time backwards to the Romans – who they wanted to see as the heirs of ancient Greece and of Greece's cultural example, Egypt – and to Europe's early Christians, seen as the moral heirs of Roman culture.

In the first years of the twentieth century, yet another museum was constructed, now to house the monumental remains of Assyria, Babylonia and other cultures from the ancient Near East excavated by Germany's state-sponsored archaeological expeditions. It was, like comparable and contemporary efforts by the French and the British, large-scale robbery, some people now say; others argue that it was the timely preservation of works of art and other testimonies of the past that almost certainly would have disappeared if Europe had not rescued them; from that perspective, the destruction wrought by the continuous warfare in the Near East has proven them right.

The nucleus of this so-called Pergamon Museum consists of an enormous sculpted frieze created for a huge ceremonial open-air altar brought to Berlin from the ruins of the eponymous city – dating to the second century BC – in what is now Turkey. The sculpture was specifically admired for the quality of its depiction of the human form, as full of movement and yet ideally-proportioned as Europeans wanted themselves to be.

At the same time, a fifth and last museum, dedicated to Emperor Frederic III but nowadays named after its first director, Wilhelm von Bode (1845–1929), came to house an extensive, albeit miscellaneous collection both of European paintings from the Middle Ages to the late eighteenth century and of the, often related, products of the applied arts.

Thus, the Berlin museum-complex became not only a vast repository of the treasures of the better part of Western Eurasia but, in the decoration of its very buildings, a politically-laden visual history of that world as well. When, sometime in the 2020s, the rebuilt imperial palace on the Spree-island also will have been turned into a museum, to house collections documenting the eastern part of Eurasia as well as Africa, Oceania and the Americas, it will, truly, be 'a treasure island of the world', though its curators feel that, in the twenty-first century, the cultural messages it so fascinatingly proclaimed have to be re-interpreted. Rather than still suggesting Europe was the unique

outcome of these civilizations, it will present it as one of them, and in interaction with all of them.

All over nineteenth-century Europe, people were similarly occupied with inventing and presenting their own past as the epitome of culture: in museums like the British Museum in London and the Louvre in Paris; in history textbooks; in the historical scenes depicted on frescoed murals in almost every public building; and, soon, also in epic films.¹¹ Thus, the European elite wanted to show that it was precisely and, indeed, only Europe that had inherited everything mankind had ever created by way of things humane and, in its European form, sublime. Only Europe was truly civilized.

Europe: the quest for ‘European-ness’

Almost a hundred years ago, one of the giants of European intellectual history, the German historian and sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920) wrote his ‘Vorbemerkung’, or Foreword to a voluminous collection of ‘Aufsätze’, essays, both previously published and new ones, which appeared in the year of his death as *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie* (1920–21). Interestingly, in his preface he did not primarily address the theme of the book, the sociology of religion. Rather, it seems an almost independent text, in which he ponders those elements of culture that he, and others, felt to be ‘typically’ European.

Though nearly a century has passed, even now Weber’s musings can help us understand not only which notions of ‘self’ and ‘other’ contributed to this great scholar’s understanding of the ‘essence’ of Europe, but also to what extent recent scholarship has modified and, sometimes, though not always, invalidated a number of his views and opinions. Such an analysis will help us understand not only the (recent) development of the notion of culture in general, but also of the concept of a European culture.

Whether or not Weber intended the cultural phenomena he lists to be interpreted as a prioritized or, even, causal sequence, he first identifies the role of empirically gained knowledge as typical of European civilization. Admitting that other Eurasian societies have developed impressive, and sometimes even systematic views of the cosmos, of the world and of nature as well as of man, he yet feels that only Europeans produced that specific combination of critical observation and rational experimentation that resulted in the kind of science that, as he writes ‘we now recognize as *valid*’ (ital. P.R.).

Weber’s second perspective is that of the arts in, significantly, two manifestations, viz. music and architecture. For the paragraphs about music, he referred to a long essay of his own which also was published posthumously: *Die rationalen und soziologischen Grundlagen der Musik* (1921) – ‘The rational and sociological foundations of music’. European music, Weber felt, had been special for a long time. It produced a number of elements that, he acknowledges, singly occurred elsewhere as well: rational tonal intervals,

polyphonic harmony, the use of the major and the minor third, counterpoint, the chromatic scale, and, on another plane, the creation of the (large) orchestra with the string quartet as its nucleus, and so forth. However, their combination, according to him, was unique. Though, given our present, far greater knowledge of non-European musical cultures, this interesting analysis no longer holds in its details, the general idea still stands.

In architecture, Weber wrote, Europe created a very specific culture as well, with the use of the pointed, 'Gothic' arch not only as a decorative element but as a structural means to cross-vault huge spaces to which, in the Renaissance, the (re-)invention of the cupola added new possibilities. Nowadays, of course, people argue that the pointed arch may well have come from the Islamic world, while the cupola originated in Hellenistic-Roman culture. Yet, Weber rightly emphasizes that the (rational) combination and further elaboration of these structural elements did, indeed, occur only in Europe: there, huge spaces were created which had no parallel in other cultures.

Continuing, Weber stresses that only in Europe the printing press, while first invented in Korea and China, did create a world of texts that only existed because of and indeed in the printed word. Moreover, by Weber's own times that world had been immensely enlarged by the proliferation of journals and periodicals. Somewhat surprisingly, he does not relate this relatively recent phenomenon directly to science, as we would now. Nor does he link it to the development of general education in most European countries from the early nineteenth century onwards, that was spurred on by, precisely, new, cheap printing methods. Though nowadays we know that in Ming and Qing China, too, extensive print cultures did exist,¹² we also see that they did not affect the lives of as many people as in Europe.

Weber goes on to argue that whereas both China and the Islamic world had known academies and universities, only in Europe did these institutions produce the 'professional man', or, to be more precise, the 'professional official', the 'cornerstone of the modern state and the modern economy of the Occident'. Admittedly, though imperial China continued to exist as a state largely through a huge bureaucracy, the officials that manned it were not schooled in the subjects that, in Europe, increasingly were felt necessary for their function, such as a thorough legal training, as I myself have recently shown.¹³ Weber, analysing developments in contemporary Europe, holds that precisely this professional bureaucracy 'determines our very existence, the political, technical and science-organizational preconditions of our life, [through] state officials who also carry the most important daily functions of society'. Following his own logic, he then characterizes as typically European the phenomenon of the bureaucratic, rational, legal state. Though Weber's link between the growth of state bureaucracy and the genesis of an elected parliament may not convince everyone, admittedly these parliaments themselves are undoubtedly of European origin.

Halfway through his text, Weber writes that what really determines 'our modern lives in the most fateful way' is capitalism. Having already published, in 1889, his *Geschichte der Handelsgesellschaften im Mittelalter* – 'The History of Medieval Commercial Businesses' – he sketches the outlines of capitalism's origins not only in (medieval) international and overseas trade, but also in (early-modern) merchant-venture enterprise and the financing of colonial plantations, etc. He adds that its modern specificity really lies both in its financing the economy through the stock exchange, for which Weber relied on his own essay *Die Börse* (1896), and in its relationship to '(formally) free labour.' In doing so, Weber distances himself from such (near-)contemporary sociologists and economists as Georg Simmel and Werner Sombart who also wrote about (the origins and nature of) capitalism. Interestingly, the capitalism debate has continued unabated till the present, though most younger scholars seem either not to have read or to have forgotten what Weber contributed.

Summarizing the elements that make up his foreword, Weber returns to his initial statement, viz. that what essentially differentiates 'the Occident' from other cultures is 'rationalism'. This, he feels, is not necessarily the same as the many forms of 'internal' rationalization that, all over the world, exist within almost all spheres of human life and culture – as in, for example, the rationality of, even, the mystical experience. Rather, it is a way of living one's entire life in a praxis-related, rational way, not accepting the forces that, according to Weber, most tend to obstruct such a choice, i.e. the powers attributed to and ensconced in magic and religion, and the ethical beliefs and precepts that follow from them. Obviously, he must have realized that in 'the West', too, in the early twentieth century many people still lived according to such premises but he seems to have felt that if one wanted to understand Europe in its turn-of-the-century phase of modernity, by and large it should be characterized as, in his word: 'disenchanted'.

Inevitably, Weber's general approach entails the danger of anachronism, as well as of creating a de-historicizing and de-historicized perspective that tends towards a timeless universalism but, really, is a form of idealized Europeanism. Indeed, some authors who have recently adopted some of Weber's categories have also used them for their own political ends, arguing that they are the very proof of the fact that 'the West beats the Rest'.¹⁴

Nevertheless, while the debate about Europe's pretended or real 'European-ness' seems endless, I do feel that such generalizing syntheses as Weber's help us formulate necessary questions, as well as force us to realize that any 'European-ness' is the sum total we create from what was really a myriad of pasts set in different times and spaces. To understand it, we need to see that everyone and everything associated with even a single and singular moment in the past of the world named Europe is a 'palimpsest', or, as the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre wrote: 'je suis mon passé' – 'I am what my past makes me'. Insofar as people share the better part of their individual

palimpsest with others, they share a culture that identifies them and makes them what they are, too.

Consequently, a Greek tragedy, a Roman road, a king's statue in Visigothic Spain, a medieval Polish monastery, a Renaissance Italian poem, a baroque tomb in Sweden, a 'Romantic' English garden, a 'Modernist' Russian novel, early democratic institutions in the Netherlands, the Napoleonic laws still in use in France, a German funk song: each of these myriad manifestations of culture needs to be analysed both as to the form and function they had in their own time and place and be seen or understood as an intricate compound. To put it otherwise: from our present-day point of view each of those manifestations has its specific past, but also is characterized by what were its own set of experiences, and, also, its own acts of reiterated reception of other, earlier pasts. The past that every past accepted as its own history was as much a complex of things remembered and things forgotten as is our own past, too. In short, all pasts once were their own present. And that present, as well as its reconstruction, its representation of its pasts, was shaped by its own, contemporary expectations of what, at that time, was seen as the future. Perhaps most essential in studying the past, and indeed all pasts – embodied in persons, things, concepts – is to understand that they always express their contemporary present: 'we are'. Now we, who, in our own day and age, 'receive' these people, objects, ideas, are able to say of them: 'you have been, and therefore now are part of our past, of us, in this present'. Only we give the past its historicity. But we inevitably do so – consciously or not – from a 'presentist' need which, of course, always entails the risk that we adapt it beyond what we should scientifically accept as its inevitable alterity: as the famous dictum goes, the past is 'another country', where people did things differently.

And indeed, the differences are, often, hard to understand and, moreover, to accept, contradictory as they are. For Europe is a place 'where Goethe's garden almost borders on Buchenwald, where the house of Corneille abuts on the marketplace in which Joan of Arc was hideously done to death'.¹⁵

Setting out to ask the famous sequence of questions of who did what, when and why, obviously we will find an answer, if only because we will modify our questions till we are finally satisfied with the result. But the danger is that, having found the answer, or rather our answer, we all too easily assume it to represent the entire reality of the past we have sought to uncover, failing to see that we have only uncovered part of it. If we accept that we cannot establish the past in a 'history' that is a 'hard fact' but, rather, as the result of our own consensual interpretation of the available data, we will realize that we see through the palimpsest as through a glass darkly. Applying that 'method' to a reconstruction of what was Europe or, to be more precise: what has become Europe, we will have to be satisfied that what we see in the glass will not be crystal-clear. Rather, the image will remain vague, its contours forever shifting.

Europe: old Europe, new Europe, old borders, new borders

Of course, there is a Europe beyond the idea and the ideal of it: a world forever between old and new borders, that combine geography and culture, and shape it, too.

Few people thinking about Europe will know that, according to modern geographers, its centre is located some dozen kilometres north of the Lithuanian capital Vilnius, a city itself situated near the border of the Russian Federation. Given this fact, geographically speaking Europe is a world that extends from the westernmost part recognized as such – the Irish Atlantic coast – to the Urals. Yet many Europeans have difficulty in accepting that the Baltic countries of which Lithuania is one and which only became members of the European Union in 2004, really belong to ‘their’ continent – let alone that they consider Russia west of the Urals a ‘natural’ part of it.

Nevertheless, travelling in the Baltic region, one becomes very much aware of what Europe is. One will experience at least the urban civilization of cities like Tallinn – formerly Reval – and Riga, the capitals of, respectively, Estonia and Latvia, as sea-oriented. Its features show it to be a culture that became European in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries because these towns were founded as ports by merchants of the German Hanse, to be part of the great shipping route that connected Flanders and the other Netherlands, on the North Sea, all the way around Denmark and the cities of northern Germany, to the Baltic Sea and beyond, as far as the upper reaches of the Finnish Gulf.¹⁶

Indeed, since the Hanse was a sociocultural as well as a commercial-financial network, Hanse cities show all kinds of similarities. Thus, the churches of Tallinn and Riga have the typical, purely ornamental brick bands of the ecclesiastical architecture one also finds in Stralsund, Rostock and Lubeck, to name but a few finely-restored cities of the German Hanseatic heartland, but also in small Dutch Hanse towns like Doesburg or Deventer.

Other traces of an old, common culture have recently been discovered and uncovered in these Baltic capitals: the frescoed medieval saints who were plastered over during the iconoclast furies of the sixteenth century that happened here as elsewhere in Europe. Though the – German-speaking! – elites of these Baltic towns turned Protestant-Lutheran after the Reformation, they used Italian Baroque forms – notwithstanding their Roman Catholic, ‘popish’ connotations – for their pulpits, baptismal fonts and richly-carved pews and, indeed, for their funerary monuments as well. Besides grand churches, the burghers of these Baltic towns – traders and descendants of traders – also built grand mansions for their own use and even grander town halls and guild halls to express their collective identity, with Gothic façades of glazed bricks; in later centuries they added Baroque staircases and Classicist assembly rooms. In these towns, too, Church schools were established where Humanist knowledge ‘European-style’ – which, from the sixteenth century onwards, also meant through the printed book – was dispensed.

And yet, these Baltic cities existed within an older, different, agrarian culture: the culture of the heirs of the Crusading German knights who had first occupied these territories – for themselves and for the Church – in the thirteenth century, like the Spanish Christian knights had conquered the Muslim parts of Iberia from the tenth century onwards. The Germans, like their Spanish contemporaries, appropriated the countryside, dividing it into huge estates, and reduced to the harsh conditions of serfdom the non-urban, indigenous population – whom they converted from their own so-called ‘heathen’ religions to Christianity, as had happened to the Islamic population of central and southern Spain.

In the seventeenth century, both this imported, but by now local aristocracy and the urban bourgeoisie of these lands had to accommodate another imported elite: the Swedish rulers who came to create an empire encompassing the entire Baltic Sea. Although the Swedes became landed magnates as well, they tried to introduce some freedom for the populace, as had become the policy in Sweden itself. The Swedish kings also founded a university, at Dorpat, which soon became a centre of regional learning, imparting to its students the ideas of civilization that also were taught to the young men who went to, e.g., Bologna or Oxford.

A century later, the tsars of Russia occupied these lands. Now the local elites of Estonia, Latvia and, also, Lithuania, themselves the descendants of earlier occupants, became part of the cosmopolitan, Enlightenment culture that was first introduced from Western Europe at the imperial court at St Petersburg in the early eighteenth century and, from there, spread to the country houses of the aristocracy all over the Russian empire. Czar Peter I built his wife a Baroque summer palace in Tallinn, while some decades later the favourite of one of his successors constructed a Versailles-like chateau at Rundale, in the depths of Latvia.

Thus, in Estonia and Latvia, both an urban-bourgeois European culture and an aristocratic-feudal but equally European culture existed side by side and intermingled. During the nineteenth century, they increasingly modelled themselves not only on St Petersburg but also on Berlin and Paris, the capitals of two of Europe’s by then most powerful states.

Yet, the Baltic lands also were a border region, with a ‘different’ culture: for unlike in Western Europe, most of what was European in the towns and in the country houses of the elites never really touched the majority of the population. And whereas in Europe the lot of the masses slowly improved, certainly from the late eighteenth century onwards, the conditions of the peasantry in the Baltic region deteriorated under the autocratic-aristocratic czarist regime until, in the early twentieth century, the serfs were finally freed. Then, for the first time, they started to participate in the culture of their own region, to become its bearers, also because they became part of the larger, town-based economies that were now growing.

At the same time these regions, to stress their independence from the continued imperialist aspirations of Russia – meanwhile turned Communist –

showed a tendency towards cultural nationalism, as had so many other regions in North-western, Southern and Central Europe. Trying to find proof of their historic roots as a cultural community, they stressed the uniqueness of their language – Estonian and Latvian – and of their art and customs to create their own national identity as the basis for a newly-won statehood. But these two Baltic states became border countries again when, after the Second World War, Communist Russia actually did occupy them. The Russian forces and the thousands of colonists who came in their wake created a culture of dependence, of fear, instilling anti-European or rather anti-Western feelings in these states now turned satellites.¹⁷

The same happened in Lithuania, though it shows a partly different culture: visiting Vilnius in the early twenty-first century, one is very much struck by its almost South-European character, with its churches – baroque, Roman Catholic – dominating a hill-top town. For hundreds of years, this too was a border region, conquered and contested, mostly by Poland and Russia. Out of this struggle arose another national culture – one, moreover, which showed an element that, though largely absent in Estonia and Latvia, was very much part of the European experience as well: the Jewish aspect. For Vilnius was the ‘Jerusalem of Lithuania’ from the seventeenth century onwards: a town where almost one-third of the population was Jewish until, between 1940 and 1945, first some of the Roman Catholic inhabitants themselves – restrained all too little by the Lithuanian Church – then the soldiers of the German Wehrmacht and the SS and, finally, the Soviet occupants slaughtered tens of thousands of Jews. Yet, precisely the Jewish Lithuanians had created the better part of the country’s industrial economy and, therefore, its prosperity. They also had created a magnificent Yiddish culture: around their synagogues (one built, incidentally, in the same Baroque style and by the same architect who designed some of the city’s grandest eighteenth-century Roman Catholic churches), their schools and their charitable institutions. As elsewhere in early twentieth-century Europe, this essentially religious Jewish culture produced not only a secular variant, in the so-called ‘Yiddische Wissenschaftliche Institut’, the ‘Jewish Scientific Institute’, but also such outstanding men as Jascha Heifetz, the violinist, Itzak Lipschitz, the sculptor, and Chaim Soutine, the painter.

In short, the experience of the Baltic states – often seen as peripheral from a Western European perspective, while they themselves consider their culture pure European, and rather think of Russia as a border region – in many ways mirrored what has happened and is still happening elsewhere in Europe. Out of a continuous process of amalgamation that resulted from and, at the same time, existed alongside forms of multiculturalism, identities have grown – and are still growing – on a local, regional and even national level. At the same time, at least part of the Baltic peoples feel they share yet another identity, overarching these three, which they call European.

Indeed, identities can and often do exist alongside each other, fulfilling different needs. Thus the Estonians, having won statehood and having created

a national history as well as, in 2004, having been given membership of the European Union, look for other forms of cohesion too. Together with the Finns and the Livonian-speaking minority in Latvia who, like their compatriots, also have opted for Europe, they want also to stress their Finnish-Ugric identity, which linguistically they share with the Magyar-speaking part of Hungary. On the other hand, the many Russians still living in the Baltic states, feeling their role has diminished with the demise of Soviet power, would like to create a Russian axis along what is now the eastern border of the European Union.

It is a border that, for example in Bjelo-Rus and in Ukraine – the vast, uninterrupted ‘European plain’ that connects Western and Central Europe to Eastern Europe and, if only therefore, has been the scene of so many battles and other forms of geopolitical struggle – even by that very fact probably will remain contested during the next decades, since many of its inhabitants fear the rulers of Russia, while these fear the proximity of Europe or, to be more precise, of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO.

By the twenty-first century, all over geographical Europe, ‘nations’ – mostly imagined communities created, like the Baltic ones, out of older, regional cultures – have to come to terms with institutional Europe: the Europe of the European Union, constantly forged and reaffirmed in its ‘capital’, Brussels, by a seemingly endless stream of rules and laws. But they also face another Europe, which terms itself the actual foundation for that very Union: a cultural Europe that, according to many, makes the political, social and economic Europe both logical and viable.

Yet, over the centuries, but especially since the nineteenth century, many people, including historians, have questioned this cultural Europe: they have questioned its component parts, its divisions, its boundaries, even its very existence, arguing that it always has been and even now is no more than a convenient prop for politicians who dream of unity for the sake of increased power or to maintain their own state’s independence. Others feel that it is a romantic but unrealistic notion, cherished mainly by artists, men of letters and, yes, some idealistic politicians as well, who dream of unity because they cannot deal with diversity. Admittedly, I do not share the criticism implicit in these two views, though the arguments of their proponents, like the scholarly ones put forward by Max Weber, are useful tools for further analysis as well.

About the authorial condition

Over the past nearly 20 years, people have responded variously to the first (1998) and the revised, second (2006) and third (2015) editions of this book. A number of reviews, both formal and informal, have sharpened my own views of what I term the ‘authorial condition’, and the ways it impinges on a scholar’s choices.

Of course, writing history always implies cultural-political, perhaps even moral dilemmas. For historians of necessity involve their own culture, as well

as their own self, in their writing: if they do not create a contemporary picture of the past, few will want to read them. Yet, when the images they conjure up are too period-bound, they will quickly fade. That said, my search for Europe unavoidably is a wilful journey along a number of paths, some of which not yet taken by other authors, others obviously well-trodden. I hope this book will provide a time- and place-bound journey through selected fields of culture in Europe, guiding readers past various points of recognition and yet stimulating their thought. Therefore, as I already wrote, I have chosen not to describe all features of the European cultural landscape. Nor do I intend to try definitively to define what cannot be defined, namely, what Europe 'really' is, for, again as indicated above, Europe will continue to change, to re-invent itself and, moreover, will mean many different things to many different people.

Also, regardless of the extent to which one's perspective is determined by the views of earlier travellers, what we see is always new, and never all-comprehensive. Just as a landscape and our perspective of it change during a journey, similarly, when we think about Europe, its contours shift and its characteristics rearrange themselves. For Europe was, is and indeed always shall be a series of world-views, of peoples' perspectives on their reality, sometimes only dreamt or desired, sometimes experienced and realized as well.

This already was clear to me when I finished the first draft of this book, before I even submitted it to a publisher. Given that, at that time, I was still in the process of writing a text that could be used by the European Council of Universities, I was asked to submit the manuscript to a number of critics, from all over Europe. I was unpleasantly surprised when some of them proved nothing less than vituperative in their judgement, revealing a bias that, I felt, was both extreme and definitely uncalled for in the scholarly debate that a review is always part of.

After I had found my publisher, of course I realized that a text is not published before it has been scrutinized by a few readers who remain anonymous for the very reason that they are asked to comment on it in view of its scholarly acceptability and commercial viability. Other critics followed, both in the scholarly press and on the Internet. Perhaps precisely because of the genuine emotions voiced by them, I became increasingly aware that Europe continues to change in time, its idea differing from individual to individual, from group to group. Now having returned to my task for the fourth time, i.e. to write its third revised edition, I have fair view of the, often to me contradictory criticism it has elicited.

A basic problem was, of course, how to give body to the concept, the definition of culture outlined above. Many authors who have written on culture in Europe – or, indeed, about 'the' culture of Europe – only vaguely indicate the actual design of their program and the extent of their research.

In my turn, I had to decide whether I should study the 'concept of Europe', only, as argued in texts that claim for Europe a cultural, even

spiritual unity – texts, therefore, that voice ideas and ideals which frequently betray an unspoken yet only barely concealed moral basis and bias. Or should I approach the problem of culture in and of Europe by searching for and then analysing behavioural patterns and institutions, ways of looking at man and society, at the things man makes – all of them ‘manifestations of meaning’ that, collectively, constitute a given culture as much as or, perhaps, even more than the concepts created by intellectual and/or political elites? Of course, these manifestations can help answer the question of what elements, and when, did (begin to) create an identity for Europe that differed from other parts of the world.

These alternative approaches touch upon the much-discussed problem of the difference between cultural history conceived as, on the one hand, a tale of ideas and ideologies and, on the other hand, as a far wider-ranging survey of the great variety of cultural forms as expressed in man’s handling of nature, of himself and of the society he lives in and of those of his representations thereof that both give and constitute meaning. Obviously, both approaches are respectable ones. Yet the many, often opposing views of what has characterized and, partly, continues to characterize Europe are so charged with norms, values and political aspirations that I felt it to be prudent to try to combine them. After all, if I were to study articulate ideas about Europe without considering them in the context of the time, the political-economic circumstances and the social framework in which they were voiced, not interpreting the very diverse cultural forms in which they became manifest, I would run the real risk of perceiving such ideas as timeless and universal and to attach too much value to them. If the past has anything to teach us, it is that ideas claiming absolute validity are always dangerous.

Some critics have argued that an undertaking of this magnitude – describing the infinitely complex history of culture in Europe – was doomed to fail if I did not harness my data in an economic or sociological ‘grand design’ such as, for example, the ones chosen by the French historian Fernand Braudel (1902–85)¹⁸ or the German sociologist Norbert Elias (1897–1990),¹⁹ or judge them against some all-embracing and explaining concept or even ‘theory’ of culture as did, amongst others, the German historian-philosopher Oswald Spengler (1880–1936), in his famous *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, ‘The Fall of the Occident’ (vol. 1 1918, rev. 1922; vol. 2 1923) and the English historian Arnold Toynbee (1889–1975), with his massive, twelve-volume *A Study of History*, published between 1934 and 1961. I cannot but say that though I have found many of the ideas put forward by these and other (cultural) historians immensely inspiring, I have nevertheless found none that has satisfactorily allowed me to use any of them as an overall, structural concept, let alone a ‘theory’.²⁰

In the end, to solve a number of problems, I decided that this book could not be ‘The Cultural History of Europe’, nor, even, ‘A Cultural History of Europe’ but should be titled ‘Europe: A Cultural History’.

On a more detailed level, some critics vehemently accused me of being too irreverent regarding the Biblical sources of the Christian tradition. Yet, I persist in feeling that no sources should ever be beyond critical analysis.

Quite contrarily, others wrote that I should not give such prominence to the influence of Christianity as my book yet does. I happen to think that in every culture, the role of religion(s), and of institutionalized Churches cannot be overestimated.²¹ Some also told me that a cultural history of Europe should chastise the various Churches for the iniquities perpetrated by them or in their name, to show that Europe's, or, rather, Christianity's record is far from unblemished, indeed, that there is a definite black side to European-Christian culture – which, of course, there is, and which I do expressly acknowledge, without, however, devoting large parts of my text to the various inquisitions, to witch-hunts and, in another context, to the genocide perpetrated by so-called Christian Europeans against their Jewish co-Europeans.

Of course, there were reviewers who felt that I should have used the gender perspective to analyse how a patriarchal society like the European till the late twentieth century not only suppressed the female part of its population but also succeeded in silencing its voice in the story that is history or, as some would rather have it, her-story. While I have striven to remain 'gender-neutral', I also must tell my readers that in many respects research does not (yet) reflect this perspective; indeed, through lack of archival or other documentary sources perhaps it never will.

In a comparable vein, some readers took me to task for not writing about 'the masses', the 'common people', who, according to them, suffered most in the 'making' of Europe. However, I feel there is little sense in expatiating on the human costs of the cultural process, both in Europe and elsewhere. Admittedly, it is important to know, for example, how many people worked on the construction of the colonnades in St Peter's Square in Rome, or, for that matter, the building of Versailles, and, also, how many died in those laborious processes, not yet regulated by labour legislation we now feel to be essentially humane. However, to give such an indication for each and every one of Europe's major buildings or, in another context, to try to work out how many people died, directly or indirectly, at the hands of each of Europe's great, albeit to many controversial enterprises – for example, Spain's colonial expansion, or the Napoleonic campaigns – is fraught with problems of methodology and statistics, again partly through lack of or biases in the source material. Even so, there also were those who wondered why this cultural history yet contains so many details about the economic as well as the political background. But while I think 'doing' cultural history always also is searching for contexts and, consequently, should pay attention to those human actions and consequences we term economic and social, I do not think it should be burdened by graphs and tables which only give the reader an often false sense of facticity.

Not surprisingly, some people argued that my text, which often describes the roles of individual historical actors, did prove what they had always thought and said, namely that cultural history is nothing but a meaningless and, even, misleading paean to so-called great men and great ideas. Others however noted the dozens, nay hundreds of ‘culture makers’ who I failed to mention, arguing that Europe’s art, literature and music constitute its most precious heritage and, indeed, its very identity. I was a bit saddened to note that the numerous past culture makers I was accused of having excluded from my pantheon often were the compatriots of these reviewers; they were not convinced by my argument that any attempt at strengthening the old canon of ‘great men (and women)’ – or, for that matter, creating a new one – would invite only a host of hostile reactions.²² Yet, I really do feel that culture is made by people; that, consequently, a cultural history should name at least some of the men and women who have contributed to its making. However, I also feel that a book like this should not read like the index of a history of art, literature and music, or, for that matter, of science. Moreover, rather than only describing men and women with whom almost everyone is familiar from the age of primary school onwards, I thought it might be revealing also to mention those who, though lesser known, are equally representative of their place and time, if only to indicate that the spectrum of people involved is broad indeed.

Finally, and rather strangely in view of my text, a few readers were convinced I was in the pay of the European Union, writing an apologia for the ideologies of its power brokers. Others, however, accused me of being a Euro-pessimist, presenting altogether too bleak a view of the reality of the values that, especially during the past 70 years, have been presented as uniquely European, and of the blessings of the process of integration and unification that is, at least according to the ardent Euro-optimists, logically based upon them.

In short, though I actually deal with all these issues and topics – but, apparently, not enough to satisfy the tastes of some critics – I definitely do not think that writing history is about apportioning praise or blame to those who have lived before us, who thought and acted under different circumstances and from different moral precepts. For indeed, human morality, too, is culturally determined and, therefore, always changing. Rather, writing history is about trying to understand people in their own time and place. Moreover, we can actually do so, for contrary to the views of the more extremist post-Modernist theorists, the texts that serious historians produce are not fictions, nor ‘just interpretations’: they are solidly and scholarly based on data that have been tested for their reliability.²³

To conclude, if writing this book – and reading the reviews it has elicited over the past two decades – has taught me anything, it is that in talking and writing about Europe the biggest problem actually is the reality of passions aroused by Europe’s past in the present, whether these be religious,

nationalist, political or moral. Precisely therefore, it is necessary to again consider the historical profession, and its claims.

However, in his famous 1917 talk about ‘scholarship as a profession (and a vocation)’, Max Weber argued that scholars, including, and I should perhaps stress, especially scholars who somehow deal with the human past, should always be aware of being themselves part of a specific present, in terms of time, location, community and indeed culture. All of these condition the questions they ask. Moreover, their answers will become part of that present, their present: their time, location, community and culture.²⁴ In that sense, we should agree with the Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce (1866–1952), who said: ‘Tutta vera storia è storia contemporanea’,²⁵ ‘all true history is contemporary history’, which, contrary to some translations, should be understood as meaning that man, who creates history, is himself a creature of history. Writing about the past, he is always doing so in the present, wherein everything that can be written about already is past, since even things that happened an instant ago are past, and cannot but be interpreted as such.

Weber’s plea for what we might term self-reflexivity and, indeed, social and political awareness as the first responsibility of any scholar, obviously antedates the precepts given by Max Horkheimer (1895–1973) to his fellow-thinkers of the so-called ‘Frankfurter Schule’ in the 1930s and 1940s,²⁶ and, indeed, the ideas of many ‘postmodern’ historians, such as, for example, Alun Munslow and Keith Jenkins,²⁷ who in the 1990s seem to have wilfully forgotten what the German master had written, and blithely re-invented the wheel.

To conclude, I am happy to say that over the past two decades there have been many encouraging and even laudatory reactions and reviews. Even the fact that some critics have suggested that my interpretation of Europe as a culture was a bit idiosyncratic I take as a compliment. Following Weber’s exhortation, I do not disguise the many realities – both challenges and restrictions – of my own ‘condition’, as he would have called it. I, the person who has authored this book, am a man, born in Western Europe at the beginning of the seemingly-secure second half of the twentieth century, but writing in the crisis-filled second decade of the twenty-first century. A scholar, moreover, politically inclined towards socio-democracy, and with a decided interest in the continuing complex role(s) of religion(s) in culture and in the interaction between Europe and other world cultures. Nor should I myself forget – or forget to mention to my readers – that I am writing as a citizen of a nation, the Dutch one, the larger part of which for several decades professed itself to be ‘pro-European’, though, in recent years, many of my compatriots have started to feel doubts about that erstwhile stance. All these characteristics determine who I am, as a person, as a scholar, as a historian who looks at the world he is part of and yet sets out to, as much as possible, describe and analyse as an outsider. Let me once more quote Freud. He once wrote a text that his editors have given the title ‘General Theory of

Psychology’ – quite misleadingly, for Freud did not adopt the, for the Humanities false notion of ‘theory’ at all. Rather, he argued:

The view is often defended that sciences should be built up on clear and sharply defined basal concepts. In actual fact no science, not even the most exact, begins with such definitions. The true beginning of scientific activity consists rather in describing phenomena and then in proceeding to group, classify and correlate them.²⁸

My text, too, departs not from definitions, or, even worse, ‘theories’, but from my own and other people’s questions. Yet, in the end, as all proper historians do, I have striven to present an interpretation of culture in Europe that represents the consensus of at least part of the scholarly community about the value of what has been searched for, found, analysed and interpreted. I maintain that producing the umpteenth bland collection of ‘facts about Europe’, suggesting they constitute its reality, not only would be impossible in scholarly-philosophical terms, but also would amount to presenting a text of no real significance, for it would not make the reader think about his own interpretations. If the present book may lay claim to any value and validity, it is by bringing together meaningful data for what I hope will be a thought-provoking analysis of the spaces, communities and cultures people in Europe have created for themselves – a book that I, as already stated, I consciously present not as ‘Europe: Its Cultural History’, but, rather, as ‘Europe: A Cultural History’.

About choices: the scope and structure of this book

The above paragraphs show that writing history means making choices against a background of complex factors, including the questions a writer poses himself, his assumptions about his reader’s interests and his selection of the disorganized details from different and often discordant sources about the past, the many pasts, which he can use. Ultimately, all these factors contribute to the final text. But in the last instance, of course, the author’s interpretation is the result of an effort to ask meaningful questions – which, as I already indicated, means present-minded questions – while trying to avoid meaningless, that is to say present-minded answers.

In view of all this, I found writing this book not an easy task. Not only did I need to determine the chronological scope of what is, essentially, an analysis as well as an interpretive tale, a story; more importantly, I had to decide where, both geographically and culturally, the Europe of this book begins and ends. Having given some general considerations on these vital points in the previous pages, an effort at a more precise definition is called for.

Must everything be described which has happened from the North Cape to Gibraltar, from the west coast of Ireland to the Urals – the, as I wrote,

accepted geographical circumscription of Europe as a ‘continent’? Or should only those developments be emphasized that can help us understand Europe’s culture as it is seen today?

Rather than engage in a futile attempt at writing an all-inclusive, encyclopaedic and, consequently, unreadable book – and also aware of the great risk of taking too teleological a view – I have decided to follow the latter approach. However, in doing so I limited both my geographical scope and the elements of culture discussed, full well knowing that to some these restrictions will be disappointing, not to say painful.

As a result of many geo-economic, geo-political and cultural-religious developments, some of which can be traced far back into past millennia while others are of more recent origin, in Europe many internal divisions have arisen that create a multiplicity and diversity of culture(s). To many, the most obvious is the ‘dividing line’ separating the Western parts of Europe from what, geographically, is called Eastern Europe. This ‘line’, actually a very wide transitional zone often referred to as Central or even Central-Eastern Europe, stretches from the Baltic to the Balkans and roughly coincides with the Baltic states, Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, and the small states of the Balkans proper, that have gained independence after the dismemberment of former Yugoslavia – states that, precisely in 2018, have started seeking membership of the European Union. In a way, Greece, too, belongs to this transitional zone, as does, to make matters complex, the entire island of Cyprus, though the Union does not recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus that calls half of the island its territory.

This book mainly, though not exclusively, records events and discloses patterns that I have noticed in the Western zone. I dwell somewhat less upon the Central-European countries and their cultures. Although there are sound scholarly reasons, besides considerations of a politically correct nature, to induce an author to fully include the cultures of the latter region, I have chosen not to do so. First of all, I lack the language skills necessary to delve into the relevant primary literature. More important, however, I believe that this non-inclusion can be defended on the basis of past developments themselves. With many ‘accidents’, during the past centuries links have been forged between a number of regional cultures in Western and Central Europe which, consequently, have shown a comparable historical development, resulting in a more widely experienced, common culture that, however diverse in many of its elements, has yet grown towards an overall unity.²⁹ However, in view of the above, this book gives but scant attention to the Balkans, and even less to Bjelo-Rus and Ukraine – though many people, there, proclaim themselves European – or to the Russian Federation, whose citizens have decidedly mixed feelings about the ‘European-ness’ of their culture.

Of course, I am very much aware of the limitations this choice creates for the interpretation of ‘European-ness’ in this book. Indeed, I have to admit

that it is entirely possible to write a book called 'Europe: A Cultural History', that starts from the many pasts experienced by the peoples east of the dividing line referred to above. Such a book, as the complement of the present one, definitely would help readers to better understand the discordant feelings about the pretence of an overall 'European-ness' that, nowadays, seem as much to divide as to unify the countries that, somehow, accept the cohesion promised to them by that manifestation of Europe that is called the European Union.

One factor often named as determining the relative unity of the area that I do study is the way of life and of thinking which was paired with and is still coloured by the development of Western Christianity after the break-up of the Carolingian Empire in the tenth century and the schism between the Churches of Rome and Byzantium-Constantinople in the eleventh century. However, another, far more important element is the fact that a number of countries in Western and Central Europe, while being ruled by 'absolute' monarchs up until the end of the eighteenth century, have yet developed towards consensual and finally even constitutional government over the past two centuries partly because, even earlier, a tradition of civic societies had evolved there. Moreover, these parts of Europe also experienced a slow transition from a mainly agrarian to an industrial economy and culture. Thus, Western and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Central Europe have long been characterized by increasing economic and political freedom for the individual and, from the late nineteenth century onwards, by some sort of collective care for that individual as well – a mixture of capitalist consumerism, political liberalism and social democracy. If judged by those criteria, the Europe that now projects itself with such a pretence of historical inevitability is a creation of the past three or four centuries, only.³⁰ Indeed, some people hold that it only came into being as late as the nineteenth century,³¹ or, as I argued above, as recently as the second half of the twentieth century.

Due to a number of historical accidents as well as to the absence of certain preconditions, in Eastern Europe that combination of traditions and structures has only been developing during the past decades. Obviously, even as I write and, certainly, in the near future, economic and political changes may or, perhaps, necessarily will result in a growing integration not only of already superficially comparable lifestyles but also of the views of the people and societies of, respectively, Western(-Central) and Eastern Europe. In this process, that really is driven by profound changes in the world's economy and in the resulting global communication networks, people in 'the West' – in this case meaning both Europe and the Americas – will be forced also to reconsider their notions of what they want Europe to be.

However, my conscious choice to apply the above cultural-geographical, and, also, political restrictions did not solve the problem of other choices. Looking into the past, I had to establish which traditions 'my' Europe is characterized by. Again as indicated above, I do realize that each one of them was not specifically, let alone uniquely 'European', but, taken together, they

have come to constitute a coherent culture, a heritage that now is worth exploring from a historical point of view, if only to determine what roles it plays in the present.

This first involved choosing the amount of detail given about ancient cultures that, while geographically speaking manifestly not part of, or restricted to the geographical Europe, yet are traditionally included in most histories of Europe – those presented in history books as well as in museums and in films. Specifically, the migration of peoples from Africa into the European parts of Eurasia and the so-called ‘Neolithic’ revolution, which introduced agriculture and the forging of iron to the world, were part of far larger movements, on a sub-global scale, though that revolution became a phase in the subsequent development of the European environment to an extent that, since then, only the Industrial Revolution has, with its aftermath till the present.

Precisely because Europe, more than any other of the world’s cultures, except China, has been searching for a historical continuity that legitimizes its uniqueness, most histories of Europe nowadays begin with an extensive analysis of ancient Egypt and the ancient Near East from c.5000 BC, suggesting that civilization was born in the eastern Mediterranean. As this is indeed the region where, first, Graeco-Roman culture and, later, Christianity originated, becoming the two probably most important ideological cornerstones of the concept of ‘European culture’, I will discuss developments in those regions, albeit only sketchily, in Part I, Chapters 1, 2 and 3. However, limiting the story to these ‘roots’ of Europe would do no justice to what was occurring, at the same time, in geographical Europe proper and, more specifically, in its Western and Central parts. Therefore, I sketch the culture of the Celts and, later, the Germanic peoples, too.

In trying to isolate the relevant traditions or sources of inspiration provided to later generations by these pre- and proto-European cultures, we have to first, albeit cautiously, concentrate on the nascent democracy of ancient Greece, specifically Athens – cautiously because it was a democracy that left out the majority of the town’s population. We should then go on to the legal structures devised in ancient Rome, which protected both individual life and property, and to the moral values of Christianity that tried to teach that protecting only oneself would not result in a humane society. The merging of the so-called Classical Tradition with the beliefs of Christianity, and the characteristics of the society that brought about this fusion – and was formed by it – are described in Part II, Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Yet, we need to realize that both the traditions of the Graeco-Roman world and of Christianity were the product of Near Eastern, ‘Asiatic’ civilizations. Also, this fusion resulted in a frequently difficult partnership of resolute rationalism on the one hand and beliefs based on revelation on the other hand. For the past 2,000 years, this has stimulated a creative tension that has become one of the dynamics of European culture, influencing the thoughts and actions both of those Europeans who remained religious and of those who, precisely because of

that tension, sought new ways. In later parts of the book, I try to show how, as a result of this process, many ideas were absorbed as normative values in the self-image of Europe as propagated by its elites.

After these two parts, an Interlude looks at Europe from another point of view, namely as a world that, for many centuries, consisted largely of local, self-contained rural cultures and of more open, urban societies. Through their more dynamic nature, the latter were, many historians have argued, the motors that brought about the change that altered Europe from the fifteenth century onwards.

To substantiate my thesis that Europe slowly underwent its most important transformation since that period, Parts III and IV take up two-thirds of the book, covering Europe's history since then. As indicated above, Max Weber argued that during these centuries Europe acquired some of its prevailing characteristics: it became a world of comparatively small, fiercely competitive 'nation-states' but, also, a world increasingly characterized by elements of an overarching capitalism, rationalism and scepticism. While nationalism embedded the peoples of Europe in an often 'invented' tradition that gave them a sense of political-cultural security, capitalism was one of the factors in often bloody inter-state strife. Meanwhile, and partly through that process, Europe became, in a sense, 'disenchanted'. This development, Weber felt, during the eighteenth but, even more, the nineteenth century was exemplified in the bipolarity of the Enlightenment, with its glorification of the 'logos', and Romanticism, with its continued search for the inspiration of the 'mythos'. The tension seems to characterize culture in Europe to the present day.

Also in Parts III and IV, I have chosen to highlight the growing importance of Europe's roles in the world's other regions: to me, this development, that can be witnessed from the fifteenth century onwards, seems as important as the discussion of Europe's pre-European roots in Part I. It also is necessary to consider it because those roles became inextricably bound up with Europe's growing economic and political power, as well as its own vision of its global cultural status and significance. Moreover, though nowadays Europe no longer is what it once claimed to be, the 'Mistress of the World', because its erstwhile power has considerably diminished with the end of its colonial and imperial presence in the twentieth century, even now that part of Europe's past impinges on the present. The background of this situation is complex.

If people want to describe themselves as 'Europeans', they can only do so by referring to their supposed or alleged contrasts: their 'opposites'. Yet, in doing so, they will all too easily forget their 'un-known side', i.e. the characteristics of fears and desires that also define them. Man, and therefore also 'European man' as he sees himself, has made and known himself through a confrontation with the 'other', and will, perhaps, continue to do so for a long time, yet.

1 *Prologue*

Therefore, it is crucially important not to forget that from the earliest times onwards, but especially between the fifteenth and the twentieth centuries, the in many ways diverse peoples of Europe, as well as, more visibly and to Europe more profitably, peoples in other worlds together have played an important, not to say an essential though also contested part in shaping Europe's culture. Conversely, Europeans themselves have always had an articulated perspective on other worlds, the more so as they came to dominate large parts of them – culminating, of course, in the inclusion of, first, Central and South America and, later, North America in its own culture, which resulted in the concept of the 'Western World'. Moreover, though in the parts of Asia and Africa that came into its orbit European political dominance effectively lasted only two centuries, covering the short period of c.1750 to c.1950, its consequences for the cultures of the present world, and for the ongoing process of globalization, yet have been enormous. Indeed, if Europe is to be called 'unique', as it is by some, one of the arguments surely should be that at least up till now no other single culture has ever influenced the globe as long and as completely, for better or for worse.

To put it otherwise: during the past five centuries, Europe really came to acquire the characteristics it now prides itself on. In this period, the economic importance of Europe's Eurasian, Atlantic and African colonies and, even, empires, and the complex interaction of these overseas possessions with the building of consumer-oriented, literate, democratic societies in Europe itself, really constituted a process that some have termed the 'Miracle of the West'. In short, if I do not at least indicate the roles various non-European worlds and their peoples and cultures played in this process, my story of the European world would be both partial and incomprehensible. Moreover, to avoid misrepresenting world history and the history of Europe in it, justice must be done to the global aspects of Europe's past also because, especially since the late twentieth century, the impact of non-European cultures on Europe through mass immigration has surprised and shocked large segments of society in all of Europe's countries. If anything, in the twenty-first century precisely this development will determine what kind of Europe its inhabitants, old as well as new, will create.

Linked to the above considerations, in Part III, I also stress the various ways in which, since the sixteenth century, forms of tolerance have been slowly developing, both through interregional and interconfessional contacts within the narrow confines of (Christian) Europe, and through intercultural relations between Europe and the various other worlds and their religious cultures. At the same time, I stress the intolerance that often characterized the daily practice of the majority as against what was preached by only a minority.

Again in Part III, I have chosen to describe the impact of the invention of printing, because it constitutes Europe's first communications revolution since the introduction of scripture through the cultures of the ancient Near East:

an essential stimulus not only to a wider distribution of knowledge and the diffusion of a spirit of criticism and debate but, perhaps more important, a road to better education and consequently to more wide-spread opportunities for cultural diversity and personal development, although this only turned into a mass phenomenon since the nineteenth century.

By then, Europe really had become the first ‘knowledge society’ of the world. Information density increased markedly from the mid-nineteenth century onwards: not so much as a result of any political will but, basically, in consequence of technological and related commercial developments.

In this process, still ongoing, inevitably people increasingly search for distinction – when ‘others’ become too near, they retire to their ‘self’ and to its trusted social and cultural parameters, that are often local and regional rather than national, European or global. Consequently, tolerance, multiculturalism even, and the perceived need to retain one’s own identity are certainly not easily reconciled, but in its development education plays a role of major importance.

Meanwhile, again between the fifteenth and the nineteenth centuries, forms of representative government emerged, in intricate interaction with economic changes that turned Europe from a mainly agrarian world – in which, through a complex set of social and legal rules, equality of chances was largely absent – into an industrial society with opportunities that were, at least in principle, open to all. The process in which people articulated ideas of social equality and social justice eventually resulted in the concept of human rights, a concept not unequivocal or historically universal, but, as developed in Europe, certainly inspiring.

Of course, we should be aware that especially tolerance and human rights represent ideas and ideals that neither were, nor yet are fully realized in practice. On the contrary, Europeans often have been untrue to their vision of themselves and of the heritage they claim. One of the historian’s tasks, I think, is to evaluate – though, again, not to judge – past practices precisely to allow people to determine what they feel to be important enough to preserve as an inheritance for the future. Throughout the book, I will show how Europeans, often though not exclusively intellectuals and scholars, did so shape their lives, creating culture in increasingly complex manifestations.

Obviously, the cohesion of elites, as of all other groups, is determined by a variety of socioeconomic and cultural factors; they share a way of thinking which determines their spoken and – much more powerful – written words as well as, at least partly, their deeds. As long as elites dominate communication and, thus, information processes, they have a strong influence on the cultural expressions of society at large, certainly on those expressions that one encounters on the surface: political and social ideas, the public manifestations of power, customs and manners, and so on.

All this does not mean to say this book deals with ‘elite culture’ only and omits any reference to ‘popular culture’. These concepts, often referred to as the ‘great’ and ‘small’ traditions, are too simple and, hence, distorting to be

tenable. Rather, I prefer to stress that precisely the question of what people thought and, more important, how and in which circumstances they acted, gives direction to every study of cultural history.

Having made all the above choices, including the one not to search for an all-encompassing framework to present the data that my research brought me, I still felt that I needed to avoid a simple chronology – though, of course, there is no denying the influence of time evolving, of new generations choosing from the inheritance of their forebears, adding to it, altering it. Yet, having said that, we have to realize that histories of culture never follow the strict chronology used by the more traditional political histories. Specifically as to Europe, for various reasons categories like ‘the Middle Ages’, the ‘Early Modern Period’ and ‘Contemporary History’, long in use, are more or less inadequate, if not actually misleading. The patterns shown by different domains of culture and, also, in different sectors of society sometimes remain static for centuries, and sometimes change in quick succession within a relatively short time-span. Therefore, if I had searched for useful beginnings and endings, and for synchronicity, I would have distorted the past only to suit the format of a textbook, which this history definitely is not. However, to yet give some structure to a story that stretches over thousands of years, it charts Europe’s cultural past along the lines of what I have termed four grand phases of continuity and change. These phases can be summed up as follows.

The *effort at survival*, characterizing the past of all mankind from the beginning, produced a great change in culture in Europe, with the slow transition, from the fifth millennium BC onwards, to an agricultural-pastoralist society, and a rather more secure livelihood.

The acceptance of *one dominant religion*, which in Europe really started when Christianity became widely imposed from the fourth century AD onwards, had enormous consequences for life and thought.

Then, though with some rhetorical exaggeration, one might argue that from the fifteenth century onwards the development of *a broader view of the world* brought Europeans slowly out of the confines of the village into the orbit, first, of the state, then into the economic and political system that was (Western) Europe, and finally even into other worlds.

Last but not least, the genesis of *mass consumption and communication* in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries gave culture in Europe its present characteristics. Yet, more than anything that came before, it also robbed the local and regional parts of Europe of many of their traditional cultural forms.

Obviously, this is not to say that the phases outlined above were peculiar only to European history, for at least the first and second definitely occurred in other parts of the world as well. But I maintain that, taken together and seen in their interaction-over-time, these four developments do represent both the result of and a framework for choices that people in Europe have made, and thus have contributed to the singularity of their world, to its peculiar cultural identity as it stands today.

Nevertheless, if we accept, as I do, that during part of its past, culture in Europe has had features that were distinct from those characterizing other world civilizations, it is now definitely part of a global dynamic in which, in complex interaction, almost all cultures start resembling each other more than ever before the 'great divergence' that gave Europe a temporary uniqueness.

About the use(s) of this book

In view of all the above arguments of definition, construction and limitation, any history of culture in Europe is a selection. It is, as mine is, influenced not only by an author's field(s) of interest, the scope of his reading and the choices he makes – which I have dealt with in the preceding pages – but also by the format of the book, the outcome of a confrontation between the author, his publisher's policy and his presumed audience.

Of course, I hope that the interested lay reader will find this book a stimulating point of entry into the history of culture in Europe. At the same time, I intend it to be an introduction for students in the early years of their academic progress, though many will never be professional historians. Some caveats are therefore appropriate.

Presenting this book as a cultural history in the broad sense, I consider economic, social and political structures and processes as well. Yet as any cultural history is, inevitably, an attempt at a synthesis, trying to recreate and analyse the lifestyle of a number of more or less cohesive groups in a specific region, I do not give a lengthy, in-depth treatment of all these aspects of Europe's past. Readers who want to be thoroughly informed of these will have to turn either to more specialized works in these fields or to works which claim to cover European history in all its aspects.

Moreover, the nature of a cultural history of Europe that tries to explain present structures and manifestations through an analysis of past developments, almost automatically leads to a selection and discussion of precisely those aspects and episodes that clarify the process of continuity and change that transformed the past into the present. Writing history that way is, therefore, the (teleological) chronicling of the behaviour and achievements of the 'victors', whether they were individuals or groups, whose actions or concepts contributed to today's cultural fabric. Some historians argue that the 'losers', those who have been side-tracked by history, are just as important. They feel we can learn just as much from the possibilities that once existed but which were never realized, the 'paths not taken' as a result of circumstance, coincidence, the exercise of power, choice. The questions implicit in this view are intriguing but unanswerable. Some would feel that, in fact, none of the energy that once existed really has been lost; that all thoughts and trends, even if, at particular moments, they have been

condemned or cast off as too unorthodox, as heretical, even, or as, simply, irrelevant, yet have only temporarily sunk into oblivion: they may well play a role in the fruitful interaction between ‘past’ and ‘present’ which always creates a ‘future’. For as William Shakespeare wrote in *The Tempest*: ‘Whatever is Past, is Prologue’.

In short, I envisage a book that will be of use both to a large audience and to students. In consequence, I felt that, if anything, my history should not be so voluminous as to be daunting instead of inviting. Therefore, I have tried to write a relatively short book. To increase its readability, a large number of quotations have been used, hoping that the reader, for whom, as I quoted above, the past is, by definition, a foreign country where people do things differently, will yet feel that he can travel there. For the same reason, longish extracts from original sources have been used to provide opportunities for discussion, reflection and further investigation. The annotation of the text is meant to serve both as a bibliography and as an incentive to further reading. Therefore, a separate bibliography has not been included.

About the 2020 edition of this book

Just as in the early 1990s, when I had wondered whether I should not renounce my project altogether, and again in 2004 and 2013, when asked to write a first and a second revised edition, in 2018 I asked myself if I would not be wiser to decline the publisher’s request for a third revision. However, in re-reading my own positions, I felt that I actually did want to reconsider some issues, as there was some truth in many – though certainly not all – of the critical remarks made over the past decades. Consequently, in 2018 the challenge and, indeed, the pleasure involved in presenting yet another, and by now completely revised text have prevailed again.

As always, a revision forces an author to rethink both the structure of his book as well as reconsider even the smallest details of his text. Therefore, I have reorganized almost all chapters, and have deleted many a redundant paragraph. Of course, I also have tried to meticulously redress mistakes both great and small, both of content and of style.

Preparing this edition, I realized how much I owe to two persons: Thomas Rietbergen and Theodore Drijvers. Over the past 20 years, they have accepted that I took direction of our summer holidays. By car, train or plane, on foot or by bicycle we travelled all over Europe, to regions and places I would never have visited by myself. Thus I came, purposefully or by chance, to locations where, in many ways, the incredible variety of culture in Europe burst upon me. For indeed, a space, a location is where man, singlehandedly or as part of a group, creates culture – his culture. Thus, all culture is, essentially, also the story of a location. Many a location becomes a ‘site’, viz. a place with meaning, as the stories connected with it, relating experiences

both individual and collective, are turned into facts that are the stones of memories. And memories, somehow, are turned into ‘historiai’ – i.e. stories describing the knowledge we think we have of our past – and, eventually, into a history that, certainly in the case of Europe, always will be a ‘grand narrative’ and yet, as I argued above, also a complex ‘palimpsest’. Therefore, without wanting to de-construct that history, for me it was, in a book like this, helpful to return to specific sites, to seek out what memories, what stories and histories have been associated with them, to better understand that, however general history is, it is, at the same time, local. As I visited sites all over Europe, each and every one of them forced me to consider not only how much the people living there now owe to their past but, also, to what extent, generation after generation, sometimes century after century, these people have changed and, consequently, have reshaped their world and their tales of its past. To somehow evoke that reality, throughout the book I have added a series of essays, or dossiers, describing and analysing cultural phenomena that, I feel, while linked to a special location, in a more general way yet bring to life ideas and actions that have contributed to the Europe we now know. Sometimes, the phenomena presented by Max Weber as ‘specifically European’ have helped me to decide which topics I needed to discuss. Thus, each chapter now is illustrated with an item from this ‘Europe Dossier’.

Finally, and inevitably in view of the time that has passed since I last revisited and revised the book, I have reconsidered the Epilogue, for I have had to ask myself whether the Europe I saw unfolding more than eight years ago still is the Europe that now seems to be evolving.

Acknowledgements

The way I learnt to experience Europe during my continuous journey has been made decidedly less one-sided by the candid criticism of a few friends who want to remain unnamed, and from remarks made and suggestions offered by those reviewers of the previous editions who did not obviously have an agenda all of their own.

Yet the book owes just as much to the questions raised by the seven generations of my Nijmegen students during my lectures and seminars in Mediterranean and Eurasian History, in Intellectual History and in the History of Cultures and Mentalities. With this book I hope to repay the debt of gratitude every teacher owes to his pupils.

‘Cruise Missiles’ Words & Music by John Watts © Copyright 1991 BMG Rights Management GmbH. BMG Rights Management (UK) Limited, a BMG Company. All Rights Reserved. International Copyright Secured. Used by permission of Hal Leonard Europe Limited. ‘Berlin’ Words & Music by John Watts © Copyright 1981 BMG Rights Management GmbH. BMG Rights Management (UK) Limited, a BMG Company. All Rights Reserved. International Copyright Secured. Used by permission of Hal Leonard Europe

Limited 'History Will Teach Us Nothing': Words and Music by Gordon Sumner © 1987, Reproduced by permission of G.M. Sumner/EMI Music Publishing Ltd, London W1F 9LD.

Peter Rietbergen

The Royal Dutch Institute, Rome, Italy

The Radboud University, Nijmegen, the Netherlands

The Netherlands Institute for Advanced Studies (NIAS), Wassenaar,
the Netherlands

Christ Church, Oxford, England

July 1994–November 1997; July 2000–December 2004;

July 2012–April 2014; June 2018–December 2019

Notes

- 1 G. Erler, ed., *Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Werke, VIII, Faust*, Berlin 1984, Faust I, 77.
- 2 N. Heinrich, *Ce que n'est pas l'identité*, Paris 2018, 105–10; K. Eder, 'A theory of collective identity. Making sense of the debate on a "European identity"', *European Journal of Social Theory*, 12 (2009), 429–31; L. Bekemans, 'The idea of Europe: Identity-building from a historical perspective', in idem, ed., *A Value-driven European Future*, Brussel 2012, 71–3; D. Jacobs, R. Maier, 'European identity: Construct, fact and fiction', in M. Gastelaars, a.o. eds., *A United Europe. The Quest for a Multifaceted Identity*, Maastricht 1998, 13 sqq.
- 3 R. Brague, *Europe: la voie romaine*, Paris 1992, 187.
- 4 Some surveys: C. Curcio, *Europa: Storia d'un Idea I-II*, Florence 1958; J.-B. Dursoelle, *L'Idée d'Europe dans l'histoire*, Paris 1965; H. Foerster, *Europa: Geschichte einer politischen Idee*, Munich 1967.
- 5 J. Delors, 'Have we betrayed the European economic and social venture?', in *European Trade Union Yearbook 1996*, 6.
- 6 G. Colli, M. Montinari, eds, *Fr. Nietzsche: Kritische Gesamtausgabe der Werke*, III/2, Berlin 1973 [=Fr. Nietzsche, *Nachgelassene Schriften, 1870–1873: Ueber Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne I*], 378.
- 7 S. Marchand, *Down from Olympus: Archaeology and Philhellenism in Germany, 1750–1970*, Princeton 1996.
- 8 Cf. W. Tatarkiewicz, 'Les quatre significations du mot "classique"', *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 12 (1958), 5–22. For the European case: A. Grafton et al. ed., *The Classical Tradition*, Cambridge, MA 2010. But see also: G. Holst-Warhaft, a.o. eds., *The Classical Movement. Views from Seven Literatures*, Lanham 1999, that compares parallel movements in seven Eurasian civilizations.
- 9 M. Kunze, ed., *Winckelmann und Egypte*, Tübingen 2003; D. Wildung, *Preussen am Nil*, Berlin 2002.
- 10 M. Wellen, *Die Deutschen sind im Treppenhaus. Der Fries Otto Geyers in der Alte Nationalgalerie*, Cologne 2002.
- 11 Peter Rietbergen, 'Oriëntalisme: een theorie van ficties – de fictie van een theorie? Een poging tot contextualisering en herinterpretatie', *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis*, 111 (1998), 545–75, esp. 552–70. Idem, *Clio's stiefzusters. Verledenverbeeldingen voorbij de geschiedwetenschap*, Nijmegen 2015.
- 12 E. Rawsky, *Education and Popular Literacy in Ch'ing China*, Ann Arbor 1979.

- 13 P. Rietbergen, 'Father and mother official: the district magistrates in imperial China and the Papal States', in P. Puschmann, T. Riswick, eds., *Building Bridges*, Nijmegen 2018, 118–33.
- 14 As in, for example, N. Ferguson, *Why the West Beat the Rest*, London 2011.
- 15 G. Steiner, *The Idea of Europe*, Tilburg 2004, 22.
- 16 For this and the following: Z. Kiaupa, et al., *Geschichte des Baltikums*, Tallinn 2002.
- 17 Cf. P. Sztompka, *From East Europeans to Europeans: Shifting Identities and Boundaries in the New Europe*, Wassenaar 2004.
- 18 For example, his *Capitalism and Material Life, 1400–1800*, London 1973, with his *Afterthoughts*, Baltimore 1977, that was then elaborated as *Civilization and Capitalism*. Also, his *Grammaire des Civilisations*, Paris 1987. However, there is, I find, little of a really unifying concept behind Braudel's often rambling writings.
- 19 One may think of his *The Civilizing Process*, I–II, Oxford 1978, 1982, though these two volumes do seem to follow two different strands of thought.
- 20 Obviously, this is not to say that such theories cannot be fruitful. Yet I find, for example, G. Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times*, London 1994, not entirely convincing.
- 21 Peter Rietbergen, 'Not of this world ... ? Religious power and imperial rule in Eurasia, ca. thirteenth – ca. eighteenth century', in M. van Berkel, a. o. eds., *Prince, Pen and Sword. Eurasian Perspectives*, Leiden 2018, 129–296.
- 22 The dangers of such an approach are evident in the recent and surely ridiculous effort by H. Bloom, *The Western Canon*, New York 1994; of the 26 authors included, about three-quarters are Anglo-Saxon.
- 23 For a spirited defence of the historian's craft against some of the sillier post-Modernist claims, see R. Evans, *In Defense of History*, London 1994.
- 24 M. Weber, *Wissenschaft als Beruf*, Munich 1919, 1921.
- 25 Croce first explained this position in *Teoria e storia della storiografia*, Bari 1917, and in another context in *La storia come pensiero e come azione*, Bari 1938.
- 26 Mainly in M. Horkheimer, *Die gegenwärtige Lage der Sozialforschung*, Frankfurt 1931; Idem, *Traditionelle und Kritische Theorie*, Frankfurt 1937.
- 27 For example, A. Munslow, *Deconstructing History*, London 1997, 2006; and: K. Jenkins, *On 'What is History?'* London 1995, 2003.
- 28 These are the opening lines of Freud's 1915 essay 'Triebe und Triebchicksale':

Wir haben oftmals die Forderung vertreten gehört, daß eine Wissenschaft über klaren und scharf definierten Grundbegriffen aufgebaut sein soll. In Wirklichkeit beginnt keine Wissenschaft mit solchen Definitionen, auch die exaktesten nicht. Der richtige Anfang der wissenschaftlichen Tätigkeit besteht vielmehr in der Beschreibung von Erscheinungen, die dann weiterhin gruppiert, angeordnet und in Zusammenhänge eingetragen werden. Schon bei der Beschreibung kann man es nicht vermeiden, gewisse abstrakte Ideen auf das Material anzuwenden, die man irgendwoher, gewiß nicht aus der neuen Erfahrung allein, herbeiholt. Noch unentbehrlicher sind solche Ideen – die späteren Grundbegriffe der Wissenschaft – bei der weiteren Verarbeitung des Stoffes. Sie müssen zunächst ein gewisses Maß von Unbestimmtheit an sich tragen; von einer klaren Umzeichnung ihres Inhaltes kann keine Rede sein. Solange sie sich in diesem Zustande befinden, verständigt man sich über ihre Bedeutung durch den wiederholten Hinweis auf das Erfahrungsmaterial, dem sie entnommen scheinen, das aber in Wirklichkeit ihnen unterworfen wird.

- 29 B. Geremek, *The Common Roots of Europe*, London 1996, gives an interesting, short survey of the genesis of the concept of Europe; he also argues that, at the

end of the twentieth century, the notion of European civilization is felt rather more strongly in central than in western Europe. Ph. Longworth, *The Making of Eastern Europe*, London 1992, goes into the long history of the diverging paths of east and west. E. Gellner, *Conditions of Liberty*, London 1994, seems to view the ancient German lands as the frontier region between east and west.

30 See also P. Burke, 'Did Europe exist before 1700?', *History of European Ideas*, 1 (1980), 21–9.

31 For example, A. Corbin, *Time, Desire and Horror*, Oxford 1995, viii–ix.

Part I

Continuity and change

New ways of surviving



Taylor & Francis

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

1 Before 'Europe'

Towards an agricultural and sedentary society

Beginnings in Africa and the eastern Mediterranean, or the non-European origins of culture in Europe

Already in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, European scholars were searching for the origins of man in a past far remote from and in developments more complex than the simple picture painted – and accepted by most of their contemporaries – in the first chapter of the Jewish Bible. To most Europeans, Holy Scripture still was the only touchstone of truth, teaching that the earth and man came into existence when God created the universe on the morning of a momentous day in the year 4004 BC.

In 1698, an English medical doctor, Edward Tyson, visited the docks in London – famous as a place where other, non-European worlds entered Europe – having heard that a chimpanzee was displayed there. When the animal died, he asked permission to dissect it. He studied all its forms and functions and compared these with those of humans. Observing many differences, he yet considered the number of similarities to be greater and more significant. His conclusion, in a book called *Orang-Outang, sive Homo Sylvestris*, 'Orang-Outang, or the Wild Wood Man' (London 1699), was that a fundamental distinction between humans and certain simian types was scientifically untenable.¹ Tyson scrupulously refrained from elaborating on the dangerous implications of his observations for the traditional, i.e. religious view of man's history as the final, most perfect stage of God's creation. However, these cannot have escaped his more perspicacious readers.

In 1819, a young Dane, Christian Jurgensen Thomsen (1788–1865), was entrusted by the king with the task of classifying archaeological finds made in Denmark which by royal order were from now on to be sent to Copenhagen. Wondering how to comply with his instructions, Thomsen finally decided on a course of action that nowadays would be considered simple logic but at that time was not part of a European's mental framework: archaeological finds were mainly judged on their aesthetic merits and if they had none, were thrown away or otherwise destroyed. Thomsen, however, divided his objects according to their material and functional aspects. On the basis of this classification he concluded that the

4 *Continuity and change*

three earliest stages of man's history should be termed the Stone Age, the Bronze Age and the Iron Age, reflecting both growing technological skills and cultural progress. He presented this development as historically significant in itself, thus establishing the study of material culture and of man's past before the invention of writing as a topic of empirical, scientific study rather than of aesthetics.² Some scholars were enthusiastic but the general public could not yet share Thomsen's grand vision, deeming the objects he had analysed too primitive to be considered proof of anything that could be termed culture.

In 1847, the Frenchman Jean Boucher de Perthes published a book called *Antiquités celtiques et antediluviennes*, in which he described the findings of his excavations at Abbeville, on the Somme river. Although some acclaimed him as an original scientist, the larger public derided his ideas: how could one possibly accept that remnants of 'antediluvial man' remained and, moreover, remained in Europe?

In short, until well into the nineteenth century the above views and their implications were unacceptable, not to say repugnant, to most Europeans, even to the well-educated. 'Civilization', 'culture' – these words and concepts referred to the marble temples and the great philosophical constructions of the ancient Greeks, to the powerful, legal structures of the Romans, to the high moral standards propagated by the Christians. Cave dwellers, whose features were more ape-like than human and who worked with 'primitive' stone tools, simply did not fit into the European self-image. Yet, the progress of archaeological research in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries eventually forced Europeans to drastically adjust that self-image, till the final, to many painful acceptance of the fact even that their ancestors had come from Africa, the continent viewed so long as a world of darkness, a world without culture.

Obviously, the question what distinguishes 'homo', man, from the chimpanzee – with the bonobo its nearest relative in the common 'hominid' ancestry, or pan-lineage – is much discussed, centring around such problems as what intelligence actually is, in relation to self-reflection, the ability to learn and to use that learning to improve one's existence, etc.³ According to the latest findings and the often widely diverging interpretations that have been given to them by palaeologists, forms of the genus 'homo' who may have been the first to craft stone tools and later may have been the first to master the art of making fire and probably were also the first to engage in big game hunting, originated in Africa sometime between c.3,000,000 and 2,000,000 years ago, inhabiting large parts of the continent.⁴

Sometime around 1,800,000 years ago, later forms of 'homo', often called *homo erectus*, the 'upright human', moved out of the area in north-east Africa where, perhaps, migrations in search of food and a better climate had brought them, and into Eurasia, where recent finds have shown traces of him in Georgia but also in northern China. For all we now know, groups of them may have lived all over Eurasia.

Between 800,000 and 400,000 BC, some groups or perhaps only one, small group of *homo erectus* evolved into *homo Heidelbergensis* – where and when exactly is still under debate, but again Africa is a possibility – who, in turn, moved to Eurasia as well, as his name indicates, for the first fossils were found in 1908 near the German town of Heidelberg.

As late as c.400,000 years ago, another type of *homo erectus*, called *Neanderthal-man*, entered the scene, named after the valley near Düsseldorf, in Germany, where his remains were discovered. Actually, he too inhabited the vast stretch of Eurasia from France and Spain to Uzbekistan. Fossils give us an idea of his appearance: very robust and stocky, on average between 1.55 and 1.65 metres tall, with short legs and a long torso enabling him to cope with the dearth of food resources in winter, when he survived on fat reserves accumulated by gathering in seasons of relative plenty. Neanderthal man's brain-volume was, moreover, bigger than that of any other creature. He used these greater cranial capacities to develop a stone-based technology, consisting largely of prepared-core flaking, which indicates that he consciously planned his survival strategies.⁵

Influenced by the seasons, these earliest inhabitants of Eurasia, including Europe, travelled around their regions seeking semi-permanent shelter in caves. Gradually, 'conscious' habitation grew, especially with the coming of fire. But scholars are divided over the question of whether they already could speak, in the sense of producing distinct words with unambiguous meanings; if not, they would have lacked much of the communicative capacity that can, for instance, organize a hunter society, though, of course, sign language, that is often said to predate speech, may have served them well.

Till the 1980s and 1990s, scientists believed that none of the genetic material of these more recent representatives of *homo erectus* survived in the present population of the world; whether they became extinct through natural causes or because they could not compete with newer types of hominids was much discussed. The debates were the more confused because scholars also were discussing the origins – again out of *homo erectus*-forms – and the culture of what they called *homo sapiens*, dating back to some 300,000 years ago. This species is now understood to be the ancestor of all modern humans. Where and when did *homo sapiens* originate?⁶ Also in (sub-) tropical Africa, from where groups of his species, too, started migrating in search of the kind of food that held the protein they needed. Fossils and DNA research show that small bands of them moved from present-day Eritrea to the Yemen – crossing the Red Sea, which at that time was partly dry land. From the Arab peninsula, men and women moved, gathering and hunting too, into Eurasia, reaching South Asia some 70,000 years ago. Adapting to the different climes they encountered, their skin colour took on a lighter or, conversely, a darker hue and some of them grew taller or, rather, became smaller; indeed, as recent as 2004 the remains of people of about one metre tall were discovered in Indonesia. Thus, the physical variety of *homo sapiens* was the result of multiple mutations.⁷

Only some 45,000 years ago – but again, new finds may alter this chronology – *homo sapiens* migrated from (West) Asia into Europe as well. In Europe, he is often called *Cro-Magnon*, named after the French site where he was discovered in 1868, though nowadays the description ‘(European) Early Modern Human’ is more widely used because, anatomically and behaviourally, he belonged to the species of modern man. This migration happened at a specific ‘moment’ in time and was perhaps instigated or at least facilitated by it.

Periodically, the climate on earth enters an ‘Ice Age’. Some 40,000 years ago, North and West Europe as well as the regions around the Alps and the Pyrenees once again were in the grip of a long period of harsh weather, with glaciers rapidly expanding from the principal mountain ranges. But during the following millennia, this Ice Age came to a climatically inevitable end, and the world gradually started to get warmer again. Precisely in these centuries, the most recent variety of *homo sapiens* slowly moved to the Mediterranean and the Balkans or into the Danube corridor, and from there entered Central and Western Europe.

There is an ongoing dispute about what occurred between the older inhabitants and the new ones. Till recently, many scholars argued that the Neanderthal people were unable to resist the newcomers, and soon disappeared entirely. We now know that for thousands of years the two groups intermingled, which accounts for Neanderthal genes still present in modern humans, today. Slowly, however, Neanderthal people did become extinct. Perhaps, in the long run, their groups – which, it should be noted, in a single generation may never have numbered more than 150,000 people, in all of Eurasia! – turned out to be less capable of surviving and were displaced, whether through natural causes or as a consequence of large-scale genocide at the hands of the newcomers, who, for example, if they had the capacity of language, may have had a definite organizational advantage. However, when this ‘extinction’ occurred and for how long before that the two species did live alongside one another is still being debated.

As proof of the changes that occurred in these millennia, archaeologists have found signs of a far more complex economy, society and culture. All over those regions of Eurasia where modern man now lived, big-game hunting as well as gathering clearly were the principal strategies for survival of these largely nomadic peoples; still, an early form of long-distance trade seems to have existed as well. Meanwhile, tools, both of stone and bone, and stone weaponry became more sophisticated: a more refined technology developed. Also, modern humans, including, that is, the ‘new Europeans’, looked for dwelling places other than caves. For example, open-air encampments with substantial huts made of wood and bone have been discovered on the plains of Bohemia and southern Russia as well as in France.

Even more fascinating is that ‘early modern men’ started to create symbolic representations both of themselves and of the world around them.⁸ Paintings

made with natural pigments – another technological innovation – have been found on the walls of caves, concentrated mainly in southern France and northern Spain. Until 1995, the most revealing were considered to be those discovered at Lascaux by a group of adventurous boys in the summer of 1940. Others of the same kind are situated in the Pyrenees and at Spanish Altamira. In 1995, a new and even more spectacular find was made in the Ardèche: there, cave paintings depict all kinds of animals hitherto unknown in early Europe; they seem to date as far back as 30,000 years. However, the discussion over the interpretation of these artefacts is not yet settled, and probably never will be, if only because the terms used are, in a sense, not yet applicable to those times. Was it 'aesthetic', art for art's sake, or didactic, a means to instruct the young men and women of the tribe in the seasonal stages of a hunting economy, with references to the male and female elements in man and society? Then again, the caves may have been used as religious centres, where shamanistic rituals were enacted and where the paintings reflected trance-like voyages into the world of the animals that were essential to the survival of man.⁹ The concentration of cave paintings in what, at that time, were apparently the most crowded areas of Europe – but again, we should realize that all people involved numbered perhaps a few thousand, only – may point to the need for ceremonial activities intended to integrate and coordinate the growing population.

However, though the fact that, from the nineteenth century onwards, such 'art' was found in Europe, only, often was interpreted as yet another sign that precisely the 'first Europeans' were unique in depicting their world, recent archaeological research has uncovered comparable and coeval forms of representation at the other extreme of Eurasia as well, thus undermining yet another claim of Europe's early superiority or, even, uniqueness.

Besides in painting, representations of humans and animals were also carved in bone and ivory, splendid examples of which, created in c.35,000 BC, were found in caves in southern Germany. The many so-called 'Venus' figures are especially fascinating. These female figurines, both stylized and naturalistic, have been found all over Central Europe. They may well point to the matrifocal character of these societies.

Did the early modern humans have speech, and language? As indicated above, the scholarly debate on the origins of language is fraught with vehemently expressed and often contradictory opinions.¹⁰ Theories diverge widely, placing this evolutionary development anywhere between 400,000 and 100,000 BC. As speech preceded writing, there will probably never be any evidence for the exact period of its genesis. Yet anatomically, these people did have the apparatus necessary to produce the sort of vowels et cetera that constitute speech. Moreover, both the organization needed for hunting in a profitable way and the very complexity of the many artefacts or 'art' forms, pointing to a culture that used symbols, intriguingly suggest the possibility of forms of communication beyond mere sounds, gestures and images.

It is also noteworthy that these European/Eurasian cultures, precisely in the articulation of domestic structures and the various representational forms,



Figure 1.1 A deer's head in yellow, red, brown and black, from a cave painting at Niaux, France, dated c.20,000–10,000 BC. The artist has captured the animal with its head thrown back, its antlers thrust forward, preparing for attack – a scene which must have been part of prehistoric man's daily life.

Source: Centre for Art-historical Documentation/Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands

already showed regional identities, which may have resulted in the formation of separate, self-conscious 'ethnic' groups. For we should not forget that Western and Central Europe's distinctive physical-geographical features must have favoured the genesis not only of culture in general – that, of course, came about everywhere – but also of incipiently diverse cultures. Unlike the vast steppes stretching from Ukraine and Russia to far-away Central Asia, these parts of Europe, a relatively small corner of the earth, showed an incredibly varied landscape: surrounded by seas on three of the four sides, criss-crossed by navigable rivers connecting the inland areas with those seas, it was a region with contrasting but congenial ecologies, with demanding and challenging climates, and with natural barriers that stimulated development through both seclusion and communication.

The advent of agriculture, temple and state

For hundreds of thousands of years, all humans were gatherers and, later, hunter-gatherers. So were the inhabitants of North Africa and the Near East until approximately 10,000 BC. In the Sahara, then not a desert but a humid and fertile region, living conditions were favourable and people continued to go on as they always had done, even developing the art of pottery. However, the Near East, the 'land bridge' that, though the Red Sea had become a real sea again, still allowed African man to move into Eurasia, was climatically and geographically somewhat less favoured, as it had been left relatively arid after the last Ice Age. People there had to start collecting wild grasses and grind them to get edible seeds; the skeletons of women found there show the spinal distortion this created. When the seeds were sown, first by chance and soon deliberately, agriculture had been 'invented'.¹¹

The introduction of a cereal diet from c.9000 BC onwards allowed for population growth and, in turn, for the intensification of agriculture. This occurred in the Levantine region (Israel, Palestine, the Lebanon and Syria), in south-eastern Turkey, in southern Russia and in present-day Iraq. Whether similar developments took place in other parts of the world or whether agriculture spread from this one region is another of early history's great debates: many scholars hold that the 'invention' of agriculture occurred simultaneously in the Near East and in China, if only because climate and, hence, soil conditions were similar, there. Demonstrably, farming reached the western end of Eurasia from the Near East, first spreading to the coasts of the Black Sea, then still a fresh water lake. During the following millennia, it was taken up in the innumerable small coastal valleys of the eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean islands, in fact in almost all places where streams, running down from the mountains, deposited their sediment and could be used to irrigate the fields. From the eastern Mediterranean and the Danube basin, agriculture spread into parts of Italy, Spain and France, and into Central Europe.¹²

We only have archaeological evidence to document the slow transition to an agrarian economy and the changing lifestyles and new social and cultural forms that accompanied it. Still, the process can be reconstructed. It seems that soon after the introduction of agriculture in the Near East, irrigation – both natural and artificial – was used to ensure higher yields and animal husbandry, with the domestication of a limited number of crops and animals,¹³ such as olives and vines, and woolly sheep. Certain nomadic or semi-nomadic groups now became sedentary, settling more or less permanently in villages, which they often surrounded by earthen or stone walls, if only to protect themselves against the hunter-gatherers with whom they competed for the use of the land.

Sometimes, these villages were quite large. Thus, for example, the ruins of Catalhöyük, in Anatolia, give evidence of what almost can be termed a town, built c.7000 BC by a people of Neolithic cattle breeders; it housed

a population of some 10,000 in small dwellings that were entered from the roof. Sculpture and gaily coloured frescos indicate that these people had thoughts that went far beyond mere physical survival. For reasons as yet unknown, the settlement was deserted some 2,000 years later.¹⁴ Another famous example of an early town is the walled city of Jericho, in Palestine, which probably also dates as far back; as people continue to live there even now, it is sometimes referred to as the 'oldest inhabited town in the world'.

This settlement process was often accompanied by a transition to institutionalized private ownership of land. Although this certainly did not lead to just and humane structures as we view them, from a purely economic perspective this form of production has proven the most successful throughout human history: only if his own gain is ensured, man seems to be driven to produce a surplus that then becomes the basis for intricate social and cultural structures.

Where conditions for agriculture were particularly favourable, the most complex societies and specialized forms of organization did develop. The people of the great river valleys led the way: in Egypt, where the annual flooding of the Nile left a narrow strip of fertile mud in the desert from which farmers could reap a rich harvest; and in Mesopotamia, the 'Land between the two Rivers', namely the Euphrates and the Tigris. The latter not only provided plenty of water for artificial irrigation,¹⁵ but, perhaps even more important, allowed for transport between another emerging food-producing area, coastal Syria. Together, these regions came to form what we now term the 'Fertile Crescent'. Soon, communities evolved which based their prosperity both on agriculture and on the manufacture of products not necessary for material well-being only, such as beautifully worked tools and weapons made of stone and later bronze, or finely crafted pottery for cooking and to store grain in. They also made added-value products that were ideologically important, to be bought and displayed by those who could afford to do so on the basis of their agriculturally produced surplus wealth: objects such as costly textiles, artful metalwork and jewellery set with precious stones. Thus, as surplus production enabled people to specialize in all kinds of manufacture, trade networks brought agricultural products and other man-made wares to those who specifically lacked or desired them.

Trade networks served as the logistic-economic context, with rivers, plied by rafts, or even sailing boats, playing a significant role, but also overland routes, plied by the newly-found forms of traction by camel and donkey. Inevitably, in these centuries, shipbuilding became one of the Mediterranean world's earliest great industries. But while ships were a means of transport, of commerce, they were also a major means of communicating other forms of culture. One of the earliest examples is the so-called Uluburun ship, a vessel constructed some 3,300 years ago, discovered in the 1980s on the Turkish south coast: it was found to carry wares from Italy, but also ivory and rhinoceros teeth from Africa, copper and tin (to make bronze) from Cyprus and spices from Asia. It probably was destined for the elites of the towns on

the Greek mainland.¹⁶ Equally interesting, in making the trip to all the Mediterranean ports supplying or selling these products, the people aboard must have carried tales as well, telling about the peoples and cultures they encountered.

In these as yet mainly agricultural civilizations, which were entirely dependent on water and other natural resources, people were intensely interested in the heavenly bodies that determined night and day but, more importantly, governed the change of the seasons with the coming of the rains and the floods. In short, heaven held power over fertility, food, subsistence, life. Indeed, natural forces could change the existing cultures and systems entirely. When, some 4,200 years ago, one of the periodical Little Ice Ages occurred, the level of the Nile sank, precipitation dropped drastically and large parts of agricultural Egypt became deserts again. As harvests failed year after year, people probably blamed their rulers, those who, after having united the various parts of the Nile valley during the so-called Old Kingdom-period, had governed the country for many centuries. These now lost their power, to be replaced by new pharaohs only when the situation improved after some hundred years of poverty and chaos.

Natural changes could not yet be interpreted in any scientific way, at least not according to science as it is now defined.¹⁷ Hence, people felt the situation to be a mystery both fascinating and tremendous. Consequently, religions developed that worshipped the forces of nature, especially the heavenly bodies, as magical, sacred. Soon, men who maintained they could make valid predictions of the movement of sun and moon, of winds and rain, or even claimed to be able to influence them were especially honoured. Dedicating themselves to studying and explaining these phenomena, they became magi, mediating between the divine and the human world. Farmers gladly gave them some of their surplus products hoping they would gain heaven's favour.¹⁸ Frequently, these mediators developed into a closed caste of priests – and, sometimes, priestesses – basing their authority on hereditary knowledge. They administered the religion in which people came to express their relationship to the incomprehensible or ineffable, by creating gods. While the divine might keep its natural form – the celestial bodies or a river, a spring – it also came to be represented in man-made objects. At first, the gods were imagined, in painting and sculpture, as animals, reflecting the view of the world of a pastoralist-nomadic society. But in the agricultural communities of villages and, later, towns, anthropomorphic images were made as well. These were worshipped in ever more elaborately-built cult sites, often centred around mountains or mountain-like artificial structures to represent the idea that the gods lived on high, ruling both the skies and all that existed under them. To these sanctuaries, the faithful went with their gifts of grain or cattle. From these temples, the priests exercised a growing power over society.

In the most advanced agricultural civilizations, the first divisions of time, calendars, were created, obviously by priests, based on their thorough

scrutiny of the heavens. In the Nile delta the year was invented, consisting of 365 days divided into 12 months, each made up of 30 days with leap days to even out the differences. Thousands of years later, the Romans took over this system. In 46 BC, Julius Caesar introduced an improved version of the Egyptian calendar that, with several adjustments in later centuries, is still used in Europe and the entire Western world.

As some agricultural societies grew more complex, a more regulated form of administration became necessary, especially when the non-productive priests, no longer satisfied with periodical gifts, started asking farmers for fixed contributions in kind or in money to finance the cost of religious services, of increasingly sumptuous temples and, of course, of the clergy themselves.¹⁹ Probably because of the bureaucratic needs of this kind of 'taxation' arising in these temple societies, the invention of some non-oral communication system to record and transmit data became a necessity. Famously, the Inca civilization of ancient Peru developed its system of knotted strings. But already at a far earlier stage, the river civilizations of India as well as, perhaps, the cultures of early China developed script. And at the same time, for necessitated by the same need for religious, economic and political-administrative communication, in the centuries between 3400 and 3200 BC complicated writing systems evolved both in Egypt, the Levant and Mesopotamia.

They were composed partly of simplified pictures (pictograms), partly of symbols (ideograms), partly of signs for syllables, and partly of one-letter signs. Egyptian 'hieroglyphics' – Greek for 'holy incisions' – were written on papyrus or inscribed in stone or clay tablets; this, and Sumerian 'cuneiform', named after the wedge-like signs used in its scripture, became the means of communication in the eastern Mediterranean. Soon, it ceased to be a 'holy' script, only; it was adapted to serve all kinds of economic needs, including the trade that connected the agricultural civilizations of Egypt, Syria and Mesopotamia with, quite probably, north-western India as well.

In 1975, a team of Italian archaeologists searching the plains of north-western Syria discovered the ruins of the once-great town of Ebla. In it, they found the remains of a huge archive/library containing tens of thousands of clay tablets covered in cuneiform script, dating back to the middle of the third millennium BC. Its reconstruction shows that it is the first such ever found that was, also, systematically ordered, according to subject.²⁰ Thanks to the on-going research of these precious sources, we now know a lot more about the economic, political and cultural aspects of these early agricultural societies: their customs, their rituals, their food, and the way all aspects of life in this region developed through interaction with and between the other three main areas of civilization now existing in the Near East: the world around the Aegean Sea, Mesopotamia and Egypt.

Besides needing temples and priests to regulate relations between the natural and the supra-natural world, and some sort of scripture to record the obligations between mortals and gods and, soon, between men themselves, these societies also sought means of defence against internal unrest or external

attack. As the priests had done, those who took up military duties now also claimed part of the harvest and often appropriated land which tenant farmers – or more often slaves – had to work to ensure the livelihood and the military provisions of these men. A new social group who did not work with their hands was now born; they developed into a class of 'aristocrats' or 'nobles'. Soon, they competed with the priests over the exercise of power. Their leaders, sometimes turning into absolute monarchs, 'kings', often drew their authority from the interface between religious and military power. Divine faculties were often attributed to them since, like the priesthood, they too claimed to be able to comprehend and even predict the life-giving or denying forces of nature, more specifically the agricultural cycle and the prosperity it brought.

On the fertile borders of the Nile, the priestly monarch was the pharaoh, worshipped as 'son of the Sun'. The authority of these semi-divine rulers, who fused religious with military might, was such that – contrary to what was believed until recently – the peasantry built the enormous pyramids and temples erected in their name of their own free will: as paid labourers, well taken care of by an enormous organization and bureaucracy operating on the Giza plateau.

In the numerous city-states that between them possessed the fertile lands of Mesopotamia, priestly elites initially ruled all. On their initiative, the gigantic, terraced temple-mountains were built of brick tiles, the local material: the traces of these adobe structures still dot the erstwhile rich countryside, much of it now returned to a desert state. In later centuries these priest-kings had to share their power with – or even completely relinquish it to – leaders emerging from the military caste who, however, nearly always induced or forced the priests to divinely legitimize their government in all kinds of mythical stories and returning religious rituals.

On the islands of the Aegean and all around its shores, royal civilizations also flourished: in the fertile valleys of Mycenae and Tiryns on the Peloponnese as well as on Crete where, besides agriculture, sea-trade became an important source not only of income but also of contact with other cultures, as witnessed by the Cretan-style frescos with the characteristic bull-fighting scenes found in some of Egypt's palaces.²¹ Since the 1970s, Cretan civilization has become a hot topic again. In the 1930s, when the English archaeologist Arthur Evans discovered and 'restored' the ruins of the palace of Knossos, he interpreted this city's culture as a matriarchy, characterized by peace, a society of youthful, elegant men and women – perhaps unconsciously recasting them in the image he had of an ideal English society. Nowadays, there is evidence of another, rather different side to the Cretan world: one wherein children were sacrificed and the followers of the various goddesses violently fought one another for supreme power.²²




Figure 1.2 Limestone statue of the scribe Heti with a papyrus scroll, showing traces of the original painted decoration. It can be dated to Egypt's 15th dynasty, i.e. c.3–2000 BC. Such statues proclaim the importance of a class of literate men for the functioning of the religious and secular bureaucracy of early temple-states such as pharaonic society.

Source: Centre for Art-historical Documentation/Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands

The further development of the structure we now know as 'the state' was made possible by two interconnected phenomena occurring within the partly agricultural, partly commercial temple-societies described above: the development of new writing systems – for example, the Cretans, too, devised their own script, known as 'linear A', which has not yet been deciphered – and the gradual extension of large-scale trade, together with the introduction of coinage. The former enabled the elaboration and, more important, the codification of law to regulate the inevitably increasing disputes over property and inheritance. The latter soon demanded the creation of accounting and credit facilities. Together, these formed the basis for a fiscal-administrative system that could support large armies which, aided by good communication systems and proper logistics, helped states to increase their power, both internally and externally, and thus to expand. Indeed, under Thutmosis III (r. 1479–1425 BC), Egypt became a veritable empire, conquering the Sudan as well as Palestine and Syria. But both pharaonic Egypt and the city-states of Mesopotamia and the Aegean, by their growing power and wealth increasingly attracted the unwelcome attention of outsiders from Central Eurasia, be they driven by hunger or greed. To assess the partly long-term influence of these 'migrants', we must return to a much earlier period.

Invasion, conquest and change: the first Eurasian wave

Around 5000 BC, the 'Pontic steppes', the region now comprising southern Ukraine and southern Russia, bounded by the Black Sea, the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea, were inhabited by tribal, nomadic-pastoralist peoples. After the burial tumuli they built, they are named 'Kurgan' in Russian. Their language is lost now, but scholars have hypothesized it as proto-Indo-European, to mean it was the origin of a number of languages spoken at later times both in Europe and in parts of the Near and Middle East – in present-day Turkey as well as in Iran – and in India. Linguists have discovered striking parallels between these languages, in the words used for such diverse fields of culture as kinship relations and agricultural practice, pottery and numerals. This may indicate that, over a period of two millennia, successive groups from among the Kurgan peoples migrated to the West and East, as well as southwards.²³ Other scholars claim that people much like them in culture, but perhaps inhabiting a region slightly further south, in eastern Turkey and northern Iraq and Iran, were the ones to start these migrations and the spread of the languages which resulted in the tongues now spoken in Europe and parts of Asia.²⁴

These tribes were ruled by military elites who maintained their power by, among other things, the use of a new invention: their horse-drawn chariots, which altered the art of warfare. Although their economy included some agriculture and various forms of barter trade, it consisted mainly of cattle-grazing; consequently, they led a frugal life of near-subsistence on their vast tundra- or steppe-like plains. Worshipping the sun and the sky gods, they


were well aware how precarious their circumstances were though, of course, they did not know that a drop in long-term temperature, however minute, greatly affected their economic basis because the amount of pasture available for their herds was then reduced. As such climatic changes, the Little Ice Ages already referred to, occurred regularly, these peoples often were forced to leave their homelands and migrate in search of more equable climes. With their horses and wheeled vehicles, they were able easily to transport their families and herds whenever natural conditions of scarcity, or their own lust for power or riches drove them.

Obviously, belligerence or hunger made the wealthy agricultural civilizations around the eastern Mediterranean and in Mesopotamia the favourite target of these nomads. But these societies were not only threatened from the north. Just like the horsemen from the Eurasian plains, the Bedouins from the Syrian and Arabian deserts were jealous of their neighbours. Thus, while Egypt was relatively safe, as the deserts that bordered the Nile were inhospitable to man, the 'fertile crescent' – as indicated above, the area of the Euphrates, the Tigris and the coast of the Levant – as well as the river valleys around the Aegean Greece frequently were the target of successful attacks or outright invasions.

Indeed, in the decades after c.2200 BC, such tribes from Central Eurasia, while moving into both Northern India and Central Europe, also invaded and settled on what is now mainland Greece and Turkey, around the Aegean. There, too, 'Kurgan'-like structures have been found dating from that time. Perhaps these tribes also introduced the horse there. They definitely spoke an Indo-European language, from which ancient Greek later developed.²⁵ But the invasion by these 'Greeks', who established royal cultures both on the Peloponnese and on Crete, is only one manifestation of a process that was occurring continuously on the Eurasian landmass, resulting in intermittent crises in all the neighbouring worlds: there, indigenous societies would be uprooted by migrants turned invaders and conquerors; often, however, they merged with the cultures they encountered.

In the two centuries after 2200 BC as well as, again, in the period between c.1500 and 1100 BC, nomad leaders gained control not only over the shores of the Aegean but also over Mesopotamia. They founded new states that, from a cultural perspective, always incorporated a mixture of existing 'native' and new 'foreign' elements. Indeed, it was not long before the foreign became native – showing that thinking in such terms always is dangerous.

Hammurāpi (1792–1750 BC), the ruler of the city and state of Babylon, on the Euphrates, descended from such nomad-invaders-conquerors. He founded a vast empire and became famous as one of the first legislators of western Eurasia.²⁶ A diorite stele, or column, more than two metres high, shows him standing before the sun god Shamash, from whom he accepts the task of writing his 'law code'. Thus, he made clear that his orders were divinely sanctioned.



Map 1.1 Migrations in western Eurasia, third to first millennium BC

BABYLON, THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY BC: THE LAW CODE OF HAMMURÁPI

The pillar on which Hammurápi's law code is inscribed, was discovered by French archaeologists in Susa, Iran, in 1901–2, and is now in the Louvre Museum in Paris. Its public function – and, moreover, its contents that, despite the differences from our own norms, still appeal to us, as they did to its discoverers – was obviously to enable anyone who could read, or be read to, to stand up and invoke 'the law', ensuring that arbitrariness was to a certain extent abolished.

The text, divided into 282 articles, reveals the existence of a complex, definitely patriarchal society, characterized by a combination of agriculture and commerce. Intricate regulations establish the rights and duties of the upper class, the nobility, towards the state, the temple and the rest of the free citizens – who were not part of the nobility, mostly farmers and traders. The prescriptions primarily deal with land development and use but also address the problems of an already quite advanced trade system, heavily emphasizing the safeguarding of property rights. In a number of cases, punishment for offences committed by the nobility against commoners is noticeably less severe than for those perpetrated by people against others from their own class: equality before the law had not been realized, but some forms of public safety had, through the state's monopoly on what we now term 'public, i.e. legal violence'.

- 1 If a seignior accused another seignior and brought a charge of murder against him, but has not proved it, his accuser shall be put to death.
- 2 If a seignior brought a charge of sorcery against another seignior, but has not proved it, the one against whom the charge of sorcery was brought, on going to the river [the Euphrates, regarded as a god], shall throw himself into the river, and if the river has then overpowered him, his accuser shall take over his estate; if the river has shown that seignior to be innocent and he has accordingly come forth safe, the one who brought the charge of sorcery against him shall be put to death, while the one who threw himself into the river shall take over the estate of his accuser.
- 6 If a seignior stole the property of church or state, that seignior shall be put to death; also the one who received the stolen goods from his hand shall be put to death.
- 15 If a seignior has helped either a male slave of the state or a female slave of the state, or a male slave of a private citizen or a female slave of a private citizen to escape through the city-gate, he shall be put to death.

- 38 In no case may a soldier, a commissary, or a feudatory deed any of his field, orchard, or house belonging to his fief to his wife or daughter, and in no case may he assign them for an obligation of his.
- 39 He may deed to his wife or daughter any of the field, orchard, or house which he purchases and accordingly owns, and he may assign them for an obligation of his.
- 104 If a merchant lent grain, wool, oil, or any goods at all to a trader to retail, the trader shall write down the value and pay (it) back to the merchant, with the trader obtaining a sealed receipt for the money that he pays to the merchant.
- 106 If a trader borrowed money from a merchant and has then disputed (the fact) with his merchant, that merchant in the presence of god and witnesses shall prove that the trader borrowed the money and the trader shall pay to the merchant threefold the full amount of money that he borrowed.
- 142 If a woman so hated her husband that she has declared, 'You may not have me', her record shall be investigated at her city council, and if she was careful and not at fault, even though her husband has been going out and disparaging her greatly, that woman without incurring any blame at all, may take her dowry and return to her father's house.
- 153 If a seignior's wife has brought about the death of her husband because of another man, they shall impale that woman on stakes.
- 195 If a son has struck his father, they shall cut off his hand.
- 196 If a seignior has destroyed the eye of a member of the aristocracy, they shall destroy his eye.
- 198 If he has destroyed the eye of a commoner or broken the bone of a commoner, he shall pay one mina of silver.
- 264 If a shepherd, to whom cattle or sheep were given to pasture, being in receipt of his wages in full, to his satisfaction, has then let the cattle decrease, has let the sheep decrease, thus lessening the birth-rate, he shall give increase and profit in accordance with the terms of his contract.
- 268 If a seignior hired an ox to thresh, twenty *qu* of grain shall be its hire.
- 269 If he hired an ass to thresh, ten *qu* of grain shall be its hire.
- 282 If a male slave has said to his master, 'You are not my master', his master shall prove him to be his slave and cut off his ear.²⁷

Interestingly, many of Hammurápi's laws recur in the oldest laws of the Jews that, though recorded much later in the Jewish Bible's parts of Exodus and Deuteronomy, show the lasting influence of early Mesopotamian culture on the societies of the Mediterranean coast.

Beginnings in Europe: after the last Ice Age

After the last so-called glacial maximum, c.20,000 years ago, the climate in Europe/Eurasia slowly started getting warmer again, and the ice cap melted. Consequently, the continent assumed much of its present shape. In the European part, too, the sea level rose, creating a Baltic Sea considerably larger than the present one, as well as, connected to the North Sea, a South Sea, a 'Zuiderzee' – which the Dutch began reclaiming since the early years of the Christian era until they finally converted the major part of it into farmland in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

With the glaciers receding, North-Western Europe also acquired its now-familiar contours of high ridges bordering low-lying plains. At the same time, however, the tremendous forces inside the earth continued to work, as they still do, for example in causing northern Scandinavia to rise by one metre per century. It is shown by the fact that the remains of many early settlements which, according to archaeological data, were situated on the coast a thousand or more years ago, have been unearthed in places now high and dry, inaccessible to any shipping. Meanwhile, South-western and Southern Europe slowly continued to sink, as they still do. Over the last millennia, this has caused the flooding of large coastal plains and the continuous battle of man against water all along these coasts. Sometimes, the process has created huge coastal lakes, like the Marismas in southern Spain, or the Pontine Marshes south of Rome, which then became uninhabitable because of malaria. Yet again, in other areas the alluvial deposits brought to the sea by Europe's rivers resulted in coastlines prograding steadily: the ancient port of imperial Rome, Ostia, once on the Tyrrhenian Sea, is now situated some three kilometres inland.²⁸

Obviously, all these processes, however slow, did deeply affect life for many centuries; indeed, until well into the nineteenth century when some, though certainly not all, of them could be halted or even reversed by technological means.

Of more immediate impact to man was the ecological change brought about by the end of the last Ice Age: all over Europe, parts of the tundra- and steppe-like landscape turned into dense forests. This process was completed by about 10,000 BC. Consequently, the animal population decreased, forcing humans to adapt their behaviour to a sharply reduced food supply. This seems to have resulted in a different, generally less sophisticated pattern of economic and social organization, evinced by the decreasing production of symbolic forms. Hunting, the exploitation of aquatic resources and the gathering of plant foods, mostly hazelnuts, became the basis of subsistence.²⁹

But as indicated above, by the seventh or sixth millennium BC, a new element slowly began entering this European environment from the Near East, dramatically changing people's lives: agriculture and animal husbandry were adopted in Western and Central Europe, too. Staples not native to this region, such as wheat and barley, as well as sheep and goats were now introduced. Farming and cattle breeding slowly were adopted by the inhabitants of the great plains of the central-western part of Eurasia.³⁰ The process, a gradual revolution,

beginning in the countries bordering the eastern Mediterranean, first affected Greece and the Balkans and then spread, by sea, to the islands of the Mediterranean and to Europe's southern shores. As indicated by c.5000 BC, possibly via the Danube valley, agriculture entered deep into the heartland of Europe.

By this time, both the physical and the cultural landscape had changed forever.³¹ The limits set on food supply and, consequently, on demographic development, first by a hunter-gatherer and later by a nomadic-pastoralist way of life, were broken. In Europe's new, farming economy, a new way of life, a new culture evolved as well, based on the security and prosperity provided by it, though people still would hunt for food as well. As in the great river civilizations of the Near East, in Europe, too, agriculture and the surpluses of food and, hence, of wealth that came with it resulted not only in population increase but also in the development of more complex institutions both in the sociopolitical field and in the realm of religion.

Hamlets and villages, mostly palisaded, now covered the temperate woodlands. Houses were built – of stone and clay in the south-east, of timber in Central and Western Europe. Pottery was introduced, painted in red and white in the Aegean and in the Balkans, decorated in linear patterns in Central Europe. People, though still donning leather clothing and grass capes, began to wear jewellery as well, made not only of shells but of the precious, very hard to work, obsidian. Most of these objects have been found in the extensive burial sites that archaeologists have researched, with graves that were both formal and individual. Apparently, shamanistic rituals, including the smoking of narcotic weeds and human sacrifice, characterized the celebrations of the sacred. As I wrote above fired clay figurines, mostly female – perhaps referring to woman's prime role in creation and reproduction – have been unearthed in these settlements.³² Some scholars maintain that in these times, culture in Europe centred around a mother-goddess.³³ Whether, if true, this also meant it was a more peaceful culture than the subsequent, patriarchal one, is a matter of much debate.

However this may be, from the fifth millennium BC onwards, various developments slowly altered geographical Europe from Ireland to the Danube and the great rivers of Russia. The increasing abundance of archaeological findings allows us better to chart the changes, resulting in an ever more complex picture. Roughly three cultural 'zones' can be distinguished: the north, the middle and the south of Europe.³⁴

For a very long time, in the cold, relatively unattractive and sparsely populated north the economic, social and political situation did not change much. An agricultural economy remained the principal means of existence; stone remained the primary raw material for tools and weapons; and the village remained the main form of settlement. Nevertheless, this culture was able to erect, first, huge wooden temples, like the one discovered in 1997 near Stanton Drew, in south-west England, dating from c.3000 BC – consisting of nine concentric circles made up of some 500 ten-metre high, ornamented wooden poles. Hundreds of years later, this and comparable structures were built over with large stones, to form so-called megalithic monuments, also in circular form, like the great sanctuary at

Stonehenge. Other examples of a new creativity are the Danish, Dutch and Breton oblong barrow graves. All in all though, society in this region was less affected by the great changes occurring in the middle and southern parts of Europe.

By c.5000 BC, agriculture had fully developed in the middle, more temperate region, with the introduction of the olive and the grape, as well as the woolly sheep and, perhaps a millennium later, the plough. From the south, viticulture eventually reached the frontiers of this zone, in mid-England, the Netherlands, Germany, southern Poland and southern Russia. From a smoking culture, Europe became a drinking culture. Sheep, bred in runs by the women, produced wool that allowed for the manufacture of textiles; this in turn revolutionized clothing, which soon became a social denominator as well. Moreover, the wheel and the horse also revolutionized both military and economic life: the chariot and the cart, as well as long-distance overland trade, now became part of European culture.³⁵ Quite probably, the chariot was introduced by the peoples referred to above, who continued to ride in from the great Eurasian steppe. Not surprisingly, temperate Europe's fertile fields held great attraction for these Indo-European migrants. As they did in the Near East and India, these groups, trekking westward, also invaded the worlds of Europe's older cultures, changing them, probably, from more matriarchal to more patriarchal societies, while, of course, being changed themselves by the contact, the conquest, as well.



Figure 1.3 Bronze chariot showing a procession of warriors and other people, some of them leading a (sacrificial?) deer, surrounding a figure (of a mother goddess?) carrying a shallow bowl in which offerings could be placed. From a grave from the seventh century BC found at Strettweg, Styria, in Austria.

Source: Universalmuseum Joanneum GmbH

Increased commerce may have been due to the proximity of these parts of Europe to the third zone, the more complex economic and cultural societies of Europe's shores of the eastern Mediterranean. There, the kingdoms and cities of the Aegean and the Near East developed a growing need for the mineral riches Central Europe could provide. For the chariot-driving peoples had also brought new techniques to the regions they entered. Around c.2500 BC, they had developed bronze casting in southern Russia and the northern Near East. This method required enclosed clay-lined furnaces driven by bellows. However, the basic metals of bronze – copper and tin – were not widely available around the Mediterranean and in Mesopotamia. This must have been one of the prime factors behind the development of trade within and soon also outside these regions. In turn, this trade decisively changed the long-static economies and societies of Western and Central Europe.³⁶

For now, long-distance trade routes came to connect the people who worked the mineral resources of the Carpathians, Austria and southern Germany with their customers around the Aegean. This brought them great wealth, resulting in a changing material culture that has left many exciting traces documenting the existence and the life-style of substantial elites in these regions – again through the rich grave-offerings that have been discovered. Chieftains and their families were buried with their horses and bronze chariots, with carefully crafted drinking vessels and beautifully tooled and decorated weapons, all of which indicate prestige but also, of course, surplus wealth. Even in Europe's more northerly regions, where copper and tin were not available for exchange, skilfully-worked bronze was sought; there, amber and fur were used as barter.

In short, by 1300–1100 BC, most of South and Central Europe had entered into their 'Bronze Age'.

Invasion, conquest and change: the second Eurasian wave

The second great wave of invasions, or migrations, from the steppes of Eurasia into the eastern Mediterranean occurred from the fifteenth century BC onwards. It was particularly destructive. While scholarly opinion on this period is characterized by many conflicting interpretations, tribes; undeniably, tribes coming from or through the Balkans and Italy penetrated into the eastern part of the Mediterranean. Wearing horned helmets and bearing large round shields and spears, the invaders seized power whenever and wherever they could.³⁷ Called 'sea raiders' by the Egyptians, they even conquered the pharaonic kingdom, as shown by the commemorative engravings depicting their attacks that cover the walls of the great temple of Medinet Habu, built by Pharaoh Rameses II a century later.

Though many splendid monuments, like the royal palaces of Knossos, on Crete, were lost during these invasions, all sorts of culture, such as language, writing and religion, were retained by the new rulers, as part of the societies

that now evolved, for the original inhabitants of the Aegean world soon mixed with the newcomers.³⁸

But while changes occurred all over the eastern Mediterranean, from a modern European point of view what happened in the communities of the Levant and Greece is the most interesting, though these functioned at the margin of the great civilizations of pharaonic Egypt and the kingdoms of Mesopotamia.

A ‘marginal’ culture? Trade and communication in Phoenicia

Certainly by the twenty-fifth century BC, trading cities started to flourish along the Levant, the coast of northern Syria and the Lebanon. Specifically the narrow strip between the foothills of the Syrian and Lebanese mountains and the sea was called Phoenicia by the ancient Greeks. The cities originated in the little pockets of arable land along the streams running down from the mountains. Lack of further agricultural potential turned the people to the sea. Soon, they began to trade along the almost natural routes that, from east to west and north to south, intersected their region: for here the Syrian and Palestinian coast and its flat, relatively fertile hinterland connected to Anatolia as well as to the islands and coasts of the Mediterranean; but also to the north of present-day Iraq and, via the Euphrates and the Tigris, and the Persian Gulf, to the civilizations along the Indus River in north-western India; and, last but not least, along the coast to the delta of the Nile. Although the Phoenician region never became politically united, these cities shared similar governmental structures. Moreover, their inhabitants spoke the same language and often worshipped the same gods.³⁹

Prosperity increased when, in the twelfth century BC, the Phoenicians discovered that besides the dye that could be obtained from the sea-snails abundant in their coastal waters – the famous ‘Tyrian purple’ – many of their trading partners lacked raw materials like copper and tin, essential for manufacturing bronze weapons and tools, and wood. Thus, at an early stage, old cities like Jericho, in the Jordan valley, as well as new ones such as Byblos, Sidon, Tyre and Ugarit, on the coast, began to flourish.

During the turbulent years between 1500 and 1100 BC, many of the great kingdoms and city-states in the Near East were either weakened or even destroyed by the invaders from the north. When rest returned after the invasions ceased, some of the Phoenician cities took the opportunity to expand. They (re-)established contacts with the fertile and wealthy valleys around the Aegean but also with Northern Africa – where slaves, ivory and gold were to be had, as well as all kinds of agricultural products – and with Italy, southern France and eastern Spain, the latter important for its silver deposits. Whenever possible, they established settlements and colonies, to allow part of their own population to emigrate. Thus, they exported many elements of their eastern Mediterranean culture to regions that, especially technologically, were not as advanced.

Somewhere in the middle of the second millennium BC, in the Syrian city of Ugarit, the many hundreds of signs up till then used for writing the Near Eastern languages were reduced to some 30. In around 1000 BC, the Phoenicians further developed this system, giving a specific sign to each specific sound, usually the first of the word for the object which the sign had originally been associated with: *alef*, from the first sound for 'cow', became the 'letter' or sound 'a', and so on.⁴⁰ This revolutionary development can, perhaps, be explained by the commercial milieu in which it took place. Whereas in the temple-states of Egypt and Mesopotamia, reading and writing the complicated sign system was deliberately restricted to a small group of highly educated and hence powerful people – though later simplified systems did develop there, too, to enable everyday use – such trading societies as Ugarit and the Phoenician cities devised a simple script that would be easy to learn by all those who needed the writing skill but could not afford to spend long years at school.

A 'marginal' culture? Democracy and its limitations in Greece

As indicated in the introduction, many Europeans are taught to look upon the culture of ancient Greece as one of the roots of their civilization. Yet, nowadays, their image of it is largely shaped by epic films and television series, and other forms of popular representation.⁴¹ If anything, these tend to dramatically romanticize and indeed distort the Greek world in such a way that it seems less alien, more like a society which twenty-first century people can 'relate' to. It is, therefore, necessary to understand not only to what extent Greek culture really was a precursor of the modern European world, but also which aspects of it were very different indeed.

By the twelfth century BC, the Mycenaean and Cretan civilizations had disappeared from Greece. New Indo-European, so-called 'Dorian', tribes, part of the second great Eurasian wave, settled there between 1200 and 800 BC. While they did adopt some elements from the civilizations they conquered or merged with, by and large they maintained their own lifestyles.⁴² This new society was concentrated around military leaders, local 'rulers' who were, however, more like rustic gentleman farmers than the splendid kings of old who had lived a refined palace culture in great cities. Writing largely disappeared, and bards became the bearers and transmitters of a mostly oral culture, singing the praises of their heroic ancestors in epic poems.

Two collections survive: the *Iliad*, which tells of the battle between a number of rulers from the Greek mainland and the king of Troy, a city in present-day north-western Turkey; and the *Odyssey*, which describes the subsequent fate of one of the heroes of this Trojan War, who manages to return home only after a long and perilous journey that takes him across the Mediterranean. The existence of that literary Troy has been debated among historians for more than a century after its discovery, in the 1860s, by the

German archaeologist Heinrich Schliemann – who, incidentally, set out to do so precisely to refute long-standing scholarship that held that the *Iliad* was romance rather than history. Though both Schliemann's methods and his interpretations are highly debated and, indeed, debatable, nowadays we do accept that the town immortalized by the epic did exist. Situated in a commercially and militarily strategic place – on the straits separating Anatolia and the Near East from mainland Europe – it was named 'Ilios', or 'Wilusa' and it is quite likely that a war was fought over it between the 'Achai(w)oi', the Peloponnesian Greeks, and the city's inhabitants.⁴³

Both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* – which may or may not be based on any ancient Greek's historical travels – were, and still are attributed to the poet Homer, who supposedly lived c.750 BC, meaning he described events that had occurred some four centuries before his life-time. While some scholars doubt his existence and, hence, authorship altogether, others maintain that even if he was the writer, he was certainly not the only one. For he evidently composed his part of the text by codifying much older, anonymous, orally transferred traditions. In turn, his texts were added to by later contributors, also anonymous.

From these two huge and, regarding the *Iliad*, also hugely-complex poems, a world emerges of gods and men interacting. The humans live a 'romantic' or rather chivalrous culture, in which valorous but often also vainglorious males treated women both as objects of desire and as the spoils of war: in the *Iliad*, war has broken out because Helen, the wife of a king from one of the Greek states, is captured by the son of the king of Troy and must be won back. Indeed, the *Iliad* sings the glories of an intensely competitive society, which considered physical prowess to be a sign of power. These themes, that probably resulted from the Indo-European stock of orally-transmitted stories, still resound through the literature of the modern world, as witnessed by, for example, the immensely popular 'Game of Thrones'-novels and their televised visualizations broadcast during the 2010s.

Yet, given its genesis in a century-old oral culture, the *Iliad* also contains fascinating glimpses of the world at the end of the previous, second millennium: comparison of Homer's text with the oldest stories of ancient Israel recorded in the first books of the Jewish Bible and with the epic poems from Egypt and Mesopotamia shows what the cultures around the eastern Mediterranean had had in common, certainly until the invasions and migrations of 1500–1100 BC. Thus, they shared the spectacular story of the Flood, which is found in the Noah-episode of the Biblical book of Genesis and in the much older Babylonian epic of the hero Gilgamesh. It probably had its historical basis in the orally-transmitted reminiscences of the huge inundations caused by the breaking of the salt barrier between the Aegean and the great lake that became the Black Sea, in the fifth millennium BC. Whereas some scholars think that in Greece this 'oriental' influence had effectively ended with the Dorian invasions, others hold that right down to, precisely, the eighth century BC, the 'Age of Homer', the economic relations

between the Near Eastern states were such that the entire eastern Mediterranean remained a cultural continuum – a continuum, however, that during the seventh and sixth centuries BC was slowly taken over by the Greek-speaking inhabitants of the coasts of the Aegean.⁴⁴

For even as Homer was recording stories both from the Greeks' distant and not so distant past, the society which he was part of was already changing. The populations of the Greek communities were growing; this necessitated not only agricultural expansion, but also a turn to trade, to provide an additional means of existence. In the process, the gap between rich and poor seems to have widened. Also, farming villages began to cooperate, creating a new structure called the *polis* – hence 'politics' as the all-inclusive word for the management of a community's socio-administrative processes, including its legal and military aspects.

In most Greek *poleis*, the tribal monarchy gradually disappeared, to be replaced by government by nobles from the most powerful families who, in the past, had been military leaders; they were those who called themselves the community's best men, the *aristoi*. The rivalry between these families frequently led to chaos; sometimes a single person seized power and ruled as a tyrant; at other times efforts to achieve peace resulted in power-sharing between various socioeconomic groups. This is what happened in the *polis* of Athens during the so-called 'Classical' age.⁴⁵

When, at the beginning of the fifth century BC, an Athenian politician called Solon introduced reforms trying to establish the rule of law, factional strife was not eradicated. In the year 508 BC, after nearly a century of war between successive tyrants and aristocratic cliques, Kleisthenes, a nobleman, decided to broaden his power by incorporating the common citizens, the 'demos', into his support base – hence, 'democracy'. Men from the more than 100 'dèmè', or neighbourhoods, which comprised Athens, were elected by lot to various administrative bodies, the most important of which was the Council of Five Hundred, or 'boulè'. However, the People's Council, made up of all adult male citizens, some 30,000 persons, had the right to vote. Yet, we should be wary of idealizing this situation or comparing it to present-day representative democracy – if only because most people living in Athens were slaves, who had no political rights whatsoever. Moreover, besides being a politically male-only system, attendance at the democratic meetings, which took place almost every week, meant that the voters who did not live in the city proper, and had to travel to attend, lost a day's work. In practice, this meant only the wealthy Athenians, who inhabited the centre, were able to exercise their democratic rights, and, thus, monopolize decision-making.

In addition, only the rich could be elected to the most senior positions, since they had the free time and the education necessary to execute complex daily administrative tasks, as well as the prestige and financial means to ensure public support for their election. To be sure, to put an end to the resulting corruption, it was decided that state subsidies would be made available to the poor to enable them to attend the People's Council and various jury courts.

This improved the situation though it still did not prevent the wealthy from frequently winning votes by a show of power, carefully selected charity and some plain bribery, allowing them yet to gain the offices through which they could continue to dominate government.

Also, the communication that would have ensured well-informed decision-making among voters was mostly lacking. To start with, most Athenians knew how to read only rudimentarily, if at all.⁴⁶ Moreover, while people may have discussed politics often, at decisive meetings the political leaders delivering their speeches simply could not be heard by everyone present during these huge, open-air meetings. Demagogy, or the capacity to somehow influence the voters by winning over, first, a small group – e.g. those sitting in the front rows – and through them ‘collect’ the votes of the larger community, was widely used by various power seekers.

Since Athenian society knew no equality of property or income, the rich could afford to accept the theory and to a certain extent even some of the practice of political democracy. Thus, the freeborn poor were given legal equality and seem not to have suffered institutionalized tyranny and exploitation; also, they could at least partly benefit from the practice of consultation and control in the exercise of power. Yet it is not without significance that two of Classical Greece’s most influential political thinkers, Plato (428/27–348/47 BC) and Aristotle (384–322 BC), held rather negative views of the democratic system. Plato, in his *Politeia*, sketches democracy as the regiment of unlimited freedom in which all desires exist together. The ensuing anarchy cannot but result in a subsequent phase of tyranny. According to Aristotle, in his *Politika* – part III, 1278–9, democracy, far from being the ‘*aristè polis*’, the ‘best form of government for a city-state’, is the rule of the poor. Describing the state and its political-constitutional structure, he presupposed a *polis* of manageable proportions, necessary because in the Greek view democracy was immediate rather than representative. However, he also presupposed a system in which the citizens proper were relatively free from day-to-day toil because immigrant workers, the ‘*metoikoi*’ – Aristotle himself came from this group – and even outright slaves performed the heavy manual tasks.

Thus, while Greek thinkers have proposed fascinating theories about the various forms of political organization, we should not uncritically proclaim them the progenitors of Western parliamentary democracy.⁴⁷ Indeed, both theoretically and practically, their ideas diverged considerably from the ideas and practices that developed in Europe during a far later period. But the discussion their ideas engendered throughout the ages definitely has been fruitful.

Herodotus (c.485–425 BC), a merchant and traveller who has often been called the ‘father of history’ because of his *Historiai*, his ‘stories’ about his life, his travels and the world in which he lived, was born in Halikarnassos in Asia Minor but spent most of his life in Athens. In the third book of his History, he describes a discussion between three men about the best, or at least the

most preferable, form of government. He uses three fictitious, high-ranking Persians as his mouthpiece, yet it is clear that he presents a debate that had been going on in Greece for decades. In its condemnation of monarchical government, his text was directed against the Persians, by that time the Greeks' most dreaded enemy since, from present-day Iran, their emperors ruled the better part of the Near and Middle East. However, Herodotus also rails against those Greeks who showed monarchic tendencies themselves. Nevertheless, Herodotus' analysis is far from being an ode to democracy; rather, it is an outstanding description of the historical phases that government in many Greek *poleis* actually went through. It summarizes the arguments for and against not only democracy but also oligarchy and monarchy, pointing out, for instance, the ease with which uneducated public opinion can be manipulated, the greed and self-interest of cliques and factions, and the tyranny of a king. These arguments continue to be of vital interest in our own age and, as such, have lost none of their relevance:

The first speaker was Otares, and his theme was to recommend the establishment in Persia of democratic government. 'I think,' he said, 'that the time has passed for any man among us to have absolute power. Monarchy is neither pleasant nor good ... How can one fit monarchy into any sound system of ethics, when it allows a man to do whatever he likes without any responsibility or control? Even the best of men raised to such a position would be bound to change for the worse – he could not possibly see things as he used to do. The typical vices of a monarch are envy and pride; envy, because it is a natural human weakness, and pride because excessive wealth and power lead to the delusion that he is something more than a man. These two vices are the root cause of all wickedness: both lead to acts of savage and unnatural violence ...

A king again, is the most inconsistent of men; show him reasonable respect, and he is angry because you do not abase yourself before his majesty; abase yourself, and he hates you for being a toady. But the worst of all remains to be said – he breaks up the structure of ancient tradition and law, forces women to serve his pleasure, and puts men to death without trial.

Contrast this with the rule of the people: first, it has the finest of all names to describe it – equality under law; and, secondly, the people in power do none of the things that monarchs do. Under a government of the people, a magistrate is appointed by lot and is held responsible for his conduct in office, and all questions are put up for open debate ... the state and the people are synonymous terms.'

Megabyzus ... recommended the principle of oligarchy in the following words: 'In so far as Otares spoke in favour of abolishing monarchy, I agree with him; but he is wrong in asking us to transfer political power to the people. The masses are a feckless lot – nowhere will you find more ignorance or irresponsibility or violence. It would be an intolerable thing to escape the murderous caprice of a king, only to be caught by the equally

wanton brutality of the rabble. A king does at least act consciously and deliberately; but the mob does not. Indeed, how should it, when it has never been taught what is right and proper, and has no knowledge of its own about such things? The masses have not a thought in their head; all they can do is rush blindly into politics like a river in flood ... let us ourselves choose a certain number of the best men in the country, and give them political power ... it is only natural to suppose that the best men will produce the best policy.'

Darius was the third to speak. 'I support,' he said, 'all Megabyzus said about the masses but I do not agree with what he said of oligarchy. Take the three forms of government we are considering – democracy, oligarchy, and monarchy – and suppose each of them to be the best of its kind; I maintain the third is greatly preferable to the other two. One ruler: it is impossible to improve upon that – provided he is the best. His judgment will be in keeping with his character; his control of the people will be beyond reproach; his measures against enemies and traitors will be kept secret more easily than under other forms of government. In an oligarchy, the fact that a number of men are competing for distinction in the public service cannot but lead to violent personal feuds; each of them wants to get to the top, and to see his own proposals carried; so they quarrel ... and from that state of affairs the only way out is a return to monarchy – a clear proof that monarchy is best.

Again, in a democracy, malpractices are bound to occur; in this case, however, corrupt dealings in government services lead not to private feuds, but to close personal associations, the men responsible for them putting their heads together and mutually supporting one another. And so it goes on, until somebody or other comes forward as the people's champion and breaks up the cliques which are out for their own interests. This wins him the admiration of the mob, and as a result he soon finds himself entrusted with absolute power, all of which is another proof that the best form of government is monarchy.'⁴⁸

As indicated above, we also should realize that in Athens – the Greek city we know most about – not only the *c.*80,000 slaves but also half of the freeborn adults, namely all women, were excluded from politics as, indeed, they were from many other aspects of public life.⁴⁹ For legally, too, women were considered unfit to speak or even act for themselves, and had to accept male guardianship all through their life, first of a father or a brother, later of a husband or a son. Their first duty was to bear children, preferably many, as only four in ten would survive infancy. While parents were required to educate their sons in preparation of at least a minimal participation in city affairs, they kept their daughters in close confinement at home. Even there, females were restricted to the women's quarters. Of formal, literary education for girls, little evidence survives. Women took care of the household chores, preparing the meals that, with population growth and the conversion of

precious soil from pasture into arable land, came to consist more and more of fish than of meat; incidentally, they were not supposed to eat with the male members of the family. Lower-class women may have gone out to work, although in a slave society most menial jobs were taken already. Middle- and upper-class girls who went out into the streets never did so unaccompanied; they may even have worn a veil. It is not clear whether women were allowed to visit the theatre, where plays enacted, articulated and shaped much of the views and attitudes of the Athenians. Still, women did participate in the processions honouring some of the gods. In the so-called mystery cults, presided over by priestesses, they even found a domain partly outside immediate male control.

In short, Athens and all other Greek cities were male-dominated societies.⁵⁰ Even Greek vase-painting seems to confirm this. Whenever women are depicted, both the freeborn and the slaves, they are shown serving the men, in the house, in the tavern or in the brothel. Only men went out to the gymnasium, participating in the many sports that Greek culture set such store by precisely because they enhanced the virtues of manly valour. Only men went out to the regular meetings of the fraternities that took care of funerals, organizing collections to allow the member-families to have a proper feast on the day of the burial. Only men went out to dinner, drinking from cups painted with scenes representing sexuality in all possible forms, mostly objectifying the female role – but, of course, the women depicted thereon were not free-born, 'honest' women. Actually, outside marriage free Athenian women were simply unavailable as sexual partners; slaves or foreign-born prostitutes took that role.

Interestingly, sexuality was not gender-structured, divided into heterosexuality and homosexuality. Rather, it was conceived as an act between an active and a passive participant, the active one mostly being male, older and of higher status, as opposed to the passive one, who could be either male or female.

Thus, it was, or so a number of scholars argue, quite common for men to practise what are now called homosexual acts, though the word homosexuality was not used by the ancient Greeks. The acts certainly were not frowned upon or stigmatized, the more so since they were practised mostly in an age-structured form, with a younger man, eager for education in all fields of life, sexually subservient to an older, wiser one. He himself would assume the role of mentor when he too came of age.⁵¹ Yet though, at least among the elite, sexual as well as emotional relationships between adult and slightly younger men may have prevailed, I still feel that this cannot have been common practice. While it is true that marriage was more of a social and procreative norm than a sexual and emotive state excluding other attachments – as it has been in most societies over the past millennia – the conclusion that bisexuality was actually wide-spread throughout Greek society may very well reflect present-day wishful thinking in search for past legitimization. Indeed, there is ample material indicating that male-female sexuality prevailed. Even though marriages were always arranged, and the

man, marrying at around age 30, was usually twice as old as the woman, partners often seem to have come to 'love' each other. Yet it is also true that for a man, divorce was very easy indeed, a simple declaration before witnesses being sufficient. Women, on the contrary, could separate for only a few very grave causes and had to go through complex legal procedures.

In short, the position of women in Classical Greece much resembled that in, e.g., traditional Islamic cultures. The *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* already summarized the female situation: Helen's infidelity created chaos, while at Ithaca the housebound faithfulness of Penelope to her seafaring husband Odysseus, presumed dead, restored order. However, much later, i.e. in the fifth century BC, the playwright Euripides showed that he was aware of the problems prevailing attitudes provoked among the female part of the population when he gave Medea, the heroine of his eponymous tragedy, the words: 'Of all living, thinking beings, we women are the most unlucky'. Nor was, a generation later, the philosopher Plato unaware of the imbalance. He is supposed to have given thanks to nature, first because he was human rather than animal and, second, because he was a man rather than a woman – continuing the enumeration of his good fortunes by adding how lucky he was to be Greek rather than a foreigner and, lastly, an Athenian citizen living at the same time as Socrates.

Only in the third and second centuries BC did Greek women acquire greater freedom, expressed, amongst other things, in and through the education that now became available not only to boys but, also, to upper-class girls.

In considering all these forms of Greek culture – that, in their gendered ways, continued to characterize life, also in Europe, well into the late nineteenth century, and in other parts of the world still subsist – we should be aware that the evidence we have is overwhelmingly urban and, indeed, Athenian, as well as upper class. It is hard to judge if the situation was different in other, smaller cities, let alone in the countryside. Even the ideas of female beauty may reflect this complex, source-based bias: we know that women who could afford to do so liked to wear a thick layer of white facial make-up, obviously to show they were not forced to go out to work for a living or, worse, labour in the fields as farmers and slaves did. Whether the lips, painted a bright red, and the hair, dyed a golden blond, also indicated a subconscious desire to emphasize a racial difference is difficult to say.

Political, social and cultural structures comparable, in varying degrees, with those in Athens evolved in many Greek *poleis*. Yet, through its sociopolitical constellation as well as on the basis of its great wealth, gained through its agricultural resources as well as its maritime expansion, in the fifth and fourth century BC Athens became the most important city-state of the Greek-speaking world. But although they repeatedly tried to do so, the Athenian leaders did not succeed in gaining control over the other cities.⁵² Nevertheless, their town became an exemplary centre, attracting talent in many fields from all over the Aegean and the Near East. Relative freedom, an educated elite and an economy which had been booming for some time

led to a vibrant intellectual climate in which many forms of culture developed and were then copied elsewhere in the Greek world.⁵³ In this way, Athenian Greek culture gained a glory which far exceeded its relative political importance.

In Athens, as in most other Greek cities, political, social and cultural life concentrated around a holy place, a shrine – generally located on the highest point of the *polis*, the *akro-polis*, easiest to defend and nearest to heaven – and a meeting place, *agora*, where the adult men from the *polis* gathered for communal affairs. Young men from the elite were taught not only to read and write, and told the old tales about gods and heroes, but also trained in rhetoric, a way of speaking and thinking specifically geared to public action and politics. Precisely this education, perfected in wealthy Athens, both reflected and contributed to the further development of a standard Greek language and a specifically Greek cultural pattern.

Both in Greece and in the other cultures of the eastern Mediterranean, gods were represented as humans, admittedly with more power than ordinary mortals but still with the same urges and desires, virtues and vices.⁵⁴ This meant that, from the point of view of ethics, the norms people used to guide their lives were determined by social rather than what we would now term religious or ethical-moral considerations. In the relations a person had with others – family, or age-group, neighbours, fellow townsmen – honour and shame were the dominant values, not guilt and atonement resulting from subjection and surrender to a morally superior essence, a perfect deity. Indeed, it seems that in their Classical era, many Athenians spent a considerable amount of their time fighting those whom they thought to have blemished their dignity – in court, however, rather than through blood feuds as in the previous age of kings and heroes.⁵⁵

Yet, other views about the ways people should consider their role in society did develop as well. In the fifth century BC, the so-called 'Sophist' school of thinkers dominated higher education. They argued that through logical, rational analysis man could uncover the rules which governed the structure of language and nature. But applying the same method, he would find there were no absolute laws: life and human action were based on conventions which people had agreed upon among themselves. However, the philosopher Socrates (469–399 BC) opposed this view, maintaining that general laws did exist, firmly anchored in absolute moral norms independent of man, time and place. It is an opposition that still fuels discussion about the validity of values in present-day society.

Yet, the 'man in the street' did relate his everyday experience as well as his actions to a larger order, judging life and society by the views embodied in a corpus of myths, in stories about the world of the gods and their relationship to the world of man. These myths, which we also encounter in the *Iliad*, were the collective representations of subconscious visions of the world of landscapes, of nature, but also of family structure and the

community, and constituted sources of great authoritative meaning in Greek society, up to the third and second centuries BC.⁵⁶

Interestingly, the theatre was one of the places where these myths were enacted. Specifically drama as created in Athens, in its two forms of tragedy and comedy, developed from the festive celebrations for the fertility god Dionysus. Vying for the honour to be invited to write plays for such events and thus instruct and please the public who attended it, led to creative competition between, for example, the dramatists Sophocles and Euripides. Consequently, they and many others produced inspiring texts that still fascinate a twenty-first century audience. For despite their time-bound context, they often articulate problems modern Europeans also wrestle with.⁵⁷

Whereas in tragedy the relations between man and the gods was the central theme, comedy developed as a form of political cabaret. Both genres, though staged for the edification and enjoyment of the people, also were used to legitimize political ideas, and ideologically manipulate the electorate.⁵⁸ For, at least to many scholars, the question whether the majority of Athenian citizens actually did attend these plays should be answered in the affirmative – as, also, the more debated question whether women were part of the audience.

Even though the Greek cities had a common identity, not only in their language and in the organization of their polytheistic pantheon but also in the political and philosophical discussions that were central to the cultural life of the elite, as I wrote the various *poleis* jealously guarded their independence, certainly vis-à-vis dominance-seeking Athens. Partly because aggression and expansion within the Greek world itself were either only briefly successful, or failed altogether, the cities had to find other ways of solving their internal problems, mostly economic and demographic. Colonization was one such option.

As a result of trade, the Greek and Phoenician cultures had already intersected in the tenth and ninth centuries BC. Obviously, the Phoenicians, expanding their power in the western part of the Mediterranean, were an example for the Greeks: from the seventh century BC, many *poleis* founded settlements there, too, first as trading posts, but soon as colonies as well. Thus, the culture of the Greek cities spread to southern Italy, southern France and eastern Spain.⁵⁹ One element deserves specific mention.

Already in the time of Homer, the Greeks had adopted Phoenician ‘alpha-betic’ script, adding to it signs to represent the vowels the Phoenician system lacked; in doing so, Greek writing became more compact and less equivocal. In southern Italy, dominated by Greek colonies, first the native Etruscan rulers and later their Roman successors took over this very useful communication tool. Thus the ‘alpha-bet’, this ‘Asian’ invention, provided the origins for the writing system that eventually came to be used first in Europe and then throughout the whole of the Western world.

Besides the alphabet, Greek thinkers have contributed one other undisputedly formative cultural element to the West: their ways of reasoning, of describing everything that exists and, then, of analysing and interpreting it

by means of scientific concepts. Obviously, these philosophers were not more intelligent than those operating in various other cultures – such as ancient India and China – either in their cognitive capacities or in developing a logic to deal rationally with the questions raised by their observations of nature and culture. Indeed, the Chinese, for example, did reason by way of a logic perhaps as systematic and critical as that of, say, Aristotle. Yet, the Greeks showed a special interest in radical questioning and arguing perhaps because of their political experience in the tradition of continuous debate both within and between the many city-states.⁶⁰ The resulting rationality, later adopted by the Romans and introduced by them into the education of their empire that subsequently became Christian and European, has deeply influenced Western thinking over the past 2,000 years. Admittedly, however, it has not resulted in a single scientific concept that can satisfactorily describe the many-dimensional nature of reality. Indeed, even some of the Greek 'philosophers' themselves already agreed that there might be many ways to describe 'truth', because a single point of view is unlikely to cover all its manifestations.

A 'marginal' culture? Tribal society in Celtic Europe

Meanwhile, in the second millennium BC, life in geographical Europe beyond the Mediterranean regions known to the Greeks – southern Italy and southern Spain – had changed again precisely because, as in the eastern Mediterranean, new groups moving south and west from their homelands in present-day Russia and Central Asia made their influence felt. As always, archaeological finds provide evidence of the ensuing developments.

In Europe proper, people continued to live in clans and tribes, dominated by aristocratic families who owed their power to their military leadership and the wealth produced by dependent farmers. Druids and sages, shamanistic medicine men, continued to control the contacts with the 'other' world through magic and various forms of ritual. But now, lentils were introduced, as well as broad beans and millet, which soon became a staple, being strong and growing quickly. And villages made way for hill forts, large, walled-in spaces, probably erected to protect against external attack.⁶¹ Burying the dead in graves was replaced by cremation and the preservation of ashes in funerary urns – hence the name 'Urnfield culture' given to this period. This new practice seems to reflect a deeper, spiritual change: rather than stressing the need to preserve the wholeness of the body for the afterlife, the corpse was now allowed to decay because it was valueless. In the visual arts, scenes depicted men – warriors – performing heroic deeds: action and glory are what remains for posterity, while the soul lives on, borne to another world by birds and boats, symbols that start to occur frequently, also in the boat-shaped stone settings for the buried urns.

This culture, which came to dominate the greater part of geographical Europe for the next millennium, has been named Celtic, simply because the Greek traveller and writer Herodotus, who, by the way, never visited these parts, named these Europeans 'Keltoi'.⁶² The Celts, or Gauls, truly were the builders

of a 'Europe before Europe', the bearers – since c.1300–1100 BC – of the first civilization which encompassed the entire region from Brittany to the Balkans and the Baltic.⁶³ Regrettably for our better understanding of this foundational civilization, the Celts did not write and, hence, have left no written records. We know them through their material remains, only: enormous stone structures, magnificent gold jewellery and many other objects which are evidence of its prosperity, also gained through transcontinental trade.

The centres of Celtic culture were, roughly, eastern France/Switzerland, southern Germany/Austria and western Bohemia, with a definite core in the Hallstatt-region, near the Salzkammergut, in Austria, and the La Tène-areas near Lake Neuchâtel, in Switzerland. There, a number of chiefdoms ruled by military aristocracies controlled rich reserves of copper, silver and tin. They also controlled some of Europe's main waterways – the Seine, Saône and Rhône, the Rhine and the Danube – that reached the farthest corners of their world.

The power of the various Celtic societies was greatly strengthened when, once more in the eastern Mediterranean, new metallurgical techniques were developed: besides making bronze, people now knew how to melt iron. But to do so, they needed iron ore, which was abundantly available in the Celtic lands.⁶⁴ The resulting, increasingly intricate trade networks came to include Spain as well: the great reserves of silver found there allowed the silver coins to be minted which became the motor of the growing economies of the South European and Mediterranean cultures.⁶⁵

Actually, precisely silver was among the main stimuli that, by the ninth century BC, had induced both the Greeks and the Phoenicians to settle in the western Mediterranean. The Greeks founded Massalia – Marseilles – which controlled the trade routes to the north via the Rhône river. They also settled in Ampurias, near present-day Barcelona, and traded with the Guadalquivir region, with the so-called 'Tartessos kingdoms': wealthy Phoenician foundations, as were the Phoenician trading posts on Ibiza. Soon, the whole of Celtic Europe became a series of interlocking systems of trade, connecting Cadiz with the Shetland Islands and, perhaps, even beyond to the shores of the Baltic. But the same systems also were linked to the Black Sea and the Danube.

However, in the seventh and sixth century BC, the climate in Europe deteriorated again. Especially trans-Alpine Europe became far more humid, and huge tracts of arable land slowly turned into peat bogs. People had to find new ways to survive, for their mainly agricultural economy had reached the limits of its productivity. Driven by overpopulation, Celtic groups began to expand to the south and south-east, over the Alps to the rich Italian peninsula and through the Balkans to the world of the Greeks and the states of Asia Minor. If anything, these migratory movements strengthened the already complex trade area of the Celts. Cultural exchanges increased as shown, for example, by the magnificent *krater* found in the 1930s in a noble lady's grave in Vix, France: it is a bronze drinking vessel, 1.68 metres high, clearly of Near Eastern, Greek-influenced workmanship. It is only one of many finds that tell us that Greek material culture

slowly began to pervade Celtic civilization, just as Celtic motifs turn up in Greek and, later, Roman art.⁶⁶

As I wrote, we know little about the details of Celtic culture beyond what we conclude from the archaeological finds that led to its rediscovery in the eighteenth century. Admittedly, we have found additional references to the Celts in the texts their Greek trading partners wrote, but it is preciously little and was, as in the case of Herodotus, mostly based on hearsay. Our only other source are the Celtic myths and legends. But it took almost a thousand years of oral transmission before such tales as the story of King Arthur⁶⁷ and the romance of Tristan and Isolde were recorded in writing and then, inevitably, in much-distorted versions. Indeed, we now know that specifically the Arthurian 'romances' were literary fictions, created in the twelfth century AD to give the then-nascent English state a heroic ancestor, a founder who defended the island against the Anglo-Saxon hordes who invaded this fiercely independent kingdom from the hostile continent; archaeological research and DNA analysis have shown that such an invasion never took place at all. Rather, the alleged Arthur's seat, Tintagel, in tin-producing Cornwall, was the farthest trading post in the trading network that linked the Atlantic to, even, the eastern Mediterranean.

In the nineteenth century, scholars in Western and Central Europe systematically began to look for their earliest roots. For a number of 'nationalistic' reasons they were not always happy to have to do so in the ancient societies of the eastern Mediterranean – by then no longer considered 'Classical', if only because they were not Christian, but, rather, Islamic. Precisely then Celtic civilization was increasingly romanticized and, indeed, idealized as having marked the 'dawn of Europe'.⁶⁸

The 'birth of Europe' and the Greek world-view, or how to define one's own culture

Nevertheless, one has to return to the ancient Greeks to see when the designation 'Europe' was first used and what they who coined it meant by it.⁶⁹ For the Greeks, Europe first and foremost was a geographical term which they adopted in the seventh century BC. The first mention speaks of 'the Peloponnese, Europe and the islands whose shores are lapped by the sea',⁷⁰ which, presumably, indicates that Europe, to them, was the mainland beyond the Peloponnese. Actually, the geographical knowledge of the Greeks was rather limited: they considered the Mediterranean to be, literally, the centre of the world they knew, or, as in the sixth-century BC Hekataios of Miletos wrote in his 'history': the sea that divided the two known worlds, Asia – 'the world of the rising sun', after an Assyrian word denoting that concept and which at first also included North Africa – and Europe.⁷¹

They also held definite ideas about their own culture. These resulted from a 'mental mechanism' by which most societies define themselves – their world of identity, of normality: they describe its peripheral areas and their

inhabitants as ab-normal, branding them as foreign and even uncivilized; only by defining what is their own and what is another's can people feel secure. Placing themselves at the centre of the world, the ancient Greeks stated that Africa (which only was given its independent geographical status several centuries later in the writings of Herodotus), was black and uncivilized, with the exception of Egypt, whence came many of the arts prized by the Greek elites.⁷² Asia they deemed more civilized but politically and militarily unsound. This, in fact, was wishful thinking rather than true, since it reflected Greek fear of the Persians who, in the sixth century BC, had expanded their home-territory, Iran, at the expense of the Greek cities on the coast of Asia Minor. Their armies even marched to within a short distance of Athens. It is true that Greek coalitions were able to halt them – in 490 BC at Marathon and in 480/479 at Salamis and Plataiai – but this did not prevent Persian pressure being noticeably felt, especially in Greek Anatolia. Precisely in this military context, the linguistic as well as cultural distinction between Greek and non-Greek gradually acquired a broader political content. For example, the difference between 'Greek freedom' and the 'oriental despotism' of the Persian great-kings was made plain with dramatic panache in Aeschylus' famous play *The Persians*.

In short, cultural stereotypes developed in the Greek world mainly as a result of the necessity to militarily confront the Persians, greatly helped to create a 'national' Greek identity. Europe, or rather the Greek sphere of influence, was the most civilized world and consequently, it was thought, the strongest region. Its strength came from a civilization concentrated in free, independent and – at least according to the Greek self-image and their political and cultural propaganda – democratic city-states which between them maintained a balance of power. These states, sharing the same language and the same religious and cultural traditions, constituted 'Hellas': not a political structure nor, indeed, a specific geographical entity but a cultural community. It celebrated its cohesion in such manifestations as the games held every fourth year near the great temple of Zeus at Olympia, in the Peloponnese, or in the pilgrimages made to the famous Pythia, the oracle at the sanctuary of Delphi, with its processional way climbing a mountain overlooking the Gulf of Corinth and lined with sumptuous monuments and statues presented by Greek cities and private citizens alike. As a cultural community of independent states, 'Hellas', in Europe, differed greatly – though certainly not as fundamentally as the Greeks would have it – from the 'other' world, from Asia, where large political systems encompassed and dominated numerous communities, and where luxury-loving despots ruled with brutal force.

And yet, the very term 'Europe' was derived from a mythical story about the rape of a maiden thus named. She was, significantly, a Phoenician princess who had been abducted from the shores of Asia by the father of the Greek gods, Zeus. Did the Greeks thus recognize and even honour their many, long-standing cultural debts to the Near East? Herodotus did not fail

to mention that the alphabet had been a Phoenician invention. And Plato, who may have crossed the Mediterranean to see other worlds, wrote admiringly about the religious and philosophical ideas of Egypt. Indeed, scholars during recent decades have found increasing evidence of Greek indebtedness to the cultures of the Near as well as Middle East, typically saying that even the Acropolis in Athens, considered by many Europeans the exemplary manifestation of Greek culture, would not have been built but for Greek knowledge of the great Persian palaces.

On a deeper level, the Greeks felt they could explain how their civilization had been shaped and why it was different. The prime cause was climate, which was so varied in Europe that four seasons followed each other in one year: the annual change of temperature, from cold to hot, made people flexible and active, both physically and mentally. In Africa and Asia the situation was different: there, temperature was more even, and generally warmer, too, causing body and spirit to be less flexible and more sluggish; consequently, people in these parts were indolent and inactive, easily led by tyrannical kings and emperors. Their other-ness, foreign-ness was expressed in their language, too. Instead of speaking the language of civilization, Greek, they spoke words that sounded like 'barbar' and, hence, they were 'barbarians'. Whether this exclusive stance, implying a negative view of most Africans and Asians, also entailed discriminatory practices based on race or skin colour, is a topic still debated by historians.⁷³

Obviously, this geographical-cum-climatological approach and the consequent characteristics the ancient Greeks attributed to various cultures were only a cover for a fascinatingly biased political and cultural argument primarily intended to bolster support for Greek opposition against the constant threat posed to them not only by the Persians but, indeed, by all their mighty neighbours.⁷⁴ It is one of the first examples of the power which a geographical-cultural representation, a 'mental' map, can have over man and his ideas.⁷⁵

However, despite their intriguing arguments and also despite their conceit, the Greek city-states in the long run proved too weak to effectively resist the expansionist politics of adjoining states. In the end, even the great alliances between the various *poleis* set up on Athens' initiative were unable to withstand the force of events, the more so because time and again their mutual jealousy opened the way for foreign influences.

The world of Alexander the Great

In the fourth century BC, a young man ascended the throne of Macedonia, a somewhat rustic principality on the northern periphery of the Greek cultural world. Bringing the city-states of Hellas under Macedonian control, he finally dealt the deathblow to their freedom. Yet at the same time, his actions were instrumental in diffusing Greek culture to an extent until then not realized.

Alexander (356–323 BC) had been raised in the best traditions of Athens by his teacher Aristotle. After succeeding to the throne, he followed in his father's expansionist footsteps, conquering, first, not only the whole of 'Greece' proper but also the Greek world of Asia Minor, then the trading cities of the Levant, and finally Egypt and large parts of the Persian empire. Much has been made of Alexander's vision. He has even been presented as a proto-global ecumenicalist. However that may be, his dream – of heroic power, basically, and, perhaps, of a post-bellum utopia – came at a price: the carnage, unnecessary probably even considering the political-military mores of his own times, of hundreds of thousands of soldiers and civilians.⁷⁶

Traversing Persia, Alexander reached the Indus River and thus the confines of the great civilizations of South Asia, barely known to the Greeks. When Plutarch, some 400 years later, wrote about Alexander's campaigns, he took care to emphasize that Alexander had founded many cities there and, indeed, had brought the essence of (Greek) civilization to these regions, giving them the Greek language and Greek values, such as love for one's parents. While thus defining Greek culture by again juxtaposing it with neighbouring ones, he and other Greek writers could not hide their admiration for the Zoroastrian culture of Persia, with its vision of the world as a battlefield between good and evil, and man's need to bring justice to all, especially the poor – as well as for the Hindu culture of India, with its accomplishments not only in the fields of religion, philosophy and cosmology, but also in the applied arts and in technology.

Alexander's vast empire did not last. After his untimely death, his generals divided the spoils. Yet, in the various kingdoms into which the Alexandrian Near East was subsequently split, an intriguing mixture emerged of elements from Greek culture and the pre-existing traditions of the conquered regions. This resulted in a civilization which has been called 'Hellenistic'.⁷⁷

Certainly, Hellenism was a veneer, laid over numerous culturally diverse, unassimilated Mediterraneans and Asians who now were confronted with a new kind of kingship. For the Hellenist rulers, combining Egyptian and Persian traditions, were theocratic, totalitarian, creating a monarchical system that eventually would affect Europe by way of the Roman emperors.


Also, thousands of artists, intellectuals and scientists had followed Alexander on his travels, eagerly absorbing new ideas. Through the roads he and his successors created, they paved the ways future generations would continue to travel. Thus, from the fourth century BC onwards, life in the world around the eastern Mediterranean changed. Many people, certainly in the economic and political-cultural elites, adopted both the Greek language and the Greek literary tradition as well as Greek art; combining these with their own Babylonian, Egyptian, Persian or Syrian heritage, they produced a society that became a fascinating mosaic; sometimes, the result was a harmonious fusion, at other times one still sees the different parts existing side by side in artistic, religious and literary forms that were intriguingly syncretic. In short, the

world of the *polis* was past. The time of 'cosmo-politanism', of 'world citizenship', had come.⁷⁸

Hellenist culture became perhaps most strikingly manifest in one of the many cities founded by and often named after Alexander. After its establishment in 331 BC, Alexandria, in the Nile delta, turned into an international port, the most prosperous city in the Mediterranean, in western Eurasia even. There, the sea routes from East to West and from South to North linked up with the land routes to and through East Africa, the Arabian peninsula and the rich world of Central and East Asia. Thus, Alexandria owed much of its wealth and cultural standing to its economic function as the gateway through which the Mediterranean, and Europe, could reach the economies and civilizations of Africa and even more of the Orient, of Asia. From the third century BC, trade across the Persian Gulf and the deserts of the Near East, and across the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, brought the wealth of Asia and Africa to Alexandria: not only diamonds and pearls, pepper and sugar, ebony and sandalwood, ivory and silk, but also cotton and wool. From the Mediterranean world came slaves, and sesame seed, flax and wine, copper, lead and tin.⁷⁹

Inevitably, this trade also served as an exchange mechanism for all sorts of ideas, greatly facilitating a diffusion of knowledge and its applications in all fields of culture, in which the question of original invention is hardly ever to be answered, if not actually meaningless. Both in Alexandria and in the major towns of India and China, such high-tech gadgets as milometers, altimeters and earthquake detectors, but also armillaries which explained the movements of the planets within our system, could be found, showing the varied interests of the innovative dynamic in the maritime and mercantile communities of the Near East and of Asia. The technicians of Alexandria even designed the first steam machine, but since slave labour was cheap it remained an interesting toy, only.

In Alexandria, this 'interface' between cultures, this cosmopolis, the first libraries and museums of Western Eurasia were founded as well: cultural institutions that, much later, would become focal points of European civilization as well as centres of tradition and renewal. Precisely Alexandria's great 'Museion' – museum, library and university in one – became a fulcrum of science and learning. This was the milieu where the origins of the venerated Homeric tradition were first researched but where, also, Euclid (c.300 BC) wrote his textbook on mathematics, *Elements*. It was the town where Archimedes (287–212 BC), who hailed from Syracuse, on Greek Sicily, studied applied physics and engineering. It was the place where Eratosthenes (280–200 BC) put two sticks in the sand and observed the different length of the shadow they cast, and then decided the earth was not flat; he went on to calculate the globe's circumference at 40,000 kilometres – his fault-margin later proved to be less than 100 kilometres. It also was where Ptolemy (c.100–c.170 AD) developed the geocentric model of the cosmos, and gave names to the continents and their various parts. Alexandria's school of



Map 1.2 Extent of Greek influence in the ancient Mediterranean world, c.400–300 BC

medicine, too, was famous all over the Hellenistic world. Researchers, continuing a tradition which borrowed from Indian insights, evolved a rational system of diagnosis and treatment; consequently such practitioners as Galen, who was a student at Alexandria in the second century AD, could become the first doctor to describe the circulation of the blood.

However, politically, the Hellenistic world soon was threatened by the armies of the nascent Roman Empire. Starting in the second century BC, they marched beyond the confines of the Italian peninsula and within two hundred years conquered all lands surrounding the Mediterranean.⁸⁰

Yet despite the decline and fall of the independent Greek cities and of the Hellenist kingdoms, and the rise of Rome's hegemonic political structures, the concept of fostering individual spiritual development, and of a citizen's (i.e. a free man's) civil rights as opposed to a powerful state, remained a lasting thought in Graeco-Hellenist-Roman culture. Admittedly, during the following 2,000 years of European and world history most peoples were not exactly granted much political freedom, at least not until the revolutions of the late eighteenth century AD drastically changed European society. However, the core of a theory about the political rights of citizens – whether or not within the context of the immediate but yet limited form of democracy that had been the practice of many Greek cities – was formulated by a number of Greek philosophers. Several centuries later, this fundamental idea would be given additional strength in the legal systems devised by a number of Roman statesmen and legal scholars and embodied in the 'legal state' of Rome. If only for this reason, the role played by Rome in the history of Europe deserves closer attention.

Dossier: the human body

In 2009, after more than 30 years of squabbling, intrigue and financial malversation, a new museum was opened at the foot of the Acropolis, the ancient hill-fort cum temple-mount of Athens, to exhibit some of the most spectacular remains of the civilization of this ancient site. To the everlasting chagrin of most modern Greeks, these do not include the famous or, as they would have it, infamous 'Elgin Marbles': those parts of the sculpted frieze of the ancient Parthenon temple that in 1801 were transferred – the legality of the removal is heavily disputed – to England by Lord Elgin, the British ambassador to the Ottoman empire, of which Greece then was part. Consequently, the sculptures are now displayed in the British Museum. However, visitors to the Athens museum see those parts of the frieze that have remained in Greece, presented in such a way – indeed, far better than in London – that one gains a clear idea of what it looked like originally, the more so since the great expanses of glass in the museum direct one's gaze to the remains of the actual temple on the hill.⁸¹

Arguably, few cultures have been so obsessed with visually representing the human body as the one called European. This obsession started with the ancient Greeks and Romans, whose religion allowed them to glory in it.

Strangely, this glorification continued with the peoples of post-Roman Europe, though their conversion to Christianity gave them the perhaps most body-hating of all world religions.

What is it about Greek sculpture, and, I should add, painting – although most of what is left of that is only on ceramic vessels – that is so striking, even today? Most would say it is that the human physique is represented in a life-like form, which artists like Phidias, Praxiteles and Apelles achieved by showing it partly or completely nude. Of course this does not mean that the way these sculptors and painters depicted the male and female body was what most ancient Greeks actually looked like. For however ‘natural’ they seem, one can see that, actually, these representations were highly idealized. Yet, from the very beginning, people admiring these apparently perfectly-formed bodies have been part of a complex process: the cultural conceptualization of the body, including physical body-fashioning.

In ancient Greece – or so part of the scholarly community argues – not only were most temples and other public buildings not creamy-white, nor was the sculpture and painting that adorned it. If people were represented in stone, their eyes were inlaid, their skin was painted, and their garments were gaudily or, to modern tastes, even garishly coloured. The paint used was produced from natural pigments – vegetal and mineral – which came, along the roads of Greek international trade, from places as far away as Spain and Afghanistan.

More importantly, the human form as presented by these artists quite obviously emphasized youth and, moreover, represented the youthful body according to an obvious set of proportions that definitely do not reflect those of the average human but, rather, follow philosophical notions of harmony. The head usually is too small in relation to the rest. The men always have wide shoulders, narrow hips, a flat stomach and a rather small penis. The women are shown with very small breasts and rather wide hips; the relationship, if any, between the cultural sexuality embodied in the female representations of ancient Greece and in the ‘Venus’ figurines of Paleolithic Europe, interpreted as both the earliest and a more naturalistic form of female depiction, is not clear, yet.

How did this view of the human body come to be the ideal type of Europe, and, by the late twentieth century, of the better part of the Westernized world?

The process started with the Romans, who adored and revered almost every aspect of Greek culture. They stage-managed its role as the epitome of civilization, conferring on it the status of a precious and normative common legacy for the various and varied elites of their empire. In fact, research has shown that most statuary now presented as Greek in museums all over the world consists of copies – once coloured, too – made by Roman sculptors. Even in Roman times it was aesthetically and technically difficult to distinguish a newly-made Roman statue in the Greek style from an ‘original’.

This became well-nigh impossible when, from the fifteenth century onwards, the elites of Italy, dreaming of a renaissance of ancient Greek culture, started

excavating, collecting and exhibiting what was from then on termed 'Classical' art. Thus, the Greek representation of the human body was presented as the norm of contemporary images of physical beauty as well. Inevitably, Greek philosophical notions of harmonious proportions considered to be inherent in creation now were projected on the contemporary European body. Soon, the artists of the day – for example Michelangelo Buonarroti (1475–1564) – began painting and sculpting the human physique in what they considered the 'antique manner'. This development also was strengthened by the fact that the new genre of anatomical drawings, used by the medical profession to better understand the human physique, tended to show a generalized form both of the male and the female body as perfectly-proportioned, again following the way of the much-admired Ancients. Moreover, since the Roman and Greek statues had lost their original colour, many thought the whiteness they showed was part of the norms of proportion and purity.

From the late fifteenth century onwards, Europe's idealization of the human form – rather than, say, the many more life-like images presented in contemporary portraiture – went through a number of phases, though the process mostly seems to have affected the female, who was represented far more often, and also more often in the nude, than the male. But whereas by and large the latter did retain his basically Classical, ideally-proportioned guise, the former's form fluctuated, as shown in sculpture and painting from the sixteenth till the early twentieth century.

During the Baroque period, the sixteenth and seventeenth century, the ideal female was shown with a rather more obvious stressing of breasts and hips, perhaps both to express the status-related notion that middle- and upper-class women were well-fed by their prosperous husbands, and also to denote their sexual functions and attraction. Inevitably, the depiction of the (female) body was part of the construction of sex and gender identities. Of course, the precepts of fashion – the outcome of status considerations that over the past centuries have become heavily commercialized – always affected representations of the clothed female form. Yet representations of her ideal nudity mostly continued to follow the Graeco-Roman example, especially from the eighteenth century onwards, when the Classicist style revived it. This has continued till the present day – although since the early twentieth century a new 'Naturalism' has led many artists such as, to name but two, Pablo Picasso and Lucian Freud, to depict the human form, both female and male, in all its varieties rather than moulding it to that 'Classical', but very artificial perfection. Yet, despite this 'Naturalism', and also despite the ever more rapid changes in fashion that, certainly since the Second World War, dictate the clothed male almost as much as the clothed female, the idealized nude form of both still seems to follow the Ancient model, though the male is now represented either as an adolescent ephebe or as a more mature man.

Perhaps precisely because most people know they are not born with specifications that follow these or indeed any model aesthetics of proportion, they still want to attain them. Since the early twentieth century, the visual media, including film and heavy advertising, have been propagating such ideals

amongst the masses. The fashion industry in particular, for purely profit-seeking reasons, has tried to introduce ever newer models – mostly females – who do not necessarily adhere to the Ancient ideal-type any more, starting with the ultra-thin ‘Twiggy’-look that came from Britain in the 1960s and that, in one way or another, continues to impose on the buying public a set of sometimes dangerously anorexic ideals.

Consequently, physical exercise today is less about the prolonging of health than about the preservation or restoration of an idealized youthful beauty. Moreover, all kinds of medical technologies assist people in these efforts to ‘correct’ what nature has given them but what they yet deem imperfect, precisely because they compare themselves with such ideals. Many people succumb to the promise of the happiness that is the pretended outcome of a ‘total makeover’ now broadcast in many popular TV shows, not only in the USA but in Europe as well. Thus, hair is transplanted, eyebrows are stylized, drooping eyelids lifted, noses straightened, lips made fuller, breasts are enlarged or reduced and penises lengthened, and Botox or even total liposuction bring back the sleek contours people desire.

This general trend, born from a complex combination of dissatisfaction with what one is and a narcissistic desire to become what one feels one should be, presents real dangers, physically as well as psychologically – all the more so as dietary habits are becoming less healthy and obesity is an ever greater problem. Yet, nowadays, Europeans, Westerners in general and, it has to be said, increasingly the upper and middle classes of Asia, too, view the human body as an object they can ‘sculpt’ to make it conform to a perceived ideal of which, probably, few now recognize the culturally-preconditioned origins in Europe’s Mediterranean past.

Notes

- 1 M.F. Ashley-Montagu, *Edward Tyson, 1650–1708, and the Rise of Human and Comparative Anatomy in England*, London 1943.
- 2 D.J. Boorstin, *The Discoverers*, II, New York 1991, 888–90.
- 3 For a stimulating, though debated view: D. Premack, A. Premack, *Original Intelligence. Unlocking the Mystery of Who We Are*, New York 2004.
- 4 For this and the following paragraphs: G. Bosinski, *Homo Sapiens*, Paris 1990; P. Mellar, C. Stringer, eds, *The Human Revolution*, Edinburgh 1989; R. Klein, *The Human Career*, Chicago 1989; C. Gamble, *The Paleolithic Settlement of Europe*, Cambridge 1986. However, the debate is ongoing, continuously fed by discoveries of new fossils all over Africa and Eurasia, and the re-classifications to which these lead, now on the basis of DNA tests.
- 5 P. Mellar, *The Neanderthal Legacy: An Archaeological Perspective from Western Europe*, Princeton 1996. See also R. Foley, *Humans before Humanity*, London 1995.
- 6 See S. Oppenheimer, *Out of Africa’s Eden: The Peopling of the World*, Jeppesstown 2003.
- 7 For a serious recent survey, see: D. Reich, *Who We Are and How We Got Here – Ancient DNA and the New Science of the Human Past*, Oxford 2018.
- 8 See P. Bahn, J. Vertut, *Images of the Ice Age*, London 1988. The sexual interpretations of A. Leroi-Gourhan, *The Art of Prehistoric Man in Western Europe*, London 1968, are widely debated.

- 9 See the interpretations of J. Clottes, D. Lewis-Williams, *Les Chamans de la préhistoire: transe et magie dans les grottes ornées*, Paris 1996.
- 10 For a survey: Ph. Lieberman, *Uniquely Human: The Evolution of Speech, Thought and Selfless Behaviour*, Cambridge, MA 1991; J. Wind et al. eds, *Language Origin: A Multidisciplinary Approach*, Dordrecht 1992.
- 11 T.D. Price, A.B. Gebauer, eds, *Last Hunter, First Farmer*, Santa Fé 1995.
- 12 A valuable survey: A. Sherratt, *Economy and Society in Prehistoric Europe*, Edinburgh 1997.
- 13 D.R. Harris, ed., *Origins and Spread of Agriculture and Pastoralism in Eurasia*, London 1996.
- 14 M. Balter, *The Goddess and the Bull: Çatalhöyük: An Archaeological Journey to the Dawn of Civilization*, New York 2004.
- 15 See for a survey A.B. Knapp, *The History and Culture of Western Asia and Egypt*, Chicago 1988; M. Silver, *Economic Structures of the Ancient Near East*, London 1986.
- 16 T. Tartaron, *Maritime Networks in the Mycenaean World*, Cambridge 2013.
- 17 An impressive, comparative and long-term study of this region is J. Krejci, *The Civilizations of Asia and the Middle East*, London 1990.
- 18 See M. Beard, J. North, eds, *Pagan Priests: Religion and Power in the Ancient World*, New York 1990.
- 19 B.J. Kemp, *Ancient Egypt: Anatomy of a Civilization*, London 1991; J.N. Postgate, *Early Mesopotamia: Society and Economy at the Dawn of History*, London 1992.
- 20 A. Archi, *Ebla and Its Archives: Texts, History and Society*, Berlin 2015. See also: P. Mathiaé, *Ebla: un impero ritrovato*, Milan 1977.
- 21 J. Chadwick, *The Mycenaean World*, Cambridge 1976.
- 22 R. Castleden, *Minoans: Life in Bronze-Age Crete*, London 1990.
- 23 J.P. Mallory, *In Search of the Indo-Europeans: Language, Archaeology and Myth*, London 1989. The Kurgan thesis has been most vociferously defended by Maria Gimbutas, especially in the culmination of her life's work: *The Civilization of the Goddess: The World of Old Europe*, San Francisco 1991. However, D. Anthony, *The Horse, the Wheel and Language: How Bronze-age Riders from the Eurasian Steppes Shaped the Modern World*, Princeton 2007, while generally accepting the Kurgan-thesis, has modified it as well.
- 24 C. Renfrew, *Archaeology and Language: The Puzzle of Indo-European Origins*, London 1987.
- 25 D. Anthony, *The Horse, the Wheel and Language. How Bronze-Age Riders from the Eurasian Steppes Shaped the Modern World*, Princeton 2007. Cf. also: R. Drews, *The Coming of the Greeks: Indo-European Conquests in the Aegean and the Near East*, Princeton 1988.
- 26 N. Klengel, *Hammurapi von Babylon und seine Zeit*, Berlin 1977.
- 27 J.B. Pritchard, ed., Th.J. Meek, trans., *The Ancient Near East: An Anthology of Texts*, Princeton 1958, 138–67, *passim*.
- 28 N.J.G. Pounds, *An Historical Geography of Europe, 450 BC–AD 1330*, Cambridge 1973, 1–16.
- 29 See C. Bailey, ed., *Hunter-Gatherer Economy in Prehistory: A European Perspective*, Cambridge 1983.
- 30 F. Wilkinson, a.o.a., *Interweaving Worlds: Systemic Interactions in Eurasia, 7th to the 1st Millennia BC*, Oxford 2011.
- 31 J. Hoddes, *The Domestication of Europe*, London 1990.
- 32 See J. Bintliff, ed., *Europe's Social Evolution: Archaeological Perspectives*, Bradford 1984.
- 33 Cf., again: M. Gimbutas, *The Civilization of the Goddess: The World of Old Europe*, San Francisco 1991.

- 34 Cf. a.o. 'Details of the history of inner Eurasia revealed', *ScienceDaily* (Max Planck Institute for the Science of Human History), Jena 29 April 2019. Cr. Also; M. Furholt, a.o.a., 'Re-integrating archeology: A contribution to aDNA studies and the migration discourse in the 3rd millennium BC', *Proceedings of the Prehistoric Society*, 85 (2019), 115–29.
- 35 S. Piggott, *The Earliest Wheeled Transport, from the Atlantic Coast to the Caspian Sea*, London 1984.
- 36 E.M. Brumfiel, T.K. Earle, eds, *Specialisation, Exchange and Complex Societies*, Cambridge 1987.
- 37 See N.K. Sandars, *The Sea Peoples*, London 1978; A. Harding, *The Mycenaeans and Europe*, London 1984; J. Bouzek, *The Aegean, Anatolia and Europe: Cultural Inter-relations in the Second Millennium BC*, Lund 1985.
- 38 See V.R.d'A. Desborough, *The Last Mycenaean and Their Successors*, Oxford 1964.
- 39 M. Woolmer, *A Short History of the Phoenicians*, London 2017. Cf. also: S. Moscati, *The World of the Phoenicians*, London 1973.
- 40 For a useful survey: H. Jensen, *Sign, Symbol and Script*, New York 1969.
- 41 Cf. G. Nisbit, *Ancient Greece in Film and Popular Culture*, Bristol 2004. Cf. also: Peter Rietbergen, *Clio's Stiefzusters. Verledenverbeeldingen voorbij de Geschiedwetenschap*, Nijmegen 2015.
- 42 O. Murray, *Early Greece*, London 1980; A. Snodgrass, *Archaic Greece: The Age of Experiment*, London 1980.
- 43 J. Latacz, *Troy and Homer*, Oxford 2004.
- 44 W. Burkert, *The Orientalizing Revolution: Near Eastern Influence in Greek Culture in the Early Archaic Age*, Cambridge 1992; orig. Munich 1984.
- 45 J. Bleicken, *Die Athenische Demokratie*, Paderborn 1986; C. Farrar, *The Origins of Democratic Thinking: The Invention of Politics in Classical Athens*, Cambridge 1988; J. Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens*, Princeton 1989; D. Stockton, *The Classical Athenian Democracy*, Oxford 1990.
- 46 See the essay by Ch. Hedricks in R. Osborne, S. Hornblower, eds, *Ritual, Finance, Politics: Athenian Democratic Accounts Presented to D. Lewis*, Oxford 1993.
- 47 In a very interesting study, P. Vidal-Nacquet, *Politics Ancient and Modern*, London 1995, explores the ways in which widely diverse notions about Greek democracy have been formulated since the Renaissance, always to support contemporary European ideas about politics.
- 48 From A. de Sélincourt, trans., *Herodotus, The Histories*, Harmondsworth 1972, III, 8–83, 238–40.
- 49 A fine survey: S. Blundell, *Women in Ancient Greece*, London 1995.
- 50 A.R. Hands, *Charities and Social Aid in Greece and Rome*, London 1968.
- 51 See A. Richlin, ed., *Pornography and Representation in Greece and Rome*, Oxford 1992.
- 52 R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire*, Oxford 1972.
- 53 T.B.L. Webster, *Athenian Culture and Society*, London 1973.
- 54 W. Burkert, *Greek Religion*, Cambridge, MA 1985.
- 55 D. Cohen, *Law, Violence and Community in Classical Athens*, Cambridge 1995.
- 56 R. Buxton, *Imaginary Greece: The Contexts of Mythology*, Cambridge 1994.
- 57 S. Goldhill, *Love, Sex and Tragedy: How the Ancient World Shapes our Lives*, London 2004.
- 58 Chr. Meier, *The Political Art of Greek Tragedy*, London 1993, focusing on Aeschylus, provides a very interesting discussion.
- 59 J. Boardman, *The Greeks Overseas*, Harmondsworth 1973.
- 60 For these questions see, e.g., G. Lloyd, *Magic, Reason and Experiment: Studies in the Origin and Development of Greek Science*, London 1999, and his *The Ambition of Curiosity. Understanding the World in Ancient Greece and China*, Cambridge 2002.

- 61 T. Champion, J.V. Megaw, eds, *Settlement and Society: Aspects of West European Prehistory in the First Millennium BC*, Leicester 1985.
- 62 B. Cunliffe, *The Celtic World*, London 1979.
- 63 N. Chadwick, *The Celts*, Harmondsworth 1984; N.N., *Au temps des Celtes, Ve-Ie siècle avant J-C*, Daoulas 1986.
- 64 J. Collis, *The European Iron Age*, London 1984.
- 65 See M.C. Fernandez Castro, *Iberia in Prehistory*, London 1995, which gives an excellent survey of the history of the peninsula in the first millennium BC.
- 66 J.-P. Mohen, A. Duval et al. eds, *Les Princes Celtes et la Méditerranée*, Paris 1988; B. Cunliffe, *Greeks, Romans and Barbarians: Spheres of Interaction*, London 1988.
- 67 J. Markale, *Arthurian Legends and Celtic Tradition*, Rochester 1997.
- 68 A very readable survey: S. Moscati, ed., *I Celti: la prima Europa*, Venice 1991.
- 69 General surveys: W. Fritzemeyer, *Christenheit und Europa: zur Geschichte des europäischen Gemeinschaftsgefühls von Dante bis Leibniz*, Munich-Berlin 1931; P. Brezzi, *Realità e mito dell'Europa dall'antichità ai giorni nostri*, Rome 1954.
- 70 M. Führmann, *Europa: zur Geschichte einer kulturellen und politischen Idee*, Konstanz 1981, 7, n. 3.
- 71 The oldest known 'map of the world' shows the earth divided into two parts: *Lexicon der Alten Welt*, Zürich-Stuttgart, 1947.
- 72 De Sélincourt, *Herodotus*, IV, 37–45.
- 73 F.M. Snowden, Jr, *Before Color Prejudice: The Ancient View of Blacks*, Cambridge, MA 1993.
- 74 J. Jüthner, *Hellenen und Barbaren*, Leipzig 1923; H. Diller, 'Die Hellenen-Barbaren Antithese im Zeitalter der Perserkriege', in *Grecs et Barbares: entretiens sur l'antiquité classique*, VIII, Geneva 1962, 37 sqq.
- 75 See D. Wood, *The Power of Maps*, London 1993.
- 76 P. Cartledge, *Alexander the Great: The Hunt for a New Past*, London 2004.
- 77 P. Green, *Alexander to Actium: The Historical Evolution of the Hellenistic Age*, Berkeley 1990. The term 'Hellenism' was coined by the nineteenth-century German historian J.C. Droysen, in his famous study *Hellenismus*, 1836–43.
- 78 See also A. Bullock et al. eds, *Images and Ideologies: Self-definition in the Hellenistic World*, Berkeley 1995.
- 79 See R.S. Agarwal, *Trade Centres and Routes in Northern India (c. 322 BC–AD 500)*, Delhi 1982.
- 80 E.S. Gruen, *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome I–II*, Berkeley 1984.
- 81 For this essay: K. Clark, *The Nude: A Study of Ideal Art*, London 1980; C. Hitchens, *The Elgin Marbles: Should they be returned to Greece?* London 1987; T. Eagleton, *The Ideology of the Aesthetic*, Oxford 1990; H. Bulle, *Der schöne Mensch im Altertum. Eine Geschichte des Körperideals*, Munich 1992; A. Stewart, *Art, Desire and the Body in Ancient Greece*, Cambridge 1997; W. St Clair, *Lord Elgin and the Marbles*, Oxford 1998; *The Oxford Companion to the Body*, Oxford 2003; *The Model as Muse*, New York 1909; M. Squire, *The Art of the Body: Antiquity and Its Legacy*, London 2011.

Notes

Preface to the fourth edition

- 1 R. Collingwood, *The Idea of History*, Oxford 1956, 10. One should note that this very perceptive study was posthumously compiled from earlier versions and from Collingwood's various manuscripts.
- 2 G. Walden, *The Sunday Times*, 20 December 1986.
- 3 M. Weber, *Wissenschaft als Beruf*, Munich 1919, 1921.

Prologue

- 1 G. Erler, ed., *Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Werke, VIII, Faust*, Berlin 1984, Faust I, 77.
- 2 N. Heinrich, *Ce que n'est pas l'identité*, Paris 2018, 105–10; K. Eder, 'A theory of collective identity. Making sense of the debate on a "European identity"', *European Journal of Social Theory*, 12 (2009), 429–31; L. Bekemans, 'The idea of Europe: Identity-building from a historical perspective', in idem, ed., *A Value-driven European Future*, Brussel 2012, 71–3; D. Jacobs, R. Maier, 'European identity: Construct, fact and fiction', in M. Gastelaars, a.o. eds., *A United Europe. The Quest for a Multifaceted Identity*, Maastricht 1998, 13 sqq.
- 3 R. Brague, *Europe: la voie romaine*, Paris 1992, 187.
- 4 Some surveys: C. Curcio, *Europa: Storia d'un Idea I–II*, Florence 1958; J.-B. Duroselle, *L'Idée d'Europe dans l'histoire*, Paris 1965; H. Foerster, *Europa: Geschichte einer politischen Idee*, Munich 1967.
- 5 J. Delors, 'Have we betrayed the European economic and social venture?', in *European Trade Union Yearbook 1996*, 6.
- 6 G. Colli, M. Montinari, eds, *Fr. Nietzsche: Kritische Gesamtausgabe der Werke*, III/2, Berlin 1973 [=Fr. Nietzsche, *Nachgelassene Schriften, 1870–1873: Ueber Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne I*], 378.
- 7 S. Marchand, *Down from Olympus: Archaeology and Philhellenism in Germany, 1750–1970*, Princeton 1996.
- 8 Cf. W. Tatarkiewicz, 'Les quatre significations du mot "classique"', *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 12 (1958), 5–22. For the European case:

- A. Grafton *et al.* ed., *The Classical Tradition*, Cambridge, MA 2010. But see also: G. Holst-Warhaft, a.o. eds., *The Classical Movement. Views from Seven Literatures*, Lanham 1999, that compares parallel movements in seven Eurasian civilizations.
- 9 M. Kunze, ed., *Winckelmann und Egypte*, Tübingen 2003; D. Wildung, *Preussen am Nil*, Berlin 2002.
 - 10 M. Wellen, *Die Deutschen sind im Treppenhaus. Der Fries Otto Geyers in der Alte Nationalgalerie*, Cologne 2002.
 - 11 Peter Rietbergen, 'Oriëntalisme: een theorie van ficties – de fictie van een theorie? Een poging tot contextualisering en herinterpretatie', *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis*, 111 (1998), 545–75, esp. 552–70. Idem, *Clio's stiefzusters. Verledenverbeeldingen voorbij de geschiedwetenschap*, Nijmegen 2015.
 - 12 E. Rawsky, *Education and Popular Literacy in Ch'ing China*, Ann Arbor 1979.
 - 13 IviiP. Rietbergen, 'Father and mother official: the district magistrates in imperial China and the Papal States', in P. Puschmann, T. Riswick, eds., *Building Bridges*, Nijmegen 2018, 118–33.
 - 14 As in, for example, N. Ferguson, *Why the West Beat the Rest*, London 2011.
 - 15 G. Steiner, *The Idea of Europe*, Tilburg 2004, 22.
 - 16 For this and the following: Z. Kiaupa, *et al.*, *Geschichte des Baltikums*, Tallinn 2002.
 - 17 Cf. P. Sztompka, *From East Europeans to Europeans: Shifting Identities and Boundaries in the New Europe*, Wassenaar 2004.
 - 18 For example, his *Capitalism and Material Life, 1400–1800*, London 1973, with his *Afterthoughts*, Baltimore 1977, that was then elaborated as *Civilization and Capitalism*. Also, his *Grammaire des Civilisations*, Paris 1987. However, there is, I find, little of a really unifying concept behind Braudel's often rambling writings.
 - 19 One may think of his *The Civilizing Process*, I–II, Oxford 1978, 1982, though these two volumes do seem to follow two different strands of thought.
 - 20 Obviously, this is not to say that such theories cannot be fruitful. Yet I find, for example, G. Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times*, London 1994, not entirely convincing.
 - 21 Peter Rietbergen, 'Not of this world ... ? Religious power and imperial rule in Eurasia, ca. thirteenth – ca. eighteenth century', in M. van Berkel, a.o. eds., *Prince, Pen and Sword. Eurasian Perspectives*, Leiden 2018, 129–296.
 - 22 The dangers of such an approach are evident in the recent and surely ridiculous effort by H. Bloom, *The Western Canon*, New York 1994; of the 26 authors included, about three-quarters are Anglo-Saxon.
 - 23 For a spirited defence of the historian's craft against some of the sillier post-Modernist claims, see R. Evans, *In Defense of History*, London 1994.
 - 24 M. Weber, *Wissenschaft als Beruf*, Munich 1919, 1921.
 - 25 Croce first explained this position in *Teoria e storia della storiografia*, Bari 1917, and in another context in *La storia come pensiero e come azione*, Bari 1938.

- 26 Mainly in M. Horkheimer, *Die gegenwärtige Lage der Sozialforschung*, Frankfurt 1931; Idem, *Traditionelle und Kritische Theorie*, Frankfurt 1937.
- 27 For example, A. Munslow, *Deconstructing History*, London 1997, 2006; and: K. Jenkins, *On 'What is History?'* London 1995, 2003.
- 28 These are the opening lines of Freud's 1915 essay 'Triebe und Triebchicksale':

Wir haben oftmals die Forderung vertreten gehört, daß eine Wissenschaft über klaren und scharf definierten Grundbegriffen aufgebaut sein soll. In Wirklichkeit beginnt keine Wissenschaft mit solchen Definitionen, auch die exaktesten nicht. Der richtige Anfang der wissenschaftlichen Tätigkeit besteht vielmehr in der Beschreibung von Erscheinungen, die dann weiterhin gruppiert, angeordnet und in Zusammenhänge eingetragen werden. Schon bei der Beschreibung kann man es nicht vermeiden, gewisse abstrakte Ideen auf das Material anzuwenden, die man irgendwoher, gewiß nicht aus der neuen Erfahrung allein, herbeiholt. Noch unentbehrlicher sind solche Ideen – die späteren Grundbegriffe der Wissenschaft – bei der weiteren Verarbeitung des Stoffes. Sie müssen zunächst ein gewisses Maß von Unbestimmtheit an sich tragen; von einer klaren Umzeichnung ihres Inhaltes kann keine Rede sein. Solange sie sich in diesem Zustande befinden, verständigt man sich über ihre Bedeutung durch den wiederholten Hinweis auf das Erfahrungsmaterial, dem sie entnommen scheinen, das aber in Wirklichkeit ihnen unterworfen wird.

- 29 B. Geremek, *The Common Roots of Europe*, London 1996, gives an interesting, short survey of the genesis of the concept of Europe; he also argues that, at the end of the twentieth century, the notion of European civilization is felt rather more strongly in central than in western Europe. Ph. Longworth, *The Making of Eastern Europe*, London 1992, goes into the long history of the diverging paths of east and west. E. Gellner, *Conditions of Liberty*, London 1994, seems to view the ancient German lands as the frontier region between east and west.
- 30 See also P. Burke, 'Did Europe exist before 1700?', *History of European Ideas*, 1 (1980), 21–9.
- 31 For example, A. Corbin, *Time, Desire and Horror*, Oxford 1995, viii–ix.

Chapter 1

- 1 M.F. Ashley-Montagu, *Edward Tyson, 1650–1708, and the Rise of Human and Comparative Anatomy in England*, London 1943.
- 2 D.J. Boorstin, *The Discoverers*, II, New York 1991, 888–90.
- 3 For a stimulating, though debated view: D. Premack, A. Premack, *Original Intelligence. Unlocking the Mystery of Who We Are*, New York 2004.
- 4 For this and the following paragraphs: G. Bosinski, *Homo Sapiens*, Paris 1990; P. Mellor, C. Stringer, eds, *The Human Revolution*, Edinburgh 1989; R. Klein, *The Human Career*, Chicago 1989; C. Gamble, *The Paleolithic*

- Settlement of Europe*, Cambridge 1986. However, the debate is ongoing, continuously fed by discoveries of new fossils all over Africa and Eurasia, and the re-classifications to which these lead, now on the basis of DNA tests.
- 5 P. Mellar, *The Neanderthal Legacy: An Archaeological Perspective from Western Europe*, Princeton 1996. See also R. Foley, *Humans before Humanity*, London 1995.
 - 6 See S. Oppenheimer, *Out of Africa's Eden: The Peopling of the World*, Jeppestown 2003.
 - 7 For a serious recent survey, see: D. Reich, *Who We Are and How We Got Here – Ancient DNA and the New Science of the Human Past*, Oxford 2018.
 - 8 See P. Bahn, J. Vertut, *Images of the Ice Age*, London 1988. The sexual interpretations of A. Leroi-Gourhan, *The Art of Prehistoric Man in Western Europe*, London 1968, are widely debated.
 - 9 See the interpretations of J. Clottes, D. Lewis-Williams, *Les Chamans de la préhistoire: transe et magie dans les grottes ornées*, Paris 1996.
 - 10 For a survey: Ph. Lieberman, *Uniquely Human: The Evolution of Speech, Thought and Selfless Behaviour*, Cambridge, MA 1991; J. Wind et al. eds, *Language Origin: A Multidisciplinary Approach*, Dordrecht 1992.
 - 11 T.D. Price, A.B. Gebauer, eds, *Last Hunter, First Farmer*, Santa Fé 1995.
 - 12 A valuable survey: A. Sherratt, *Economy and Society in Prehistoric Europe*, Edinburgh 1997.
 - 13 D.R. Harris, ed., *Origins and Spread of Agriculture and Pastoralism in Eurasia*, London 1996.
 - 14 M. Balter, *The Goddess and the Bull: Çatalhöyük: An Archaeological Journey to the Dawn of Civilization*, New York 2004.
 - 15 See for a survey A.B. Knapp, *The History and Culture of Western Asia and Egypt*, Chicago 1988; M. Silver, *Economic Structures of the Ancient Near East*, London 1986.
 - 16 T. Tartaron, *Maritime Networks in the Mycenaean World*, Cambridge 2013.
 - 17 An impressive, comparative and long-term study of this region is J. Krejci, *The Civilizations of Asia and the Middle East*, London 1990.
 - 18 See M. Beard, J. North, eds, *Pagan Priests: Religion and Power in the Ancient World*, New York 1990.
 - 19 B.J. Kemp, *Ancient Egypt: Anatomy of a Civilization*, London 1991; J.N. Postgate, *Early Mesopotamia: Society and Economy at the Dawn of History*, London 1992.
 - 20 A. Archi, *Ebla and Its Archives: Texts, History and Society*, Berlin 2015. See also: P. Mathiae, *Ebla: un impero ritrovato*, Milan 1977.
 - 21 J. Chadwick, *The Mycenaean World*, Cambridge 1976.
 - 22 R. Castleden, *Minoans: Life in Bronze-Age Crete*, London 1990.
 - 23 J.P. Mallory, *In Search of the Indo-Europeans: Language, Archaeology and Myth*, London 1989. The Kurgan thesis has been most vociferously defended by Maria Gimbutas, especially in the culmination of her life's work: *The Civilization of the Goddess: The World of Old Europe*, San Francisco 1991. However, D. Anthony, *The Horse, the Wheel and Language: How Bronze-age Riders*

- from the Eurasian Steppes Shaped the Modern World, Princeton 2007, while generally accepting the Kurgan-thesis, has modified it as well.
- 24 C. Renfrew, *Archaeology and Language: The Puzzle of Indo-European Origins*, London 1987.
 - 25 D. Anthony, *The Horse, the Wheel and Language. How Bronze-Age Riders from the Eurasian Steppes Shaped the Modern World*, Princeton 2007. Cf. also: R. Drews, *The Coming of the Greeks: Indo-European Conquests in the Aegean and the Near East*, Princeton 1988.
 - 26 N. Klengel, *Hammurapi von Babylon und seine Zeit*, Berlin 1977.
 - 27 J.B. Pritchard, ed., Th.J. Meek, trans., *The Ancient near East: An Anthology of Texts*, Princeton 1958, 138–67, *passim*.
 - 28 N.J.G. Pounds, *An Historical Geography of Europe, 450 BC–AD 1330*, Cambridge 1973, 1–16.
 - 29 See C. Bailey, ed., *Hunter-Gatherer Economy in Prehistory: A European Perspective*, Cambridge 1983.
 - 30 F. Wilkinson, a.o.a., *Interweaving Worlds: Systemic Interactions in Eurasia, 7th to the 1st Millennia BC*, Oxford 2011.
 - 31 J. Hoddes, *The Domestication of Europe*, London 1990.
 - 32 See J. Bintloff, ed., *Europe's Social Evolution: Archaeological Perspectives*, Bradford 1984.
 - 33 Cf., again: M. Gimbutas, *The Civilization of the Goddess: The World of Old Europe*, San Francisco 1991.
 - 34 Cf. a.o. 'Details of the history of inner Eurasia revealed', *ScienceDaily* (Max Planck Institute for the Science of Human History), Jena 29 April 2019. Cr. Also; M. Furholt, a.o.a., 'Re-integrating archeology: A contribution to aDNA studies and the migration discourse in the 3rd millennium BC', *Proceedings of the Prehistoric Society*, 85 (2019), 115–29.
 - 35 S. Piggott, *The Earliest Wheeled Transport, from the Atlantic Coast to the Caspian Sea*, London 1984.
 - 36 E.M. Brumfiel, T.K. Earle, eds, *Specialisation, Exchange and Complex Societies*, Cambridge 1987.
 - 37 See N.K. Sandars, *The Sea Peoples*, London 1978; A. Harding, *The Mycenaeans and Europe*, London 1984; J. Bouzek, *The Aegean, Anatolia and Europe: Cultural Interrelations in the Second Millennium BC*, Lund 1985.
 - 38 See V.R.d'A. Desborough, *The Last Mycenaeans and Their Successors*, Oxford 1964.
 - 39 M. Woolmer, *A Short History of the Phoenicians*, London 2017. Cf. also: S. Moscati, *The World of the Phoenicians*, London 1973.
 - 40 For a useful survey: H. Jensen, *Sign, Symbol and Script*, New York 1969.
 - 41 Cf. G. Nisbit, *Ancient Greece in Film and Popular Culture*, Bristol 2004. Cf. also: Peter Rietbergen, *Clio's Stiefzusters. Verledenverbeeldingen voorbij de Geschiedwetenschap*, Nijmegen 2015.
 - 42 O. Murray, *Early Greece*, London 1980; A. Snodgrass, *Archaic Greece: The Age of Experiment*, London 1980.
 - 43 J. Latacz, *Troy and Homer*, Oxford 2004.

- 44 W. Burkert, *The Orientalizing Revolution: Near Eastern Influence in Greek Culture in the Early Archaic Age*, Cambridge 1992; orig. Munich 1984.
- 45 J. Bleicken, *Die Athenische Demokratie*, Paderborn 1986; C. Farrar, *The Origins of Democratic Thinking: The Invention of Politics in Classical Athens*, Cambridge 1988; J. Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens*, Princeton 1989; D. Stockton, *The Classical Athenian Democracy*, Oxford 1990.
- 46 See the essay by Ch. Hedricks in R. Osborne, S. Hornblower, eds, *Ritual, Finance, Politics: Athenian Democratic Accounts Presented to D. Lewis*, Oxford 1993.
- 47 In a very interesting study, P. Vidal-Nacquet, *Politics Ancient and Modern*, London 1995, explores the ways in which widely diverse notions about Greek democracy have been formulated since the Renaissance, always to support contemporary European ideas about politics.
- 48 From A. de Sélincourt, trans., *Herodotus, The Histories*, Harmondsworth 1972, III, 8–83, 238–40.
- 49 A fine survey: S. Blundell, *Women in Ancient Greece*, London 1995.
- 50 A.R. Hands, *Charities and Social Aid in Greece and Rome*, London 1968.
- 51 See A. Richlin, ed., *Pornography and Representation in Greece and Rome*, Oxford 1992.
- 52 R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire*, Oxford 1972.
- 53 T.B.L. Webster, *Athenian Culture and Society*, London 1973.
- 54 W. Burkert, *Greek Religion*, Cambridge, MA 1985.
- 55 D. Cohen, *Law, Violence and Community in Classical Athens*, Cambridge 1995.
- 56 R. Buxton, *Imaginary Greece: The Contexts of Mythology*, Cambridge 1994.
- 57 S. Goldhill, *Love, Sex and Tragedy: How the Ancient World Shapes our Lives*, London 2004.
- 58 Chr. Meier, *The Political Art of Greek Tragedy*, London 1993, focusing on Aeschylus, provides a very interesting discussion.
- 59 J. Boardman, *The Greeks Overseas*, Harmondsworth 1973.
- 60 For these questions see, e.g., G. Lloyd, *Magic, Reason and Experiment: Studies in the Origin and Development of Greek Science*, London 1999, and his *The Ambition of Curiosity. Understanding the World in Ancient Greece and China*, Cambridge 2002.
- 61 T. Champion, J.V. Megaw, eds, *Settlement and Society: Aspects of West European Prehistory in the First Millennium BC*, Leicester 1985.
- 62 B. Cunliffe, *The Celtic World*, London 1979.
- 63 N. Chadwick, *The Celts*, Harmondsworth 1984; N.N., *Au temps des Celtes, Ve–Ie siècle avant J-C*, Daoulas 1986.
- 64 J. Collis, *The European Iron Age*, London 1984.
- 65 See M.C. Fernandez Castro, *Iberia in Prehistory*, London 1995, which gives an excellent survey of the history of the peninsula in the first millennium BC.
- 66 J.-P. Mohen, A. Duval et al. eds, *Les Princes Celtes et la Méditerranée*, Paris 1988; B. Cunliffe, *Greeks, Romans and Barbarians: Spheres of Interaction*, London 1988.

- 67 J. Markale, *Arthurian Legends and Celtic Tradition*, Rochester 1997.
- 68 A very readable survey: S. Moscati, ed., *I Celti: la prima Europa*, Venice 1991.
- 69 General surveys: W. Fritzemeyer, *Christenheit und Europa: zur Geschichte des europäischen Gemeinschaftsgefühls von Dante bis Leibniz*, Munich-Berlin 1931; P. Brezzi, *Realtà e mito dell'Europa dall'antichità ai giorni nostri*, Rome 1954.
- 70 M. Führmann, *Europa: zur Geschichte einer kulturellen und politischen Idee*, Konstanz 1981, 7, n. 3.
- 71 The oldest known 'map of the world' shows the earth divided into two parts: *Lexicon der Alten Welt*, Zürich-Stuttgart, 1947.
- 72 De Sélincourt, *Herodotus*, IV, 37–45.
- 73 F.M. Snowden, Jr, *Before Color Prejudice: The Ancient View of Blacks*, Cambridge, MA 1993.
- 74 J. Jüthner, *Hellenen und Barbaren*, Leipzig 1923; H. Diller, 'Die Hellenen-Barbaren Antithese im Zeitalter der Perserkriege', in *Grecs et Barbares: entretiens sur l'antiquité classique*, VIII, Geneva 1962, 37 sqq.
- 75 See D. Wood, *The Power of Maps*, London 1993.
- 76 P. Cartledge, *Alexander the Great: The Hunt for a New Past*, London 2004.
- 77 P. Green, *Alexander to Actium: The Historical Evolution of the Hellenistic Age*, Berkeley 1990. The term 'Hellenism' was coined by the nineteenth-century German historian J.C. Droysen, in his famous study *Hellenismus*, 1836–43.
- 78 See also A. Bullock et al. eds, *Images and Ideologies: Self-definition in the Hellenistic World*, Berkeley 1995.
- 79 See R.S. Agarwal, *Trade Centres and Routes in Northern India (c. 322 BC–AD 500)*, Delhi 1982.
- 80 E.S. Gruen, *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome I–II*, Berkeley 1984.
- 81 For this essay: K. Clark, *The Nude: A Study of Ideal Art*, London 1980; C. Hitchens, *The Elgin Marbles: Should they be returned to Greece?* London 1987; T. Eagleton, *The Ideology of the Aesthetic*, Oxford 1990; H. Bulle, *Der schöne Mensch im Altertum. Eine Geschichte des Körperideals*, Munich 1992; A. Stewart, *Art, Desire and the Body in Ancient Greece*, Cambridge 1997; W. St Clair, *Lord Elgin and the Marbles*, Oxford 1998; *The Oxford Companion to the Body*, Oxford 2003; *The Model as Muse*, New York 1909; M. Squire, *The Art of the Body: Antiquity and Its Legacy*, London 2011.

Chapter 2

- 1 Cf, for example, M. Winkler, 'Gladiator': *Film and History*, Oxford 2004.
- 2 E. MacNamara, *The Etruscans*, London 1990, but also, because of its use of recent archaeological material: G. Barker, Th. Rasmussen, *The Etruscans*, London 1996.
- 3 See, for example, J. Wernicke, *Die Kelten in Italien: Die Einwanderungen und die frühen Handelsbeziehungen zu den Etruskern*, Stuttgart 1989.
- 4 R.M. Ogilvie, *Early Rome and the Etruscans*, Glasgow 1979.

- 5 See R.P. Saller, *Patriarchy, Property and Death in the Roman Family*, Cambridge 1994.
- 6 A. Alföldy, *Early Rome and the Latins*, Ann Arbor 1965; A. Keaveney, *Rome and the Unification of Italy*, London 1987.
- 7 J. Bleicken, *Die Verfassung der Römischen Republik*, Paderborn 1978; L.R. Taylor, *Roman Voting Assemblies*, Ann Arbor 1990.
- 8 J. Heurgon, *Rome et la Méditerranée occidentale jusqu'aux guerres puniques*, Paris 1969.
- 9 Z. Yavetz, *Slaves and Slavery in Ancient Rome*, Oxford 1988.
- 10 G. Rickman, *The Corn-Supply of Ancient Rome*, Oxford 1980.
- 11 P. Veyne, *Le Pain et le Cirque*, Paris 1976.
- 12 K. Christ, *Krise und Untergang der Römischen Republik*, Darmstadt 1979.
- 13 A.H.M. Jones, *Augustus*, London 1977.
- 14 See F. Millar, *The Roman Empire and Its Neighbours*, London 1967.
- 15 H.H. Scullard, *Roman Britain: Outpost of the Empire*, London 1979.
- 16 A survey: J.F. Drinkwater, *Roman Gaul: The Three Provinces, 58 BC–AD 260*, London 1983, 35–53, 143–60.
- 17 For a survey: R.M. Cimino, ed., *Ancient Rome and India: Commercial and Cultural Contacts between the Roman World and India*, New Delhi 1994.
- 18 See, for example, M. Benabou, *La Résistance africaine à la romanisation*, Paris 1975.
- 19 R. Chevallier, *Les Voies romaines*, Paris 1972.
- 20 For the following: F. Millar, *The Emperor in the Roman World*, London 1977.
- 21 S.R.F. Price, *Rituals and Power: The Roman Imperial Cult in Asia Minor*, Cambridge 1984.
- 22 C.G. Starr, *The Roman Empire, 27 BC–AD 476: A Study in Survival*, Oxford 1982.
- 23 An up-to-date and interesting survey: J.S. Richardson, *The Romans in Spain*, London 1996.
- 24 F. de Zuleta, ed., *The Institutes of Gaius*, Oxford 1946, I, i–xi, xlviii–xlix.
- 25 N. Lewis, M. Reinhold, eds, *Roman Civilization: Selected Readings. II: The Empire*, New York 1990, 500–5, 509.
- 26 J.F. Gardner, *Women in Roman Law and Society*, London 1986. See for a nuanced view of patriarchal authority Saller, *Patriarchy*.
- 27 See Suetonius, in his section on Augustus of *De Vita Caesarum*, 89; P. Harvey, *The Oxford Companion to Classical Literature*, Oxford 1937, 451.
- 28 Horace, *Odes*, III, 6.
- 29 B. Severy, *Augustus and the Family at the Birth of the Roman Empire*, London 2004; B. Rawson, *Children and Childhood in Roman Italy*, Oxford 2004.
- 30 B. Isaac, *The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity*, Princeton 2004. See also: F.M. Snowden, Jr, *Blocks in Antiquity: Ethiopians in the Greco-Roman Experience*, Cambridge, MA 1970.
- 31 S.F. Bonner, *Education in Ancient Rome*, London 1977; M. Beard et al. eds, *Literacy in the Roman World*, Ann Arbor 1991.

- 32 From J.A. Shelton, *As the Romans Do: A Sourcebook in Roman Social History*, New York 1988, 32–3, 106, 117.
- 33 J. Balsdon, *Romans and Aliens*, London 1979, still provides a very readable overview.
- 34 C.R. Whittaker, *Rome and its Frontiers: The Dynamics of Empire*, London 2004.
- 35 B. Cunliffe, *Greeks, Romans and Barbarians: Spheres of Interaction*, London 1988.
- 36 This and the following quotations from B. Cunliffe, 'Iron Age societies in Western Europe and beyond, 800–140 BC', in B. Cunliffe, ed., *The Oxford Illustrated Prehistory of Europe*, Oxford 1994, 361, 362, 363.
- 37 A survey: M. Todd, *The Early Germans*, London 1992.
- 38 A discussion of the slow development of tribes into 'proto'-states: L. Hedeager, *Iron-Age Societies: From Tribe to State in Northern Europe, 500 BC to AD 700*, London 1992.
- 39 As examples: W.A. van Es, *Wijster: A Native Village beyond the Roman Frontier*, Groningen 1967; M. Stenberger, *Vallhagar*, Stockholm 1955.
- 40 N. Downs, *Basic Documents in Medieval History*, 11.
- 41 B. Kruger, ed., *Die Germanen*, I–II, Berlin 1976, 1986; R. Christlein, *Die Alamannen*, Stuttgart 1978; P. Perrin, L.-C. Feffer, *Les Francs*, I–II, Paris 1987; W. Menguin, *Die Longobarden*, Stuttgart 1986.
- 42 N. Downs, ed., *Basic Documents in Medieval History*, New York 1959, 9, 10.
- 43 A.A. Lund, *Zum Germanenbild der Römer: Eine Einführung in die antike Ethnographie*, Heidelberg 1990.
- 44 F. Dvornik, *The Slavs: Their Early History and Civilisation*, London 1956.
- 45 Ammianus Marcellinus, *History* (Loeb Classical Library), XXXI, ii.
- 46 Ammianus Marcellinus, *History* (Loeb Classical Library), XVI, iv.
- 47 For this dossier: P. Koschaker, *Europa und das römische Recht*, Munich 1966; J.D. Harke, *Römisches Recht. Von der klassischen Zeit bis zu den modernen Kodifikationen*, Munich 2008; J. Johrendt, a.o.a., *Rom und die Regionen*, Berlin 2012.

Chapter 3

- 1 See P. Johnson, *Civilization of the Holy Land*, London 1979; J. Maier, *Geschichte des Judentums im Altertum*, Darmstadt 1989.
- 2 R. Patai, *The Hebrew Goddess*, Detroit 1990.
- 3 J.H. Hayes, J.M. Miller, eds, *Israelite and Judean History*, London 1977.
- 4 M. Hengel, *Juden, Griechen und Barbaren: Aspekte des Judentums in vorchristlicher Zeit*, Stuttgart 1976.
- 5 C. Thiede, *The Dead Sea Scrolls and the Jewish Origins of Christianity*, London 2000.
- 6 Obviously, biographies of Jesus abound, despite the dearth of reliable sources. A stimulating account is J.D. Crossan, *The Historical Jesus. The Life of a Mediterranean Jewish Peasant*, New York 1991.

- 7 J. Collins, G. Sterling, eds, *Hellenism in the Land of Israel*, Notre Dame 2000; L. Levine, *Judaism and Hellenism in Antiquity: Conflict or Confluence?* Berkeley 1999.
- 8 M. Jack Suggs et al. eds, *The Oxford Study Bible*, New York 1992, 1271 sqq.
- 9 R.E. Brown, *The Birth of the Messiah*, London 1994.
- 10 See E.P. Sanders, *The Historical Figure of Jesus*, New York 1993.
- 11 B. Ehrman, *Lost Christianities*, New York 2003.
- 12 Recently, an effort has been made by G. Vermes, *The Authentic Gospel of Jesus*, Oxford 2003.
- 13 Many have speculated about early contacts between Israel and India: e.g. H. Goodman, ed., *Between Jerusalem and Benares*, Albany 1994. Obviously, trade continued to be a medium for cultural transfer. Cf. J. Innes Miller, *The Spice Trade of the Roman Empire*, Oxford 1969.
- 14 A competent survey of Christian Mariology is M. Warner, *Alone of All Her Sex: The Myth and the Cult of the Virgin Mary*, New York 1985.
- 15 R. Turcan, *Mithra et le mithraïsme*, Paris 1993; D. Ulansay, *The Origins of the Mithraic Mysteries: Cosmology and Salvation in the Ancient World*, New York 1985; M.J. Vermaseren, *Die Orientalische Religionen im Römerreich*, Leiden 1981. M. Clauss, *Cultores Mithrai. Die Anhänger der Mithras-Kulte*, Stuttgart 1992, gives the archaeological sites.
- 16 Cf. W. Sommerfeld, *Der Aufstieg Marduks*, Kevelaer 1982.
- 17 J. Alvar, *Romanising Oriental Gods: Myth, Salvation, and Ethics in the Cults of Cybele, Isis, and Mithras*, Leiden 2008.
- 18 Cf. F. Dunand, *Isis: mère des dieux*, Paris 2000; T.T. Tinh, *Isis lactans*, Leiden 1973.
- 19 For a survey, see A. Böhlig, *Der Manichaeismus*, Zürich 1980, and M. Tardieu, *Le manichéisme*, Paris 1981. Cf. A. Böhlig, 'Der Synkretismus des Mani', in A. Dietrich, ed., *Synkretismus im Syrisch-Persischen Kulturgebiet*, Göttingen 1975, 144–69.
- 20 J. van Oort, *Jerusalem and Babylon: A Study into Augustine's 'City of God' and the Sources of His Doctrine of the Two Cities*, Leiden 1991.
- 21 R.M. Ogilvie, *The Romans and Their Gods*, London 1979.
- 22 H.W. Obbink, *Cybele, Isis en Mithras*, Amsterdam 1965; M.J. Vermaseren, *Die orientalischen Religionen im Römerreich*, Leiden 1981.
- 23 For this and the following quotation: N. Lewis, M. Reinhold, eds, *Roman Civilization: Selected Readings. II: The Empire*, New York 1990, 542, 548–9.
- 24 R. MacMullen, *Christianizing the Roman Empire, AD 100–400*, New Haven 1984.
- 25 For a survey: W. den Boer, ed., *Romanitas et Christianitas*, Amsterdam 1973. Also R. Lane Fox, *Pagans and Christians in the Mediterranean World from the Second Century AD to the Conversion of Constantine*, Harmondsworth 1986.
- 26 See P. Brown, *The World of Late Antiquity*, London 1971, 53.
- 27 Lewis, Reinhold, *Roman Civilization*, 553–4.
- 28 B. Knopf, *Ausgewählte Märtyrerakten*, Tübingen 1929, third edition, no. 6.
- 29 Lewis, Reinhold, *Roman Civilization*, 556–7.

- 30 N. Downs, ed., *Basic Documents in Medieval History*, Princeton 1959, 17.
- 31 Cl. Pharr, trans., *The Theodosian Code*, Princeton 1952, XVI, x, 12.
- 32 Eusebius, *Historia ecclesiastica*, X, vii.
- 33 R. MacMullen, *Constantine*, London 1987.
- 34 See Lane Fox, *Pagans and Christians*, but also J. Blecken, *Constantin der Grosse und die Christen: Überlegungen zur konstantinischen Wende*, Munich 1992, 64 sqq.
- 35 See the analysis in E. Pagels, *The Gnostic Gospels*, London 1982.
- 36 R. Lim, *Public Disputation, Power and Social Order in Late Antiquity*, Berkeley 1996.
- 37 Pharr, *Theodosian Code*, XVI, i, 2.
- 38 Cf. M.R. Salzman, *The Making of a Christian Aristocracy*, New Haven 2004.
- 39 Pharr, *Theodosian Code*, IX, xvi, 4.
- 40 See P. Heather, *Goths and Romans, 332–489*, Oxford 1994, who argues that the Goths entering the Empire were not yet a settled group.
- 41 P. Scardigli, *Lingua e Storia dei Goti*, Florence 1964 [translated as *Die Goten: Sprache und Kultur*, Munich 1973].
- 42 Scardigli, *Lingua*, 95–132.
- 43 Pharr, *Theodosian Code*, II, viii, 18.
- 44 Pharr, *Theodosian Code*, XVI, x, 12 and 19.
- 45 Pharr, *Theodosian Code*, XVI, v, 62.
- 46 See E.A. Thompson, *Romans and Barbarians: The Decline of the Western Empire*, Madison 1982.
- 47 For a survey of these two centuries: A. Cameron, *The Mediterranean World in Late Antiquity: AD 395–600*, London 1993.
- 48 Cf. J. Liebeschuetz, *Decline and Fall of the Roman City*, Oxford 2001.
- 49 See R. van Dam, *Leadership and Community in Late Antique Gaul*, Berkeley 1985, esp. 141–52.
- 50 J. Lindsay, *Byzantium into Europe: The Story of Byzantium as the First Europe (AD 326–1204)*, London 1952; J. Décarreaux, *Byzance ou l'autre Rome*, Paris 1982; M. Whittow, *The Making of Orthodox Byzantium, 600–1025*, London 1993.
- 51 J. Vogt, *Kulturwelt und Barbaren: zum Menschheitsbild der spätantiken Gesellschaft*, Wiesbaden 1976, 21. See also M. Pavan, *La politica gotica di Teodosio nella publicistica del suo tempo*, Rome 1964.
- 52 Vogt, *Kulturwelt*, 24.
- 53 Lewis, Reinhold, *Roman Civilization*, 627.
- 54 G. Cardona et al., *Indo-European and the Indo-Europeans*, Philadelphia 1970; W.B. Lockwood, *A Panorama of Indo-European Languages*, London 1972.
- 55 One among many vehement denials of any outside influence on India is P. Choudhury, *The Aryans: A Modern Myth*, New Delhi 1993.

Chapter 4

- 1 See J. Fischer, *Oriens-Occidens-Europa: Begriff und Gedanke 'Europa' im späten Antike und im frühen Mittelalter*, Wiesbaden 1957.

- 2 G. Wijdeveld, trans., *Augustinus: De Stad van God*, Baarn-Amsterdam 1984, 760.
- 3 J.W. McCrindle, ed., *Cosmas: The Christian Topography*, London 1897.
- 4 See J.-G. Arentzen, *Imago Mundi Cartographica: Studien zur Bildlichkeit mittelaltlicher Welt- und Ökumenekarten unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Zusammenhanges von Text und Bild*, Munich 1980, which, on plates 1 and 1a, has the Kosmas map.
- 5 R.L. Wilken, *The Christians as the Romans Saw Them*, New Haven 1982, 79 sqq.
- 6 Some testimonies in M. Führmann, *Europa: zur Geschichte einer kulturellen und politischen Idee*, Konstanz 1981, 23, n. 10.
- 7 See N. Cohn, *Noah's Flood: The Genesis Story in Western Thought*, Yale 1996.
- 8 The text is in Th. Mommsen, ed., *Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Auctores antiquissimi*, XIII, Berlin 1898, 149 sqq.
- 9 Some testimonies in Führmann, *Europa*, 23, n. 10.
- 10 J. Vogt, *Kulturwelt und Barbaren: zum Menschheitsbild der spätantiken*, Wiesbaden 1976, 39.
- 11 For the Merovingians see I. Wood, *The Merovingian Kingdoms, 450–751*, London 1993.
- 12 L. Duchesne, ed., *Liber pontificalis*, Paris 1886, 420.
- 13 B. Pullan, ed., *Sources for the History of Medieval Europe, from the Mid-eighth to the Mid-thirteenth Century*, Oxford 1966, 176–7.
- 14 P. de Letter, ed., *St. Prosper of Aquitaine, The Call of All Nations*, London 1950, 46.
- 15 See R. Fletcher, *The Conversion of Europe: From Paganism to Christianity, AD 371–138*, New York 1997.
- 16 P. Anderson, *Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism*, London 1974.
- 17 The text is in R. Rau, ed., *Briefe des Bonifatius: Willibalds Leben des Bonifatius*, Darmstadt 1968, 483, 30; 41–2; 493, 19–23.
- 18 J. Haldon, *The State and the Tributary Mode of Production*, London 1993, provides a stimulating reappraisal of developments in the west, compared with, especially, the Ottoman Empire.
- 19 E.g.: S. Brogan, *The Royal Touch in Early Modern England*, Martlesham 2015.
- 20 See P. Rietbergen, *Karel de Grote: Vader van Europa?*, Amersfoort 2009. Also: R. McKitterick, *The Frankish Kingdoms under the Carolingians, 751–987*, London 1983, but also the excellent survey by P. Riché, *Les Carolingiens: une famille qui fit l'Europe*, Paris 1983.
- 21 See R. Hodges, D. Whitehouse, *Muhammad, Charlemagne and the Origins of Europe: Archaeology and the Pirenne Thesis*, Ithaca 1983.
- 22 Bartholomew of Lucca, in the fourteenth century, quoted in J. van Laarhoven, *Europa in de Bijbel: kanttekeningen bij een middeleeuws concept*, Nijmegen 1991, 23.
- 23 J.W. Smit, 'Karel en zijn Kring', *Lampas*, 18/2 (1985), 98–108.

- 24 See the discussion in *Nascità dell'Europa ed Europa Carolingia: un'equazione da verificare*, Spoleto 1981.
- 25 See a letter from Alcuin, AD 790, in E. Dümmler, ed., *Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Epistolae*, IV, Berlin 1895, 32.
- 26 See also A. Barbero, *Charlemagne: Father of a Continent*, Berkeley 2004.
- 27 W. Henze, ed., *Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Epistolae*, VII, Hanover 1928, 388, letter from Emperor Louis II to Emperor Basilius I.
- 28 N. Downs, *Documents in Medieval History*, New York 1959, 33.
- 29 See B. Bischoff, *Manuscripts and Libraries in the Age of Charlemagne*, Cambridge 1994, 61.
- 30 Pullan, *Sources*, 27–8.
- 31 For the background the important synthesis by P. Riché, *Education et culture dans l'Occident barbare, VIe–VIIIe siècle*, Paris 1995.
- 32 See T. Stoianovich, ed., *Balkan Civilization: The First and Last Europe*, London 1992.
- 33 See R. Bartlett, *The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change, 950–1350*, Princeton 1993.
- 34 A. Hofmeister, ed., *Otonis Episcopi Frisingensis, Chronica*, V, prologue, in *Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptores Rerum Germanicarum in usu Scholarum*, Hanover 1912, 227.
- 35 For an example: V.I.J. Flint, *The Rise of Magic in Early Medieval Europe*, Oxford 1991.
- 36 J.C. Russell, *The Germanization of Early Medieval Christianity*, Oxford 1994.
- 37 See P. Biller, A. Hudson, eds, *Heresy and Literacy, 1000–1530*, Cambridge 1996; R. Copeland, ed., *Criticism and Dissent in the Middle Ages*, Cambridge 1996.
- 38 For a survey: C.H. Lawrence, *Medieval Monasticism: Forms of Religious Life in Western Europe in the Middle Ages*, London 1984. A useful reconsideration: L. Milis, *Angelic Monks and Earthly Men*, Woodbridge 1992.
- 39 For an example: N. Metzger, *Cultural Interplay in the Eighth Century: The Trier Gospels and the Making of a Scriptorium at Echternach*, Cambridge 1994.
- 40 See P. Dronke, *Intellectuals and Poets in Medieval Europe*, Rome 1992.
- 41 See Bischoff, *Manuscripts*, 134 sqq. on the role of Benedictine monasteries.
- 42 E.M. Wischermann, *Grundlagen einer Cluniacensische Bibliotheksgeschichte*, Munich 1988, 8 sqq.
- 43 P. Dronke, *Women Writers of the Middle Ages: A Critical Study of Texts from Perpetua (d. 203) to Marguerite Parete (d. 1310)*, Cambridge 1984.
- 44 See J.L. David, R.K. Ehrmann, eds, *The Letters of Hildegard of Bingen*, London 1994; J. Buehler, ed., trans., *Schriften der Heiligen Hildegard von Bingen*, Frankfurt 1980; P. Dronke, *Poetic Individuality in the Middle Ages*, Oxford 1970, 150–79.
- 45 For a later example: C.B. Bouchard, *Holy Entrepreneurs: Cistercians, Knights and Economic Change in Twelfth-century Burgundy*, Ithaca 1991.

- 46 For this essay: P. Rietbergen, *Karel de Grote. Vader van Europa?* Amersfoort 2009; J. Fried, *Karl der Grosse: Gewalt und Glaube. Eine Biographie*, Munich 2014.

Chapter 5

- 1 I have borrowed the idea from G. Fowder, *Empire to Commonwealth: Consequences of Monotheism in Late Antiquity*, Princeton 1992.
- 2 R. Morris, *Monks and Laymen in Byzantium, 843–1138*, Cambridge 1995.
- 3 D. Baker, ed., *Relations between East and West in the Middle Ages*, Edinburgh 1973.
- 4 R. Byron, D. Talbot Rice, *The Birth of Western Painting*, New York 1968; see also J. Beckwith, *Studies in Byzantine and Medieval Western Art*, London 1989.
- 5 D.J. Geanakoplos, *Interaction of the 'Sibling' Byzantine and Western Cultures in the Middle Ages and Italian Renaissance (330–1600)*, New Haven 1976, provides an extensive survey that yet shows the paucity of proof for really intense interaction.
- 6 A. Davids, ed., *The Empress Theophano: Byzantium and the west at the Turn of the First Millennium*, Cambridge 1996.
- 7 See R.P. Hughes, I. Piperno, eds, *Christianity and the Eastern Slavs II: Russian Culture in Medieval Times*, Berkeley 1994.
- 8 For a survey: B. Gasparov, O. Raevsky-Hughes, eds, *Christianity and the Eastern Slavs I: Slavic Culture in the Middle Ages*, Berkeley 1993; D. Obolensky, *Byzantium and the Slavs*, Crestwood 1994.
- 9 A. Papadakis, *The Christian East and the Rise of the Papacy*, Crestwood 1994.
- 10 For a survey: A. Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples*, Cambridge, MA 1991, and P. Crone, *Meccan Trade and the Rise of Islam*, London 1988, who argues that the trade routes, although profitable, were not a source of great riches and of a specific culture based upon it which would account for the genesis of Islam.
- 11 For a vast survey of the relationship between the three monotheistic religions, see: F.J. Peters, *The Monotheists: Jews, Christians and Muslims in Conflict and Competition*, Princeton 2004.
- 12 A. Özek, ed., *The Holy Qur'an with English Translation*, Istanbul 1992.
- 13 See H. Kennedy, *The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates*, New York 1986.
- 14 For a survey: A. Dhanun Taha, *The Muslim Conquest and Settlement of North Africa and Spain*, London 1989.
- 15 See also the interesting survey by: H. Kennedy, *The Court of the Caliphs*, London 2004.
- 16 For the following: A.Y. al-Hassan, a.o. eds, *Science and Technology in Islam*, Paris 2001.
- 17 See Ph.K. Hitti, *The Arabs: A Short History*, Chicago 1964, 120.
- 18 For the background: W. Montgomery Watt, *Muslim-Christian Encounters: Perceptions and Misperceptions*, London 1992.

- 19 For a balanced survey: C. Cahen, *Orient et occident au temps des croisades*, Paris 1983.
- 20 H. Hagenmeyer, ed., *Fulcher von Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana*, Heidelberg 1913, 130–8, passim.
- 21 N. Downs, ed., *Basic Documents in Medieval History*, New York 1959, 75–6.
- 22 F. Gabrieli, trans., ed., *Arab Historians of the Crusades*, 1957; London 1964, 1984, 10–11, 79–80, 83–4, 82.
- 23 See S. Schein, *Fideles Crucis: The Papacy, the West and the Recovery of the Holy Land, 1274–1314*, Oxford 1991; N. Hously, *The Later Crusades, 1274–1580: From Lyons to Alcazar*, Oxford 1992.
- 24 W. Stubbs, ed., *Willelmi Malmesburiensis, De Gestis Regum Anglorum*, London 1887, 394–8, passim.
- 25 B. Kedar, *Crusade and Mission: European Approaches toward the Muslims*, Princeton 1984; W. Montgomery Watt, *Muslim-Christian Encounters: Perceptions and Misperceptions*, London 1991; N. Bonaparte, *Campagnes d’Egypte et de Syrie*, Paris 1998, 140 sqq; 275; J. Dodds, *Architecture and Ideology in Early Medieval Spain*, London 1990; M. Reeves, *Muhammad in Europe: A Thousand Years of Western Myth-making*, New York 2003; P. Rietbergen, *Cultuurwegen, cultuurwerelden: Europa en/in Eurazië*, Nijmegen 2008, 59–75.
- 26 Cf. P. Rietbergen, ‘De profeten van Jan Nomsz (1738–1803): Zoroaster en Mohammed’, *De Achttiende Eeuw*, 35/1 (2003), 3–14.

Chapter 6

- 1 For the following: P. Anderson, *Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism*, London 1978; G. Duby, *The Early Growth of the European Economy: Warriors and Peasants from the Seventh to the Twelfth Century*, London 1978.
- 2 See H. Clarke, B. Ambrosiani, *Towns in the Viking Age*, London 1995.
- 3 ‘Formulae Turonenses’, edited by K. Zeumer, *Monumenta Germaniae historica: Formulae Merovingici et Karolingi Aevi*, Hanover 1886, 158.
- 4 L. Vanderkindere, *Ghislebert de Mons, Chronicon Hanoniense*, Brussels 1904, 13–14.
- 5 Vanderkindere, *Ghislebert*, 119–20.
- 6 B. Pullan, ed., *Sources for the History of Medieval Europe, from the Mid-eighth to the Mid-thirteenth Century*, Oxford 1966, 237–8.
- 7 See the ‘iconoclastic’ vision proposed by Susan Reynolds in her magnificent study: *Fiefs and Vassals: The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted*, Oxford 1994.
- 8 J. Strayer, *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State*, Princeton 1970.
- 9 J.A. Hall, *Powers and Liberties: The Causes and Consequences of the Rise of the West*, Oxford 1985, 125 sqq., is highly illuminating on this and related issues.
- 10 The case defended by J. Boswell, *Christianity, Social Tolerance and Homosexuality: Gay People in Western Europe from the Beginning of the Christian Era to the Fourteenth Century*, Chicago 1980, is definitely strong. It seems, however, that his argument for widespread acceptance of same-sex unions – in A

Marriage of Likeness: Same-sex Unions in Pre-modern Europe, London 1995 – is less convincing.

- 11 J.B. Holloway *et al.* eds, *Equally in God's Image: Women in the Middle Ages*, New York 1990; M. Williams, A. Echols, eds, *Between Pit and Pedestal: Women in the Middle Ages*, Princeton 1993.
- 12 See R.I. Moore, *The Origins of European Dissent*, Oxford 1985, 58.
- 13 For an example, see A. Classen, ed., *Women as Protagonists and Poets in the German Middle Ages*, Göttingen 1991; H. Solterer, *The Master and Minerva: Disputing Women in French Medieval Culture*, Berkeley 1995.
- 14 For a survey of the many aspects of the cult of Mary through the ages: N. Perry, L. Echevarria, *Under the Heel of Mary*, London 1989.
- 15 M. Halissy, *Clean Maids, True Wives, Steadfast Widows: Chaucer's Women and Medieval Codes of Conduct*, Westport 1993.
- 16 Hall, *Powers*, 130–2.
- 17 For a survey: D. Sweeney, ed., *Agriculture in the Middle Ages: Technology, Practice and Representation*, Philadelphia 1996.
- 18 On the evolution of the water-mill since its early origins in the eastern parts of the Mediterranean: T.S. Reynolds, *Stronger than a Hundred Men*, Baltimore 1983.
- 19 J. Gimpel, *The Medieval Machine: The Industrial Revolution of the Middle Ages*, London 1977.
- 20 J. Landes, *The Field and the Forge: Population, Production and Power in the Pre-industrial West*, Oxford 2004.
- 21 On indigenous developments in Europe: A. Pacey, *The Maze of Ingenuity: Ideas and Idealism in the Development of Technology*, Cambridge, MA 1976.
- 22 G. Duby, *The Early Growth of the European Economy*, Ithaca 1977.
- 23 A.Y. al-Hassan, D.R. Hill, *Islamic Technology: An Illustrated History*, Cambridge 1986.
- 24 For the following: J. Needham, *Science and Civilization in China*, 7, Cambridge 1986, *passim*.
- 25 A.P. Smyth, *King Alfred the Great*, Oxford 1995.
- 26 J. Krynen, *L'Empire du roi: idées et croyances politiques en France, XIIIe–XVe siècle*, Paris 1993.
- 27 Cf. B. Reynolds, *Kings and Communities in Western Europe, 900–1300*, Oxford 1997, 34–5, 118–19.
- 28 Hall, *Powers*, 141 *sqq.*
- 29 For example, Krynen, *L'Empire*, for developments in France.
- 30 Ch. Tilly *et al.* eds, *Cities and the Rise of States in Europe, AD 1000 to 1800*, Oxford 1994, provides a sweeping interpretation. See also E. Pitz, *Europäisches Staedtewesen und Buergetum: von der Spaetantike bis zum hohen Mittelalter*, Darmstadt 1991.
- 31 An interesting study is D. Harrison, *The Early State and the Towns: Forms of Integration in Lombard Italy, AD 568–774*, Lund 1993.
- 32 See the essays in R. Holt, ed., *Houses and Households in Towns, 1000–1600*, London 1998.

- 33 For a survey: D.C. North, *The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History*, Cambridge 1976.
- 34 Pullan, *Sources*, 265–6.
- 35 For the importance of the towns for the growth of the European concept of freedom, see R.W. Davies, ed., *The Origins of Modern Freedom in the West*, Stanford 1995.
- 36 Ph. Dollinger, *La Hanse*, Paris 1962.
- 37 G. Weilandt, a.o. eds., *Hansische Identitäten*, Fulda 2017.
- 38 R.S. Lopez, I.W. Raymond, eds, *Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean World*, New York 1955, 416–18, *passim*.
- 39 See Davies, *The Origin of Modern Freedom*, as well as G. Dilcher, ed., *Respublica: Burgerschaft in Stadt und Staat*, Berlin 1988.
- 40 W.-D. Heim, *Romanen und Germanen in Charlemagnes Reich: Untersuchung zur Benennung Romanischer und Germanischer Völker, Sprachen und Länder in Französischen Dichtungen des Mittelalters*, Munich 1984.
- 41 M.R. James, C.N.L. Brooke, R.A.B. Meyers, eds, *Walter Map De Nugis Curialium: Courtiers' Trifles*, Oxford 1983, 73, 173, 169, 183.
- 42 L. Wieland, ed., *Deutsche Chroniken. Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptorum qui vernacula lingua usi sunt*, II, Hanover 1876; Zürich 1971, 115, 10; 116, 45; 133, 13–14; 139, 28–30; 150, 28–36.
- 43 See H.J. Graff, ed., *Literacy and Social Development in the West*, Cambridge 1982.
- 44 P. Strauch, ed., *Jansen Enikels Werke. Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptorum qui vernacula lingua susi sunt III*, Hanover 1900. For the passages quoted in this chapter: 55, 2,847–53; 382, 20,021; 484–5, 24,837, 24,843; 498, 25,524 sqq.; 499, 25,576; 536, 27,393; 549, 27,661.
- 45 Strauch, *Jansen Enikel*, 535, 27,509–11; 535, 27,501–4; 536, 27,523–5.
- 46 His 'Noticia seculi' have been published by H. Grundmann, H. Heimpel, eds, *Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Staatsschriften des späten Mittelalters I*, 1, Stuttgart 1958; for this quote: 155–6.
- 47 Peter Rietbergen, 'Sacralizing the Palace, Sacralizing the King: Sanctuaries and/in Royal Palaces in Medieval Europe', in M. Verhoeven, a.o. eds., *Monuments and Memory: Christian Cult Buildings and Constructions of the Past*, Turnhout 2016, 209–21. Also: C. Beaune, *Naissance de la nation française*, Paris 1985, or its enlarged 2nd edition: *The Birth of an Ideology: Myths and Symbols of Nation in Late Medieval France*, Berkeley 1991.
- 48 F. Kempf, 'Das Problem der Christianitas im 12. und 13. Jahrhundert', *Historisches Jahrbuch*, 79 (1960), 104 sqq.; P.E. Schramm, *Kaiser, Rom und Renovatio*, I, Darmstadt 1962, 3rd edition, 74 sqq.
- 49 Ch.-V. Langlois, ed., P. Dubois, *De Recuperatione Terrae Sanctae*, Paris 1891, 1 sqq.
- 50 R.F.M. Brouwer, trans., ed., *Dante Alighieri, De Monarchia en andere politieke teksten*, Baarn 1993, I, ch. 5; III, chs 13–15.
- 51 A. Gewirth, ed., trans., *Marsiglio of Padua: The Defender of Peace*, New York 1956.

- 52 See A. Erlande-Brandenburg, *The Cathedral: The Social and Architectural Dynamics of Construction*, Cambridge 1994.
- 53 L.J. Lekai, *The Cistercians: Ideals and Reality*, London 1977.
- 54 C. Stephen Jaeger, *The Origins of Courtliness: Civilizing Trends and the Formation of Courtly Ideals, 939–1310*, Philadelphia 1985.
- 55 A survey: A.S. Bernardi, S. Levin, eds, *The Classics in the Middle Ages*, Binghampton 1990.
- 56 An impressive case study: M.T. Clanchy, *From Memory to Written Record: England, 1066–1307*, Oxford 1992.
- 57 See I.D. Reynolds, N.G. Wilson, *Scribes and Scholars: A Guide to the Transmission of Greek and Latin Literature*, Oxford 1991.
- 58 For Notker Balbulus: G.H. Pertz, ed., *Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptores, II*, Hanover 1829, 330; his *Gesta Karoli*, in R. Rau, ed., *Quellen zur Karolingischen Reichsgeschichte, III*, Darmstadt 1964, 344, 366; for Nithard: Rau, I, Darmstadt 1962, 386, 448.
- 59 For the background of the concepts ‘little’ and ‘great’ tradition: P. Burke, *Popular Culture in Europe*, London 1978, 28.
- 60 For a still masterful survey: M. Bloch, *La Société féodale*, Paris 1968; orig. 1939–40.
- 61 B. Reynolds, trans., *Dante Alighieri, la Vita Nuova*, Harmondsworth 1980, 97.
- 62 Good reading is provided by J. Sumption, *Pilgrimage: An Image of Medieval Religion*, London 1975; R. Stoppani, *Le grandi vie di pellegrinaggio del medioevo: le Strade per Roma*, Florence 1986.
- 63 A survey with many illustrations: N.N., *Santiago. Camino de Europa: Culto y Cultura en la Peregrinación a Compostela*, Santiago 1993.
- 64 D.G. Rossetti, trans., *The New Life by Dante Alighieri*, London 1904, sonnet 40.
- 65 N. Coghill, ed., trans., *Geoffrey Chaucer, The Canterbury Tales*, Harmondsworth 1960, 20–1.
- 66 R. Lafont, *La Geste de Roland*, I–II, Paris 1991; W. van Emden, *La Chanson de Roland*, London 1995, gives the text of one of the many versions.
- 67 A good survey of the many elements that made up the ‘world of the knight’ is R. Barber, *The Knight and Chivalry*, London 1996.
- 68 M.E. Lacarra, *El Poema de Mio Cid: realidad historica e ideologia*, Madrid 1980. The text has been translated by P. Such, J. Hodgkinson, *The Poem of my Cid*, Warminster 1987.
- 69 S. Reynolds, *Fiefs and Vassals: The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted*, Oxford 1995.
- 70 G. Duby, *Les Trois ordres ou l’imaginaire du féodalisme*, Paris 1978.
- 71 Ch. Potoin, ed., *Oeuvres de Ghillebert de Lannoy, voyageur, diplomate et moraliste*, Leuven 1878.
- 72 See Th. Bender, ed., *The University and the City: From Medieval Origins to the Present*, New York 1988.
- 73 S. Bertino, *Le Strade della Civiltà: I grandi itinerari della Storia di ieri e di oggi*, Milan 1984.

- 74 A survey that is also a plea for the notion that this specific culture dominated Europe until the end of the eighteenth century is R.W. Southern, *Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe. I: Foundations*, London 1995.
- 75 Pullan, *Sources*, 104.
- 76 Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, 178, cols 1339–49.
- 77 G. Makdisi, *The Rise of Humanism in Classical Islam and the Christian West: With Special Reference to Scholasticism*, Edinburgh 1990.
- 78 A. Lewis, *The Islamic World and the West, AD 622–1492*, New York 1970.
- 79 B. Reilly, *The Contest of Christian and Muslim Spain, 1031–1157*, London 1992.
- 80 A synthesis: S.K. Jayyusi, ed., *The Legacy of Muslim Spain*, Leiden 1992.
- 81 Cf. G. Andress, a.o. eds, *Averroes and the Aristotelian Tradition*, Leiden 1999.
- 82 Quoted in H.-J. Störig, *Geschiedenis van de Filosofie*, I, Utrecht 1972, 246–7.
- 83 N. Downs, ed., *Documents in Medieval History*, New York 1959, 134–5.
- 84 Pullan, *Sources*, 105–8.
- 85 For a history of the phenomenon of language as a constructor of identity: P. Burke, R. Porter, eds, *Language, Self and Society*, London 1991.
- 86 F.P. van Oostrom, *Het Woord van Eer: Literatuur aan het Hollandse hof omstreeks 1400*, Amsterdam 1987, 18–22.
- 87 For this essay: J. Dunn, *Democracy: The Unfinished Journey, 508 BC–1993 AD*, Oxford 1994; A. Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-six Countries*, New Haven 1999.
- 88 I do not share the interpretation of M. Prak, *Citizens without Nations: Urban Citizenship in Europe and the World, c.1000–1789*, Cambridge 2018, who argues that in many parts of the world strong forms of (local, urban) democracy predated the French Revolution and were, indeed, stronger than the limited democracy created by that revolution.

Chapter 6

- 1 For a general survey of this ‘world’, which many would think of as the world of the ‘Middle Ages’, see A. Gurevich, *Historical Anthropology of the Middle Ages*, Cambridge 1992. W. Rosener, *The Peasantry of Europe*, London 1994, provides a survey from the early Middle Ages to the present.
- 2 A. Cowan, *Urban Europe, 1500–1700*, London 1997, provides a very competent overview of life in Europe’s cities.
- 3 See P. Hohenberg, *The Making of Urban Europe, 1000–1994*, Cambridge, MA 1995; G. Huppert, *After the Black Death: A Social History of Early Modern Europe*, Bloomington 1986, esp. ch. 1, ‘The eternal village’.
- 4 B. Lepetit, J. Hooek, eds, *La Ville et l’innovation: relais et réseaux de diffusion en Europe, 14e–19e siècles*, Paris 1987.
- 5 The near all-importance of food has been sketched, albeit impressionistically, in two studies by P. Camporesi, *Bread of Dreams: Food and Fantasy in Early Modern Europe*, London 1989, and *The Magic Harvest: Food, Folklore*

- and Society, London 1993, as well as in his *The Land of Hunger*, London 1995.
- 6 W.H. McNeill, *Plagues and Peoples*, Oxford 1977.
 - 7 Cf. R. Chartier, 'De praktijk van het geschreven woord', in Chartier, ed., *Geschiedenis van het Persoonlijk Leven 3: Van de Renaissance tot de Verlichting*, Amsterdam 1989, 95–139.
 - 8 This, at least, is the outcome of the research by H. Roosenboom, *De Dorps-school in de Meijerij van's-Hertogenbosch van 1648 tot 1795*, Tilburg 1997.
 - 9 See V. Fumagalli, *Landscapes of Fear: Perceptions of Nature and the City in the Middle Ages*, Cambridge 1993.
 - 10 See P. Burke, 'The invention of leisure in Early Modern Europe', *Past and Present*, 146 (1995), 136–50.
 - 11 P. Rietbergen, *Willem III (1650–1702). Stadhouder en Koning in Europese Context*, Amersfoort 2015, 14–29 and *passim*.
 - 12 See C. Ginzburg, *The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-century Miller*, London 1980, who deals with the methodological problems involved.
 - 13 The best survey to date of this complex way of writing cultural history is P. Burke, *Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe*, London 1978.
 - 14 For a survey of this field, on which opinions between scholars continue to clash: G. Duby, ed., *Amour et sexualité en Occident*, Paris 1991.
 - 15 A. Murray, *Reason and Society in the Middle Ages*, Oxford 1978, provides a fine introduction to the phenomenon of the mathematization of European culture. It does so rather more satisfactorily than A. Crosby, *The Measure of Reality: Quantification and Western Society, 1250–1600*, Cambridge 1996.
 - 16 For a survey: M.L. Bush, ed., *Social Orders and Social Classes in Europe since 1500*, Harlow 1992.
 - 17 G. Nigro, ed., *Aspects of the Life and Character of Francesco Datini*, Firenze 2013.
 - 18 For example, J. Kaplow, *The Names of Kings: The Parisian Labouring Poor in the Eighteenth Century*, New York 1972.
 - 19 A survey of the attitudes involved: M. Sommerville, *Sex and Subjugation: Attitudes to Women in Early Modern Society*, London 1995.
 - 20 N. Davis, ed., *Paston Letters and Papers of the Fifteenth Century*, I–II, Oxford 1971, 1976.
 - 21 P. Rietbergen, *Willem III (1650–1702). Stadhouder en Koning in Europese Context*, Amersfoort 20, 30–61.
 - 22 See N. Armstrong, L. Tennenhouse, eds, *The Ideology of Conduct*, New York 1987.
 - 23 An interesting case: A. Pardailhé-Galabrun, *The Birth of Intimacy: Privacy and Domestic Life in Early Modern Paris*, London 1991.
 - 24 The problem of childhood is one of the most discussed topics in recent cultural history. It seems that the original thesis about the 'invention' of childhood in the seventeenth century, voiced by Ph. Ariès, *L'Enfant et la vie familiale sous l'ancien régime*, Paris 1960, should definitely be revised; see e.g. S. Shahar, *Childhood in the Middle Ages*, London 1990; B.A. Hanawalt,

Growing Up in Medieval London: The Experience of Childhood in History, New York 1993.

- 25 From the vast literature: S. Brauner, *Fearless Wives and Frightened Shrews: The Construction of the Witch in Early Modern Germany*, Amherst 1996, as well as R. Briggs, *Witches and Neighbours*, London 1997.
- 26 For a survey that compares the European experience with that of other cultures: A. Burgière *et al.* eds, *A History of the Family*, II, London 1996.
- 27 L. Bogaers, 'Geleund over de onderdeur: Doorkijkjes in het Utrechtse buurtleven van de vroege Middeleeuwen tot in de zeventiende eeuw', *Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden*, 112 (1997), 336–64.
- 28 Instances are given in P. Burke, *The Historical Anthropology of Early Modern Italy: Essays in Perception and Communication*, Cambridge 1987.
- 29 For example, E.M. Benabou, *La Prostitution et la police des moeurs au XVIIIe siècle*, Paris 1981.
- 30 Instances in M. Barberito, ed., *Giacinto Gigli, Diario di Roma, 1608–1670*, I–II, Rome 1994.
- 31 See R. van Dülmen, 'Das Schauspiel des Todes', in R. van Dülmen, N. Schindler, eds, *Volkskultur: zur Wiederentdeckung des vergessenen Alltags*, Frankfurt 1984, 203–45.
- 32 J. Delumeau, *Une histoire du paradis*, Paris, 1992.
- 33 J. Riess, *Luca Signorelli's Orvieto Frescoes*, Princeton 1995.
- 34 See: P. Stanford, *Heaven: A Traveller's Guide to the Undiscovered Country*, London 2003.
- 35 G. Klaniczay, *The Uses of Supranatural Power: The Transformation of Popular Religion in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, Cambridge 1990.
- 36 See the position taken in L. Milis, ed., *De heidense Middeleeuwen*, Brussels 1991.
- 37 See A. Demandt, ed., *Mit Fremden leben: eine Kulturgeschichte von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart*, Munich 1995.
- 38 See: R. Briggs, *Witches and Neighbours: The Social and Cultural Context of European Witchcraft*, Oxford 2002, maps 1 and 2.
- 39 See: L. Roper, *Witch Craze*, New Haven 2004.
- 40 Cf. P. Burke, *Languages and Communities in Early Modern Europe*, Cambridge 2004.
- 41 R.A. Houston, *Literacy in Early Modern Europe: Culture and Education, 1500–1800*, London 1988, 207.
- 42 See L. Trenard, 'L'enseignant de la langue nationale', in D.N. Burke, ed., *The Making of Frenchmen: Current Directions in the History of Education in France, 1679–1979*, Waterloo 1980, 95–114; R.A. Houston, *Literacy in Early Modern Europe: Culture and Education, 1500–1800*, London 1988, 40 sqq.
- 43 E. Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*, London 1976.
- 44 P.J.A.N. Rietbergen, 'Beeld en zelfbeeld: "Nederlandse identiteit" in politieke structuur en politieke cultuur tijdens de Republiek', *Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden*, 107 (1992), 635–56.

Chapter 7

- 1 See R. Jacoff, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Dante*, Cambridge 1993.
- 2 A very perceptive study of the thinkers of the Renaissance is L.M. Baktin, *Gli Umanisti Italiani: Stile di Vita e di Pensiero*, Rome 1990. E. Garin, ed., *L'Uomo del Rinascimento*, Rome 1988, provides an attractive series of portraits of various Renaissance 'types'.
- 3 A masterly succinct survey is given by G. Nauert, *Humanism and the Culture of Renaissance Europe*, Cambridge 1995.
- 4 An exhaustive survey: A. Rabil, ed., *Renaissance Humanism: Foundations, Forms and Legacy*, I–III, Philadelphia 1988.
- 5 Piccolomini's treatise on Europe is in A.S. Piccolomini (Pius II), *Opera*, Basle 1551, 387 sqq.
- 6 W. Fritzemeyer, *Christenheit und Europa*, Munich-Berlin 1931, 18.
- 7 Fritzemeyer, *Christenheit*.
- 8 See Piccolomini's *Oratio de Constantinopolitana clade*, in his *Opera*, 682.
- 9 See Piccolomini's *Bulla de profectione in Turcos*, in his *Opera*, 923.
- 10 R. Sabbadini, *Storia del Ciceronianismo*, Turin 1885, 82.
- 11 D.J. Geanakoplos, *Constantinople and the West*, Madison 1989; J.J. Yiannias, ed., *The Byzantine Tradition after the Fall of Constantinople*, London 1991; D. M. Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice: A Study in Diplomatic and Cultural Relations*, Cambridge 1992.
- 12 P.O. Kristeller, *Il pensiero filosofico di Marsilio Ficino*, Florence 1953; a German edition was published in 1972. Further: E. Garin, *La cultura filosofica del Rinascimento italiano*, Florence 1961; P.O. Kristeller, *Marsilio Ficino and his work after five hundred years*, Florence 1987.
- 13 E. Garin, ed., *La Disputa delle Arti nel Quattrocento*, Florence 1947, 5–6.
- 14 G. Christianson, Th. Izbicki, eds, *Nicholas of Cusa in Search of God and Wisdom*, London 1991.
- 15 A.G. Weiler, *Desiderius Erasmus: De spiritualiteit van een christen-humanist*, Nijmegen 1997, provides an up-to-date evaluation of Erasmus' spiritual significance. For a biography see L. Halkin, *Erasme parmi nous*, Paris 1987; trans. as *Erasmus: A Critical Biography*, Oxford 1993.
- 16 P.S. Allen, ed., *Opus Epistolarum Des: Erasmi Roterodami*, Oxford 1913, III, 587 sqq., Erasmus to Cardinal Wolsey, 18 May 1519.
- 17 Part of the original texts have been digitized by the British Library.
- 18 C. Nicholl, *Leonardo da Vinci: Flights of the Mind*, New York 2004.
- 19 G.L. Hersey, *The Evolution of Allure: Sexual Selection from the Medici Venus to the Incredible Hulk*, Cambridge, MA 1996.
- 20 R.J. Clements, ed., *Michelangelo: A Self Portrait*, Englewood Cliffs 1963, 37, 44.
- 21 G. Bull, ed., trans., *The Autobiography of Benvenuto Cellini*, Harmondsworth 1956, 15, 28, 29, 31, 37–8.
- 22 P. Bange, ed., *De doorwerking van de Moderne Devotie*, Hilversum 1988; R.R. Post, *The Modern Devotion: Confrontation with Reformation and Humanism*, Leiden 1968.

- 23 M.M. Phillips, *Erasmus and the Northern Renaissance*, Woodbridge 1981.
- 24 Cf. P. Rietbergen, *De Retoriek van de Eeuwige Stad: Rome gelezen*, Nijmegen 2003.
- 25 The preceding is surveyed succinctly in G. Quazza, *La Decadenza Italiana nella Storia Europea*, Turin 1971.
- 26 For this essay: K. Levy, *Gregorian Chant and the Carolingians*, Princeton 1998; A. Atlas, *Renaissance Music*, New York 1998; C. Dahlhaus, *Die Musik des 19. Jahrhunderts*, 1989; J. Warrack, *The Oxford Dictionary of Opera*, Oxford 1992. For some (early) musical examples: *La Musique de l'Antiquité*, on: Harmonia Mundi CD (2005), with, however, some highly debatable reconstructions.

Chapter 8

- 1 W.Ch. Jordan, *The Great Famine: Northern Europe in the Early Fourteenth Century*, Princeton 1996, is a good survey.
- 2 F. Chabod, 'L'Idea di Europa', *Rassegna d'Italia* II (1947), 7.
- 3 F.-M Arouet, Voltaire, *Le Siècle de Louis XIV*, Paris 1752.
- 4 Francis Bacon, *Novum Organum*, London 1620 or later editions, aphorism 129.
- 5 M. Devèze, R. Marx, trans., eds, *Textes et documents d'histoire moderne*, Paris 1967, 77–8.
- 6 An excellent introduction is provided by L. Avrin, *Scribes, Script and Books: The Book Arts from Antiquity to the Renaissance*, Chicago 1991; a beautifully illustrated survey of all aspects of medieval manuscript production is J. Glenisson, ed., *Le Livre au moyen âge*, Paris 1988.
- 7 See P. Gumbert, *The Dutch and Their Books in the Manuscript Age*, London 1989.
- 8 C. Bozzolo, E. Ornato, *Pour une histoire du livre manuscrit au moyen âge*, Paris 1983, especially part I: 'La production du livre manuscrit en France du Nord', 15–121.
- 9 H. Bresc, *Livre et société en Sicile (1299–1499)*, Palermo 1971, 187, table 2.
- 10 For the general background: Tsien Tsuen-Hsuei, *Paper and Printing*, Cambridge 1985 [= J. Needham, ed., *Science and Civilisation in China*, 1].
- 11 J. Moran, *Printing Presses: History and Development from the Fifteenth Century to Modern Times*, Berkeley 1973.
- 12 For the following: E.L. Eisenstein, *The Printing Press as an Agent of Change: Communication and Cultural Transformation in Early Modern Europe*, I–II, Cambridge 1979.
- 13 The problem of economic and technological stagnation in Asia in general, and in the Chinese empire in particular has been much discussed, lately, with very interesting but largely non-conclusive and always contradictory interpretations being brought forward by various authors. See M. Elvin, *The Pattern of the Chinese Past*, London 1973; C.A. Alvares, *Homo Faber: Technology and Culture in India, China and the West from 1500 to the Present Day*,

- The Hague 1980. However, see also: C. Pommerantz, *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy*, Princeton 2000.
- 14 D.S. Landes, *Revolution in Time: Clocks and the Making of the Modern World*, Cambridge, MA 1983.
 - 15 W. Schivelbusch, *The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Space and Time*, New York 1986.
 - 16 G.R. Elton, *Renaissance and Reformation, 1300–1648*, London 1963, 135–40.
 - 17 For a splendid overview, see D. MacCulloch, *Reformation: Europe's House Divided, 1490–1700*, London 2003.
 - 18 A.R. Wentz, ed., *Luther's Works*, Philadelphia 1959, XXXVI, 66–7.
 - 19 J.I. Packer, O.R. Johnston, trans., eds, *Martin Luther: On the Bondage of the Will*, London 1957, 80–1, 313–14.
 - 20 Cf. B. Erne, ed., *De Gentse Spelen van 1539*, The Hague 1982.
 - 21 E.g. J. Black, *Kings, Nobles and Commoners. States and Societies in early Modern Europe*, London 2004.
 - 22 The problematic nature of the term 'intellectual' as used in European cultural history is best illustrated by the following three studies, each a valuable contribution in its own right: J. le Goff, *Intellectuals in the Middle Ages*, Oxford 1993, originally Paris 1957; D. Masseau, *L'Invention de l'intellectuel dans l'Europe du XVIII^e siècle*, Paris 1994; C. Charle, *Naissance des intellectuels 1880–1900*, Paris 1990. I take an intellectual to be a person who, from a certain background of erudition or perhaps even specialized scholarship, participates in the wider debate regarding the functioning and direction of his culture and society.
 - 23 See among others: E. Kaeber, *Die Idee des Europäischen Gleichgewichts in der publizistischen Literatur vom 16. bis zur Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts*, Berlin 1907.
 - 24 For the following: M.U. Edwards, *Printing, Propaganda and Martin Luther*, Berkeley 1994.
 - 25 R.W. Scribner, *For the Sake of Simple Folk: Popular Propaganda for the German Reformation*, Oxford 1994.
 - 26 J.L. Koerner, *The Reformation of the Image*, Chicago 2004.
 - 27 See T. Watt, *Cheap Print and Popular Piety, 1550–1640*, Cambridge 1991.
 - 28 For an overview of, often conflicting, interpretations, see M. Luebke, ed., *The Counter-Reformation*, London 1990.
 - 29 See also: L. Chatellier, *The Europe of the Devout: The Catholic Reformation and the Formation of a New Society*, Cambridge 1989.
 - 30 M. Novak, *The Catholic Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism*, New York 1993.
 - 31 D. Baggioni, *Langues et Nations en Europe*, Paris 1997.
 - 32 R. Myers, M. Harris, *Censorship and the Control of Printing in England and France, 1600–1910*, Winchester 1992.
 - 33 See, e.g., Peter Rietbergen, *Bij de Paus aan Tafel. Culinaire cultuur tijdens de Renaissance en de Barok*, Amersfoort 2011.
 - 34 See for an illuminating example S. Anglo, ed., *Chivalry in the Renaissance*, Woodbridge 1990, 1–12, for Anglo's essay 'How to kill a man at your ease: fencing books and the duelling ethic'.

- 35 Especially by the great historian of the process, Norbert Elias, in his *The Civilizing Process. I: The History of Manners*, New York 1978.
- 36 E.C. Riley, *Don Quijote*, Winchester, MA 1986.
- 37 See A. Flores, M.J. Bernadete, *Cervantes across the Centuries*, New York 1947.
- 38 R. Palmer, *The Sound of History*, Oxford 1988, 1–29.
- 39 C. Kruyskamp, ed., *Mariken van Nieumeghen*, Antwerp 1982, vs. 227–30.
- 40 See L. Smith, *Reason's Disciples: Seventeenth-Century English Feminists*, Urbana 1982.
- 41 E.L. Eisenstein, 'Revolution and the printed word', in R. Porter, M. Teich, eds, *Revolution in History*, Cambridge 1986, 190–2.
- 42 W. Schmale in his introduction to W. Schmale, N.L. Dodd, eds, *Revolution des Wissens? Europa und seine Schulen im Zeitalter der Aufklärung*, Bochum 1991.
- 43 R. O'Day, *Education and Society, 1500–1800: The Social Foundations of Education in Early Modern Britain*, London 1982, 13, 42.
- 44 D. Cressy, *Literacy and the Social Order: Reading and Writing in Tudor and Stuart England*, Cambridge 1980, 175–89.
- 45 F. Furet, J. Ozouf, *Lire et ecire: l'alphabétisation des français de Calvin à Jules Ferry*, Paris 1977, 59–68.
- 46 K.P. Luria, *Territories of Grace: Cultural Change in the Seventeenth-Century Diocese of Grenoble*, Berkeley 1991.
- 47 J.M. Lloyd Thomas, ed., *The Autobiography of Richard Baxter*, London 1931, 3–4.
- 48 See R. Gawthrop, G. Strauss, 'Protestantism and literacy in early modern Germany', *Past and Present*, 104 (1984), 31–55; G. Strauss, 'Lutheranism and literacy: a reassessment', in K. von Greyerz, ed., *Religion and Society in Early Modern Europe, 1500–1800*, London 1984, 109–23; R.A. Crofts, 'Printing, reform and the Catholic Reformation in Germany', *The Sixteenth Century Journal*, 16 (1985), 369–81; R.B. Bottigheimer, 'Bible reading, "bibles" and the Bible for children in early modern Germany', *Past and Present*, 139 (1993), 66–89.
- 49 For example, T. Watt, *Cheap Print and Popular Piety, 1550–1640*, Cambridge 1991.
- 50 See also P.E. Grendler, *Schooling in Renaissance Italy: Literacy and Learning, 1300–1600*, Baltimore 1989, 111 sqq.
- 51 H. Chisich, *The Limits of Reform in the Enlightenment: Attitudes toward the Education of the Lower Classes in Eighteenth-century France*, Princeton 1981.
- 52 This argument has been raised by A. Grafton, L. Jardine, *From Humanism to the Humanities: Education and the Liberal Arts in Fifteenth- and Sixteenth-Century Europe*, Cambridge, MA 1986, 17; see also G. Strauss, 'Liberal or illiberal arts?', *Journal of Social History*, (1981), 361–7.
- 53 N. Kolowski, J.B. Lasek, eds, *Internationales Comenius-Kolloquium*, Bayreuth 1991; G. Michel, *Die Welt als Schule*, Hanover 1978.
- 54 R.A. Houston, *Literacy in Early Modern Europe: Culture and Education, 1500–1800*, London 1988, 83 sqq.

- 55 See, for example, R. Kagan, *Students and Society in Early Modern Spain*, London 1974; L. Brockliss, *French Higher Education in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, Oxford 1987.
- 56 See also: W. Frijhoff, 'Grandeur des nombres et misères des réalités: la courbe de Franz Eulenburg et le débat sur le nombre des intellectuels en Allemagne, 1576–1815', in D. Julia et al. eds, *Histoire sociale des populations étudiantes I*, Paris 1986, 23–64.
- 57 See also: H. Blumenberg, 'Der Prozess der theoretischen Neugierde', in his *Die Legitimität der Neuzeit*, Frankfurt 1966, 201–433.
- 58 N.G. Wilson, *From Byzantium to Italy: Greek Studies in the Italian Renaissance*, London 1992.
- 59 On the problem of the frontiers of Europe: R. Bartlett, A. Mackay, eds, *Medieval Frontier Societies*, Oxford 1994.
- 60 See J.-Cl. Margolin, ed., *L'Humanisme portugais et l'Europe*, Paris 1984; M. Simões, 'Camões e a Identidade Nacional', *Peregrinação*, 5 (1984), 3–8; J. Kaye, 'Islamic imperialism and the creation of some ideas of Europe', in F. Barker, et al. eds, *Europe and its Others*, Colchester 1985, 59–71.
- 61 R. Beaton, *Folk Poetry of Modern Greece*, Cambridge 1980; R. Beaton, D. Ricks, eds, 'Digenes Akrites': *New Approaches to Byzantine Heroic Poetry*, Aldershot 1995.
- 62 H.R. Cooper, *Judith*, Boulder 1991.
- 63 C. Barbolani, ed., *Juan de Valdes, Diálogo de la Lengua*, Madrid 1992, 132.
- 64 For this essay, besides Weber's text on the Protestant ethic: F. Braudel, *La Dynamique du Capitalisme*, Paris 1985; M. Albert, *Capitalisme contre Capitalisme*, Paris 1991; D. Cantoni, 'The economic effects of the protestant reformation', 10 November 2009: www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~cantoni/cantoni_jmp_2_7_1.pdf; H. Steinert, *Max Webers unwiderlegbare Fehlkonstruktionen*, Frankfurt 2010; J. Kocka, *Geschichte des Kapitalismus*, Munich 2013; L. Neal, ed., *The Cambridge History of Capitalism*, I–II, Cambridge 2014, is a collection of though very competent also very disparate essays.
- 65 P. Rietbergen, *De VOC, 's werelds eerste multi-national tussen commercie en cultuur*, Amersfoort 2015.

Chapter 9

- 1 I.M. Franck, D.M. Brownstone, *The Silk Road: A History*, New York 1986.
- 2 For a brilliant survey of this world: K.N. Chaudhuri, *Asia before Europe: The Economy and Civilization of the Indian Ocean from the Rise of Islam to 1750*, Cambridge 1990.
- 3 The most recent in a long line of authors who have doubted Polo's presence in China, F. Wood, *Did Marco Polo Go to China?* London 1995, cannot really substantiate her claim.
- 4 J. Needham, *Clerks and Craftsmen in China and the West: Lectures and Addresses on the History of Science and Technology*, Cambridge 1970, 239 sqq.

- 5 N. Perrin, *Giving Up the Gun: Japan's Reversion to the Sword, 1543–1879*, Boston 1979.
- 6 C.G. Ekeborg, *Kort Berättelser om den chineska Landthusholdningen*, Stockholm 1757. A German translation followed in 1765; English and French ones in 1771.
- 7 A fundamental study is J.H. Elliott, *The Old World and the New, 1492–1650*, Cambridge 1992.
- 8 The most recent documentation can be found in *Amerika 1492–1992. Neue Welten, Neue Wirklichkeiten. Eine Dokumentation*, Berlin 1992, and *Amerika 1492–1992. Neue Welten, Neue Wirklichkeiten. Geschichte – Gegenwart – Perspektive*, Berlin 1992. Besides these, H.J. König, *Die Entdeckung und Eroberung Amerikas*, Berlin 1992, is fascinating as well for the visual material of the time presented in it.
- 9 The already substantial amount of literature on the ‘discoverer’ greatly swelled in 1992. One of the useful titles is W.D. Phillips, C.R. Phillips, *The Worlds of Christopher Columbus*, Cambridge 1992.
- 10 W. Uitterhoeve, H. Werner, eds, *Christoffel Columbus: De Ontdekking van Amerika. Scheepsjournaal 1492–1493*, Nijmegen 1992, 48, 55, 65, 79, 80, 81, 84, 88, 114, etc., for mentions concerning Cipangu and Cathay.
- 11 Uitterhoeve, Werner, *Columbus*, e.g. 66, 71, 73, 78, 83 etc., on the beauty of the islands; 90, 100, on the beauty of language; 96, 97 on the absence of evil; 65, 97–8 on the natural belief in God; 93 on the absence of weapons and laws. For the quote: 116.
- 12 Quoted in D. Divine, *Ontdekkers van een Nieuwe Wereld*, Bussum 1973, 249.
- 13 Quoted in Divine, *Ontdekkers*, 245.
- 14 Quoted in Divine, *Ontdekkers*, 246.
- 15 For an overview of the influence of tobacco on different cultures of the world see J. Goodman, *Tobacco in History: The Cultures of Dependence*, London 1993.
- 16 R.N. Salaman, *The History and Social Influence of the Potato*, Cambridge 1949.
- 17 E. Forster and R. Forster, eds, *European Diet from Preindustrial to Modern Times*, New York 1975; R. Forster, O. Ranum, eds, *Food and Drink in History*, Baltimore 1979.
- 18 S.W. Mintz, *Sweetness and Power*, New York 1985.
- 19 A very informed case study: S. Gruzinski, *The Conquest of Mexico: The Incorporation of Indian Societies into the Western World, Sixteenth–eighteenth Centuries*, London 1993.
- 20 A. Crosby, Jr, *The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492*, Westport 1972.
- 21 Crosby, *The Columbian Exchange*, 158–60.
- 22 For the following: H. Kellenbenz, ed., *Precious Metals in the Age of Expansion*, Stuttgart 1981; J.F. Richards, ed., *Precious Metals in the Later Medieval and Early Modern Worlds*, Durham 1983, especially 397–496.
- 23 H. Pohl, ed., *The European Discovery of the New World and Its Economic Effects on Pre-Industrial Society, 1500–1800*, Stuttgart 1990.

- 24 See R. Pieper, *Die Preisrevolution in Spanien (1500–1640)*, Stuttgart 1985.
- 25 R. Ehrenberg, *Capital and Finance in the Age of the Renaissance: A Study of the Fuggers and Their Connections*, New York 1963, 80.
- 26 H. Rowen, C.I. Ekberg, eds, *Early Modern Europe: A Book of Source Readings*, Ithaca 1973, 74–5.
- 27 Rowen, Ekberg, *Early Modern Europe*, 77.
- 28 On the problem: E. Zerubavel, *Terra Cognita: The Mental Discovery of America*, New Brunswick 1992.
- 29 See also J.B. Russel, *Inventing the Flat Earth: Columbus and Modern Historians*, New York 1910.
- 30 Two recent surveys: J. Brotton, *Trading Territories: Mapping the Early Modern World*, London 1997; J. Black, *Maps and Politics*, London 1997.
- 31 G. Menzies, *1421: The Year China Discovered the World*, New York, 2002, and its sequel, simply are not based on verifiable facts.
- 32 L. Bergreen, *Over the Edge of the World: Magellan's Terrifying Circumnavigation of the Globe*, London 2004.
- 33 J. Fischer, F. von Wieser, eds, trans., *Martin Waldseemüller: Cosmographiae Introductio*, Ann Arbor 1966, 68–70.
- 34 A. Taylor, *The World of Gerard Mercator*, London 2004.
- 35 See Bodin's *Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem*, in P. Mesnard, ed., *Jean Bodin, Oeuvres Philosophiques*, Paris 1951, 223 sqq.
- 36 The following studies deal with this problem: S. Greenblatt, *Marvellous Possessions: The Wonders of the New World*, Oxford 1991; A. Grafton, A. Shelford, N. Siraisi, *New Worlds, Old Texts: The Power of Tradition and the Shock of Discovery*, Cambridge, MA 1992.
- 37 L.E. Huddleston, *Origins of the American Indians: European Concepts, 1492–1729*, Austin 1967.
- 38 K. Crossley-Holland, ed., *The Oxford Book of Travel Verse*, Oxford 1986, 364–5.
- 39 Crossley-Holland, *Travel Verse*, 365–6.
- 40 J.A. Levenson, ed., *Circa 1492: Art in the Age of Exploration*, Washington 1991.
- 41 Shakespeare, *The Tempest*, Act I, Scene II, 407–14.
- 42 Shakespeare, *The Tempest*, Act II, Scene II, 163–4, 166–8.
- 43 For the psychological background: O. Manoni, *Prospéro et Caliban: psychologie de la colonisation*, Paris 1984.
- 44 P.N. Carroll, *Puritanism and the Wilderness: The Intellectual Significance of the New England Frontier, 1629–1700*, New York 1969, 72, 112, 134.
- 45 R.H. Pearce, *Savagism and Civilization: A Study of the Indian and the American Mind*, Berkeley 1988, 23.
- 46 L.B. Wright, ed., *Robert Beverly: History of the Present State of Virginia*, Chapel Hill 1947, 235.
- 47 Lawson's *History of North Carolina*, Richmond 1937, 251–2.
- 48 A short but excellent survey of the process is U. Bitterli, *Cultures in Conflict: Encounters between European and Non-European Cultures, 1492–1800*, London 1993.

- 49 D. Heikamp, *Mexico and the Medici*, Florence 1972.
- 50 G.Th.M. Lemmens, 'Die Schenkung an Ludwig XIV. und die Auflösung der brasilianischen Sammlung des Johann Moritz 1652–1679', in G. de Werd, ed., *Soweit der Erdkreis reicht: Johann Moritz von Nassau-Siegen, 1604–1679*, Cleves 1979, 265–93.
- 51 P.J.A.N. Rietbergen, 'Zover de aarde rijkt. De werken van Johan Nieuwhof (1618–1672) als illustratie van het probleem der cultuur- en mentaliteits geschiedenis tussen specialisatie en integratie', *De Zeventiende Eeuw*, 2–1 (1986), 17–40.
- 52 J.-M. Apostolides, *Le Roi-machine: spectacle et politique au temps de Louis XIV*, Paris 1981.
- 53 Th. Hetzer, *Die Fresken Tiepolos in der Würzburger Residenz*, Frankfurt 1943; see also C. le Corbeiller, 'Miss America and her sisters: personifications of the four parts of the world', *The Metropolitan Museum of Art Bulletin*, April 1961.
- 54 *Federschmuck und Kaiserkrone: Das barocke Amerikabild in den Habsburgischen Ländern*, Schlosshof im Marchfeld 1992.
- 55 S. Münster, *Cosmographia Universalis*, Basle 1559, 40–1.
- 56 See also U. Nef, *Cultural Foundations of Industrial Civilization*, Cambridge 1958.
- 57 S. Purchas, *Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas His Pilgrimes*, New York 1965 [originally *Works of the Hakluyt Society*, Extra Series I, London 1905], 248, 249, 250, 251.
- 58 Purchas, *Pilgrimes*, 251.
- 59 M. Eliav-Feldon, *Realistic Utopias: The Ideal Imaginary Societies of the Renaissance, 1516–1630*, Oxford 1982; J.C. Davis, *Utopia and the Ideal Society: A Study of English Utopian Writing, 1516–1700*, Cambridge 1981, 299.
- 60 Pearce, *Savagism*, 86.
- 61 This essay largely is based on my thorough inspection of the sites and buildings mentioned. Cf. also: M. Duval, *A la découverte du Portugal manuélin*, Verviers 1975. G. Kollert, *Der Gesang des Meeres. Die portugiesischen Entdeckungsfahrten als Mythos der Neuzeit*, Ostfildern 1997; S. Subrahmanyam, *The Career and Legend of Vasco da Gama*, Cambridge 1997; A. de Oliveira Marques, *Histoire du Portugal et de son empire colonial*, Paris 1998.

Chapter 10

- 1 Much has been written on the development of the travel story, which became a literary genre in the course of time, and on the use of such stories as historical sources. I mention only B.I. Krasnobaev *et al.* eds, *Reisen und Reisebeschreibungen im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert als Quellen der Kulturbeziehungsforshung*, Berlin 1980, and A. Maczak, H.J. Teuteberg, eds, *Reiseberichte als Quellen Europäischer Kulturgeschichte. Aufgaben und Möglichkeiten der historischen Reiseforschung*, Wolfenbüttel 1982.
- 2 D. Brewer, *Chaucer and His World*, London 1978.

- 3 A.W. Pollard *et al.* eds, *The Works of Geoffrey Chaucer*, London 1923, 1.
- 4 J. Brouwer, ed., *Spaansche reis- en krijgsjournalen uit de Gouden Eeuw*, Groningen 1932; Brouwer, *Kronieken van Spaansche soldaten uit het begin van de tachtigjarige oorlog*, Zutphen 1933.
- 5 J. van Bakel, P. Rolf, eds, *Vlaamse soldatenbrieven uit de Napoleontische tijd*, Bruges 1977.
- 6 For an impression, see A. Kopecny, *Fahrenden und Vagabunden: Ihre Geschichte, Ueberlebenskunste, Zeichen und Strassen*, Berlin 1980, and C. Kother, *Menschen auf der Strasse: Vagierende Unterschichten in Bayern, Franken und Schwaben in der zweiten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts*, Göttingen 1983.
- 7 J. Edwards, *The Jews in Christian Europe, 1400–1700*, London 1988; J.I. Israel, *European Jewry in the Age of Mercantilism, 1550–1750*, Oxford 1985.
- 8 See M.A. Shulvass, *The Jews in the World of the Renaissance*, Leiden 1973; B. D. Cooperman, ed., *Jewish Thought in the Sixteenth Century*, Cambridge, MA 1983; D.B. Ruderman, *Jewish Thought and Scientific Discovery in Early Modern Europe*, New York 1995.
- 9 For an overview see M. Yardeni, *Le Refuge protestant*, Paris 1985, especially 129–54, 179 sqq. and 201 sqq.
- 10 For example S. Jersch-Wendel, *Juden und ‘Franzosen’ in der Wirtschaft des Raumes Berlin/Brandenburg zur Zeit des Merkantilismus*, Berlin 1978, especially 182 sqq.
- 11 P. Jeannin, ‘Guides de voyage et manuels pour marchands’, in J. Céard, J.-Cl. Margolin, eds, *Voyager à la Renaissance*, Paris 1987, 160.
- 12 See, for example, G. Miselli, *Il Burattino veridico ... per chi viaggia*, Rome 1682.
- 13 V. von Klarwill, *Fugger-Zeitungen: Ungedruckte Briefe an das Haus Fugger aus die Jahre 1568–1605*, Vienna 1933.
- 14 K. Pisa, *Schopenhauer: Kronzeuge einer unheilen Welt*, Vienna 1977.
- 15 R.L. Latham, *The Illustrated Pepys*, London 1983, *passim*; in this splendidly illustrated work, in which Latham summarizes his monumental 11-volume edition of the diary, there are many passages which illuminate this statement in more detail.
- 16 Julius Bellus, *Justinopolitani Hermes Politicus sive de Peregrinatoria Prudentia Libri tres*, Frankfurt 1608; S. Von Birker, *HochFürstlicher Brandenburgischer Ulysses*, Bayreuth 1669.
- 17 P.J.A.N. Rietbergen, ‘Prince Eckembergh comes to dinner: food and political propaganda in the seventeenth century’, *Petit Propos Culinaires: A Journal of Culinary History*, VI (1983), 45–54. See also S. Bertelli *et al.* eds, *Rituale. Cerimoniale. Etichetta*, Milan 1985; M. Jeanneret, *A Feast of Words: Banquets and Table Talk in the Renaissance*, Oxford 1991 (originally Paris 1987).
- 18 See for the following paragraphs: N. Elias, *Die höfische Gesellschaft*, Darmstadt 1969; translated as *The Court Society*, Oxford 1983; R. von Krüdener, *Die Rolle des Hofes im Absolutismus*, Stuttgart 1973.
- 19 For a survey: G. Walton, *Louis XIV’s Versailles*, Harmondsworth 1986.
- 20 See L. Norton, *Saint-Simon at Versailles*, Hamilton 1985.

- 21 See Ph. Beaussait, *Lully, ou le musicien du soleil*, Paris 1992.
- 22 An entertaining and informative study is B. Ketcham Wheaton, *Savouring the Past*, Baltimore 1983, esp. ch. 7 and following.
- 23 P.J.A.N. Rietbergen, 'Den Haag, 20 april 1660: de bruiloft van Susanna Huygens', *De Zeventiende Eeuw*, III-2 (1987), 181-9.
- 24 E.B. Johnson, ed., *The Letters of the Right Honourable Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, 1709-1762*, London 1906, *passim*.
- 25 W.Th.M. Frijhoff, *La Société néerlandaise et ses graduées, 1575-1814: une recherche sérieuse sur le statut des intellectuels*, Amsterdam 1981, 83 sqq., 102, 106.
- 26 For example, H. Bots et al. eds, *Noordbrabantse Studenten, 1550-1750*, Tilburg 1979, *passim*.
- 27 J. Pesek, D. Sanan, 'Les étudiants de Bohême dans les universités et les académies d'Europe centrale et occidentale entre 1596 et 1620', in D. Julia et al. eds, *Histoire sociale des populations étudiantes*, I, Paris 1986, 89-112.
- 28 R.A. Houston, *Literacy in Early Modern Europe: Culture and Education, 1500-1800*, London 1988, 85.
- 29 For example, J.G. Klinger, *Commentario de promotionibus studiosorum iuris ad iter iuridicum pertinentibus*, Leipzig 1744; Th. Bartholinus, *De peregrinatio medica*, Copenhagen 1674.
- 30 See H. Zimmer, *Die Dientzenhofer: Ein bayerisches Baumeistergeschlecht in der Zeit des Barock*, Munich 1976.
- 31 P.J.A.N. Rietbergen, 'Magnaten en Maecenassen in Zwedens Stormakstid: Magnus Gabriel de la Gardie (1622-1686) and Carl-Gustaf Wrangel (1613-1676)', *Artilleri*, III-3 (1986), 67-80; IV-1 (1986), 35-50.
- 32 We are well informed about the experiences of all these sorts of trips by the travellers from at least one country, England, during the seventeenth century: J.W. Stoye, *English Travellers Abroad, 1604-1667: Their Influence in English Society and Politics*, London 1993; J. Lough, *France Observed in the Seventeenth Century by British Travellers*, Stocksfield 1984.
- 33 One example among many is P.J.A.N. Rietbergen, 'Papal policy and mediation at the Peace of Nijmegen', *Acta: International Congress of the Tercentenary of the Peace of Nijmegen, 1678-1978*, Amsterdam 1980, 29-96.
- 34 A. Frank-Van Westrienen, *De Groote Tour: Tekening van de educatiereis der Nederlanders in de 17e eeuw*, Amsterdam 1983; J. Black, *The British and the Grand Tour*, London 1985.
- 35 N.N., *Het Italië-gevoel: Nederlandse schrijvers over Italië*, Amsterdam 1989.
- 36 H. Harder, *Le Président de Brosses et le voyage en Italie au dix-huitième siècle*, Geneva 1981.
- 37 The expression is derived from a fascinating study by J. Pemble, *The Mediterranean Passion: Victorians and Edwardians in the South*, London 1988. He mainly describes the motives for and experiences of nineteenth-century English travellers, yet also exposes structures which already determined the southerly tendencies of northerners during the ancien régime.
- 38 As an example: G.J. Hoogerwerff, ed., *De twee reizen van Cosimo de Medici, prins van Toscane, door de Nederlanden (1667-1669)*, Amsterdam 1919.

- 39 W. Bray, ed., *The Diary of John Evelyn*, I–II, London 1950, I, 101, 102, 107–8, 128, 136, 139, 140, 161–2.
- 40 An excellent survey: A. Maczak, *Travel in Early Modern Europe*, London 1995.
- 41 Such lists can be found in: *Carpentras, Bibliothèque Ingouimbertaine*, Mss. 1821, folios 494, 496 and 497.
- 42 P. Charbon, *Au temps des malles-postes et des diligences: histoire des transports publics et de poste du XVIIe au XIXe siècle*, Strasbourg 1979.
- 43 L.E. Halkin, ed., *Desiderius Erasmus, Colloquia*, Louvain 1972, 333–8.
- 44 One such professional guide was the seventeenth-century Englishman Richard Lassels, who recorded his experiences: R. Lassels, *Description of Italy, with Instructions for Travellers*, London 1660.
- 45 Pitcher, *Bacon, Essays*, 114.
- 46 Pitcher, *Bacon, Essays*, 113.
- 47 M. Rassem, J. Steigl, *Apodemiken: eine räsionierte Bibliographie der reisetheoretische Literatur des 16., 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts*, Paderborn 1983.
- 48 J. Locke, *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*, London 1693, 189–201.
- 49 W. Blunt, *Linnaeus: the Complete Naturalist*, London 2004.
- 50 Carl von Linné, *Oratio, qua peregrinationum intra patriam asseritur necessitas*, Uppsala 1741.
- 51 P.J.A.N. Rietbergen, ‘The library of a Guelders country squire: Thomas Walraven van Arkel van Ammerzoden (1630–1684): A contribution to the history of Dutch aristocratic culture in the seventeenth century’, *LIAS*, IX-2 (1983), 271–84.
- 52 See H. Peres, *L’Espagne vue par les voyageurs musulmans de 1610 à 1930*, Paris 1937.
- 53 W. Bray, ed., *The Diary of John Evelyn I–II*, London 1907; for this passage, see I, 118.
- 54 For this essay: P. Rietbergen, ‘Verledenverbeeldingen in de St Pieter’, in: B. Roest, ed., *De Last der Geschiedenis*, Nijmegen 2013, 149–68, as well as: P. Rietbergen, ‘A vision come true. Alexander VII, Gianlorenzo Bernini and the Colonnades of St. Peter’s’, *Mededelingen van het Nederlands Instituut te Rome*, XLVI, new series, XI (1983), 111–63; 237–41.

Chapter 11

- 1 For a short introduction: F. Wacquet, H. Bots, *La République des Lettres*, s.l. 1997.
- 2 A.B. Grosart, ed., *The Complete Works in Verse and Prose of S. Daniel*, I, London 1885, 106.
- 3 Michel de Montaigne, *Essais*, Paris 1580.
- 4 Most of these plans were published and commented on in German translation by K. von Raumer, *Ewiger Friede: Friedensrufe und Friedenspläne seit der Renaissance*, Munich 1953.
- 5 Von Raumer, *Ewiger Friede*, 321.

- 6 Von Raumer, *Ewiger Friede*, 89 sqq.
- 7 See: G. Kanthak, *Der Akademiegedanke zwischen utopischem Entwurf und barocker Projektmacherei*, Berlin 1987, especially 64 sqq. An example is R. Hahn, *The Anatomy of a Scientific Institution: The Paris Academy of Sciences, 1666–1803*, Berkeley 1971.
- 8 O. Ranum, ed., *National Consciousness, History and Political Culture in Early Modern Europe*, Baltimore 1975, 54 sqq., 73 sqq.
- 9 Juan de Mariana, *Historia de España*, Book 26, ch. 1.
- 10 M. Warnke, *Hofkünstler: zur Vorgeschichte des modernen Künstlers*, Cologne 1985, 314.
- 11 M. Cherniavsky, 'Russia', in Ranum, *National Consciousness*, 118–43.
- 12 P.J.A.N. Rietbergen, 'Onderwijs en Wetenschap als instrumenten van cultuurpolitiek: Rusland in de tweede helft van de zeventiende en in de achttiende eeuw', *Ex Tempore*, 11 (1992), 147–59.
- 13 See W.F. Reddaway, ed., *Documents of Catharina the Great*, Cambridge 1931, the nakaz of 1767, ch. 1, sec. 6.
- 14 See A. Dietz, *Zur Geschichte der Frankfurter Büchermesse, 1462–1792*, Frankfurt 1921.
- 15 See H. Kiesel, P. Münch, *Gesellschaft und Literatur im 18. Jahrhundert*, Munich 1977.
- 16 Pitcher, *Bacon, Essays*, 114.
- 17 See the map in R. Mandrou, *Des humanistes aux hommes de science*, Paris 1973.
- 18 M. Lowry, *The World of Aldus Manutius: Business and Scholarship in Renaissance Venice*, Oxford 1979.
- 19 For a case see H.-J. Martin, *Livre, pouvoirs et société à Paris au XVIIe siècle (-1598–1701)*, I–II, Geneva 1969, 1064, 1073.
- 20 See C. Berkvens-Stevelinck et al. eds, *Le Magasin de l'Univers. The Dutch Republic as the Centre of the European Book Trade*, Leiden 1992.
- 21 G.C. Gibbs, 'The role of the Dutch Republic as the intellectual entrepot of Europe', *Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden*, 86 (1971), 323–49; Gibbs, 'Some intellectual and political influences of the Huguenot émigrés', *Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden*, 90 (1975), 255–87.
- 22 J. Marx, 'La Bibliothèque impartiale', in M. Couperus, ed., *L'Etude des périodiques anciens*, Paris 1972, 89–108.
- 23 See, too, for background information: E.L. Eisenstein, 'The cosmopolitan enlightenment', in her *Grub Street Abroad*, Oxford 1992, 101–30.
- 24 H.H.M. van Lieshout, *Van Boek tot Bibliotheek: de Wordinggeschiedenis van de 'Dictionnaire Historique et Critique' van Pierre Bayle (1689–1706)*, Grave 1992.
- 25 P.J.A.N. Rietbergen, 'Light from the North: Christian Constantijn Rumph, Gisbert Cuper and cultural relations between Sweden and the Dutch Republic during the last quarter of the seventeenth century', in J. A. van Koningsbrugge et al. eds, *The Netherlands and the Balticum, 1524–1814*, Nijmegen 1991, 315–42.

- 26 For the following, see P.J.A.N. Rietbergen, 'Witsen's world: Nicolaas Witsen (1642–1717) between the Dutch East India Company and the Republic of Letters', *Itinerario*, IX–2 (1985), 121–34.
- 27 J. Bouchard, 'Les relations épistolaires de Nicolas Mavrocordatos avec Jean Le Clerc et William Wake', *O Eranistis*, 1 (1974), 67–92; Bouchard, ed., *N. Mavrocordatos, les loisirs de philothée*, Athens 1989.
- 28 For the following, see P.J.A.N. Rietbergen, 'Dutch and Spanish "Enlightenments"? The case of Gerard Meerman (1722–1777) and Gregorio Mayans y Siscar (1691–1781)', in Rietbergen, ed., *Tussen Twee Culturen: Nederland en de Iberische wereld, 1500–1800*, Nijmegen 1988, 105–34.

Chapter 12

- 1 See on this subject A. Grafton, *Defenders of the Text: The Traditions of Scholarship in an Age of Science, 1450–1800*, Cambridge, MA 1993.
- 2 A French translation was made in 1934 by A. Koyré, a German one in 1939 by Cl. Menzer.
- 3 M. Devèze, R. Marx, eds, *Textes et documents d'histoire moderne*, Paris 1967, 119–20.
- 4 On Galilei: P. Redondi, *Galilei eretico*, Turin 1983, which, although not accepted by all scholars in the field, is a stimulating study.
- 5 See Redondi, *Galilei*.
- 6 Cited from G. de Santillana, ed., *The Age of Adventure: The Renaissance Philosophers*, New York 1956, 159.
- 7 See Bax, ed., trans., *The Signature of All Things, with Other Writings by Jacob Boehme*, London 1926, 14, II, no. 8.
- 8 Bax, *Boehme*, 268.
- 9 For an interesting analysis: R. Barthes, *Sade, Fourier, Loyola*, Paris 1971.
- 10 Though I date the phenomenon a century earlier, one should also consult: J. Seigel, *The Idea of Self: Thought and Experience in Western Europe since the Seventeenth Century*, Cambridge 2004.
- 11 R. Porter, *Flesh in the Age of Reason*, London 2004.
- 12 J. Peakman, *Lascivious Bodies: A Sexual History of the Eighteenth Century*, London 2004.
- 13 F. Bacon, *Novum Organum*, London 1620.
- 14 R. Descartes, *Discours sur la méthode*, Paris 1637.
- 15 C. Wilson, *The Invisible World*, Oxford 1995.
- 16 A good background study: M.F. Cohen, *The Scientific Revolution: A Historiographical Enquiry*, Chicago 1995.
- 17 R.S. Westfall, *Never at Rest: A Biography of Isaac Newton*, London 1981.
- 18 I. Newton, *Foreword to Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica*, London 1687.
- 19 Cf. e.g. M. White, *Isaac Newton: The Last Sorcerer*, Addison 1997.
- 20 A.J. Krailsheimer, trans., *Blaise Pascal, Pensées*, Baltimore 1966, 48, 95.

- 21 Cf. B. Gert, ed., *Thomas Hobbes, 'de Homine' and 'de Cive' – Man and the Citizen*, Boston 1972, 110–11; J. Watkins, *Hobbes' System of Ideas*, London 1973, 23–4, 89 sqq., and 47 for the quote.
- 22 For a survey of developments in science: R. Olson, *Science Deified and Science Defied: The Historical Significance of Science in Western Culture. II: From the Early Modern Age through the Early Romantic Era, ca. 1640 to ca. 1820*, Berkeley 1990.
- 23 A. Thomson, ed., *La Mettrie: Machine Man and Other Writings*, Cambridge 1996.
- 24 Cf. L. Roper, *Witch Craze: Terror and Fantasy in Baroque Germany*, New York 2004.
- 25 R.M. Adams, *Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist*, Oxford 1994.
- 26 For a short introduction to this highly complex thinker: R. Popkin, *Spinoza*, Oxford 2004.
- 27 For an introduction, see H.E. Allison, *Benedict de Spinoza*, London 1987.
- 28 J.H. Spalding, F. Bayley, eds, trans., *Heaven and Its Wonders, and Hell: From Things Heard and Seen: By Emmanuel Swedenborg*, London 1920, nos 318, 328.
- 29 See: A. Schopenhauer, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, I, 125 ff, and II, 366, in A. Hübscher, ed., *A. Schopenhauer, Sämtliche Werke I–VII*, Wiesbaden 1972.
- 30 For a survey: D. Goodman, *The Republic of Letters: A Cultural History of the French Enlightenment*, Ithaca 1994.
- 31 A very inspiring analysis is D. Roche, *La France des lumières*, Paris 1994.
- 32 H.C. Payne, *The Philosophes and the People*, New Haven 1976.
- 33 R. Porter, M. Teich, eds, *The Enlightenment in National Context*, Cambridge 1981.
- 34 For example, R.B. Sher, *Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment: The Moderate Literati of Edinburgh*, Princeton 1985.
- 35 Th.J. Schlereth, *The Cosmopolitan Ideal in Enlightenment Thought*, Notre Dame 1977.
- 36 H. Vyverberg, *Human Nature, Cultural Diversity and the French Enlightenment*, New York 1987.
- 37 For a brief overview: Ph.N. Furbank, *The Encyclopédie*, Milton Keynes 1980; P. Swiggers, 'Pre-histoire et histoire de l'encyclopédie', *Revue Historique*, 549 (1984), 83–93; J. Lough, *The Encyclopédie*, London 1971, Geneva 1989.
- 38 U. im Hof, *Das gesellige Jahrhundert: Gesellschaft und Gesellschaften im Zeitalter der Aufklärung*, Munich 1982; R. von Dülmen, *The Society of the Enlightenment: The Rise of the Middle Class and Enlightenment Culture in Germany*, Cambridge 1992 (originally Frankfurt 1986).
- 39 O. Dann, ed., *Lesegesellschaften und bürgerliche Emanzipation: ein europäischer Vergleich*, Munich 1981.
- 40 See J. Bernal, *Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization*, London 1987.
- 41 F.M. Turner, 'Why the Greeks and not the Romans in Victorian Britain', in G.W. Clarke, ed., *Rediscovering Hellenism: The Hellenic Inheritance and the*

- English Imagination*, Cambridge 1989, 61–81. For Germany, see B. Näf, *Von Perikles zu Hitler? Die athenische Demokratie und die deutsche Althistorie bis 1945*, Berne 1986.
- 42 See P. Kitromilides, *The Enlightenment as Social Criticism: Iosipos Moisiodax and Greek Culture in the Eighteenth Century*, Princeton 1992.
- 43 See D. Ringrose, *Spain, Europe and the 'Spanish Miracle', 1700–1900*, Cambridge 1996.
- 44 E. Sisman, ed., *Haydn and His World*, Princeton 1997.
- 45 A. Faivre, *Mystiques, theosophes et illuminés au siècle des lumières*, Hildesheim 1976.
- 46 A. Harrington, *Reenchanted Science: Holism in German Culture from Wilhelm II to Hitler*, Princeton 1996.
- 47 For this essay: D. King-Hele, *Doctor of Revolution: The Life and Genius of Erasmus Darwin*, London 1977; K. Drexler, *Nanosystems: Molecular Machinery, Manufacturing, and Computation*, New York 1992; J. Uglow, *The Lunar Men: The Friends Who Made the Future 1730–1810*, London 2002; R. Falk, *Genetic Analysis: A History of Genetic Thinking*, Cambridge 2009; M. Ruse, ed., *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Darwin and Evolutionary Thought*, Cambridge 2012.

Chapter 13

- 1 Quoted in G. Wurzbacher, R. Pflaum, *Das Dorf im Spannungsfelde industrieller Entwicklung*, Stuttgart 1961, 13.
- 2 F.A. Pottle, ed., *Boswell's London Journal, 1762–1763*, London 1982, 159.
- 3 See M.C. Moine, *Les Fêtes à la cour du Roi Soleil, 1665–1715*, Paris 1984.
- 4 A. Chérueil, ed., *Mémoires de Saint-Simon, XII*, Paris 1857, 461 sqq.
- 5 For a case study: J.H. Plumb et al. eds, *The Birth of Consumer Society: The Commercialization of Eighteenth-Century England*, Bloomington 1982.
- 6 See D. Roche, *The Culture of Clothing: Dress and Fashion in the Ancien Régime*, Cambridge 1995.
- 7 See F.B. Kaye, ed., *Bernard Mandeville: The Fable of the Bees*, Oxford 1924.
- 8 For a survey: B. Gottlieb, *The Family in the Western World from the Black Death to the Industrial Age*, Oxford 1987.
- 9 See B.W. Robinson, R.F. Hall, *The Aldrich Book of Catches*, London 1989, 79, no. 56.
- 10 A survey: H. Cunningham, *Children and Childhood in Western Society since 1500*, London 1995.
- 11 N. Elias, *The Civilizing Process. I: The History of Manners. II: State Formation and Civilization*, Oxford 1982.
- 12 See J. Barry, C. Brooks, eds, *The Middling Sort of People: Culture, Society and Politics in England, 1550–1800*, Basingstoke 1994, esp. 1–27; D. Blackbourn, R.J. Evans, eds, *The German Bourgeoisie*, London 1991; P.M. Pilbeam, *The Middle Classes in Europe, 1789–1914: France, Germany, Italy and Russia*, Basingstoke 1990.
- 13 See D. Roche, *Les Republican des lettres: gens de culture et lumières au XVIIIe siècle*, Paris 1988. An important case: C. Lougee, *Le Paradis des Femmes:*

Women, Salons and Social Stratification in Seventeenth-Century France, Princeton 1976.

- 14 F. Chabod, 'L'Idée di Europa', *Rassegna d'Italia*, II (1947), 3.
- 15 See H. Bots, ed., *Henri Basnage de Beauval en de histoire des ouvrages des savans, 1687–1709*, I–II, Amsterdam 1976.
- 16 P.J.A.N. Rietbergen, 'Pieter Rabus en de "Boekzaal van Europe"', 1692–1702', in H. Bots, ed., *Pieter Rabus en de Boekzaal van Europe*, Amsterdam 1974, 1–102.
- 17 See on the moralizing nature of many weeklies: W. Martens, *Die Botschaft der Tugend*, Stuttgart 1968.
- 18 P.J. Buijnsters, 'Sociologie van de Spectator', *Spiegel der Letteren*, 15/1 (1973), 1–17.
- 19 P. Clark, *Sociability and Urbanity: Clubs and Societies in the Eighteenth-Century City*, Leicester 1986.
- 20 M.C. Jacob, *Living the Enlightenment: Freemasonry and Politics in Eighteenth-Century Europe*, Oxford 1992.
- 21 R. Stadelman, *Preussens Könige in ihrer Tätigkeit für die Landeskultur. II: Friedrich der Grosse*, Leipzig 1882, 333.
- 22 G. Schmoller, ed., *Acta Borussica*, I/2, Berlin 1892, 8.
- 23 Stadelman, *Preussens Könige*, 287.
- 24 R. Chartier, *Les Origines culturelles de la révolution française*, Paris 1991.
- 25 Among the numerous introductions, for background information one might read Ph. Deane, *The First Industrial Revolution*, Cambridge 1979, and J. Goodman, K. Honeyman, *Gainful Pursuits: The Making of Industrial Europe, 1600–1914*, London 1988. An illuminating case study is D. Sabeau, *Property, Production and Family in Neckarshausen, 1700–1870*, Cambridge 1990.
- 26 H. Ch. Mettin, ed., *Fürst Pückler reist nach England: aus den Briefen eines Verstorbenen*, Stuttgart 1958, 107 sqq.
- 27 For a non-English case study: R. Sandgruber, *Die Anfänge der Konsumgesellschaft*, Vienna 1982, which deals with Austria in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
- 28 O. Wilde, *The Picture of Dorian Gray*, London 1891, chs 8 and 6.
- 29 A. Joubin, ed., *Eugène Delacroix, Journal. 1822–1863*, Paris 1981, 346–7.
- 30 See R. von Dülmen et al. eds, *Volkskultur: zur Wiederentdeckung des vergessenen Alltags, 16.–20. Jahrhundert*, Frankfurt 1984.
- 31 For a survey: R. Wendorff, *Zeit und Kultur: Geschichte des Zeitbewusstseins in Europa*, Opladen 1980.
- 32 K. Jantke, D. Hiler, eds, *Die Eigentumslosen*, Freiburg–Munich 1965, 178.
- 33 *Journal des Débats*, 18 April 1832.
- 34 See the fine study by J.M. Meriman, *The Margins of City Life: Explorations on the French Urban Frontier, 1815–1851*, New York 1991.
- 35 Quoted in P. McPhee, *A Social History of France, 1780–1880*, London 1993, 203.
- 36 For this essay: A. Usher, *A History of Mechanical Inventions*, New York 1988; J. Lin, 'The Needham puzzle: Why the industrial revolution did not

- originate in China', in *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 43, 269–92; K. Drexler, *Nanosystems: Molecular Machinery, Manufacturing, and Computation*, New York 1992; R. Thurston, *A History of the Growth of the Steam Engine*, New York 1996, 12, 15–16, 21–2; K. Drexler, *Nanosystems: Molecular Machinery, Manufacturing, and Computation*, New York 1992; R. Finlay, 'China, the West, and world history in Joseph Needham's *Science and Civilisation in China*', in *Journal of World History*, 11, 265–303; D. Landes, *The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present*, Cambridge 2003; R. Krebs, *Groundbreaking Experiments, Inventions and Discoveries*, Westport 2004.
- 37 S. Wolfram, *Idea Makers: Personal Perspectives on the Lives and Ideas of Some Notable People*, Champaign 2016.

Chapter 14

- 1 For a very perceptive study of similarities and continuities in this field, see R. Wuthenow, *Communities of Discourse: Ideology and Social Structure in the Reformation, the Enlightenment and European Socialism*, Cambridge, MA 1989.
- 2 A comparative survey of the socio-political consequences: G.A. Ritter, *Der Sozialstaat: Entstehung und Entwicklung im internationalen Vergleich*, Munich 1989; as well as S. Padgett, W.E. Patterson, *A History of Social Democracy in Europe*, London 1991.
- 3 H. de Saint-Simon, *Le Système industriel*, Paris 1821, 19.
- 4 B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London 1983.
- 5 For further arguments: S. Woolf, *Napoleon's Integration of Europe*, London 1991.
- 6 For a general survey: B. Tobia, *Una patria per gli Italiani: spazi, itinerari, monumenti nell'Italia unita (1870–1900)*, Rome 1991.
- 7 For the concept: P. Nora, ed., *Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past*, I, New York 1996.
- 8 See S. Collini, *Public Moralists: Political Thought and Intellectual Life in Britain, 1850–1930*, Oxford 1991.
- 9 For the background see P. Greenhalgh, *Ephemeral Vistas: The Expositions Universelles, Great Exhibitions and World Fairs, 1851–1939*, Manchester 1988.
- 10 P.E. Schramm, *Neun Generationen: Dreihundert Jahre deutscher 'Kulturgeschichte' im Lichte des Schicksals einer Hamburger Bürgerfamilie, 1648–1948*, Göttingen 1963, I, 295.
- 11 For example, D. Blackburn, R.J. Evans, eds, *The German Bourgeoisie: Essays on the Social History of the German Middle Class from the Late Eighteenth to the Early Twentieth Century*, London 1991; see also the essays in J. Kocka, A. Mitchell, eds, *Bourgeois Society in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, Oxford 1993 (originally Munich 1988). Pamela Pilbeam, in her wide-ranging *The Middle Classes in Europe, 1789–1914*, Basingstoke 1990, has raised the question of the continuity of the pre-revolutionary urban patriciate and the new industrial elite.

- 12 For example, E. Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*, London 1976.
- 13 See, too, H.J. Graff, *The Legacies of Literacy: Continuities and Contradictions in Western Culture and Society*, Bloomington 1987.
- 14 Kocka, Mitchell, *Bourgeois Society*, 430, table 16.3.
- 15 See S. Collini, *Matthew Arnold: A Critical Portrait*, Oxford 1994.
- 16 M. Arnold, *Popular Education and the State*, London 1861; *Arnold, Schools and Universities on the Continent*, London 1868.
- 17 J. Dover Wilson, ed., M. Arnold, *Culture and Anarchy*, Cambridge 1971, 129 sqq.; M. Arnold, *Essays in Criticism I*, London 1865, 18.
- 18 G.W.E. Russell, ed., M. Arnold, *Letters I*, London 1895, 4.
- 19 *Culture and Anarchy*, 138.
- 20 *Culture and Anarchy*, 195.
- 21 Quoted by J. Dover Wilson in his introduction to *Culture and Anarchy*, XXXV.
- 22 P. Anderson, *The Printed Image and the Transformation of Popular Culture, 1790–1860*, Oxford 1994.
- 23 See O. Dann, ed., *Lesegesellschaften und bürgerliche Emanzipation: ein europäischer Vergleich*, Munich 1981, 22, 159 sqq.
- 24 See the details in F. Parent-Lardeur, *Lire à Paris au temps de Balzac: les cabinets de lecture à Paris, 1815–1830*, Paris 1981, 171, 172, 178.
- 25 G. Jäger, J. Schönert, eds, *Die Leihbibliothek als Institution des literarischen Lebens im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert. Organisation, Bestände, Publikum*, Hamburg 1980, 11 sqq.
- 26 Quoted in H. Nicolson, *Tennyson: Aspects of His Life, Character and Poetry*, London 1923, 1960, 235.
- 27 *La Regenta*, written by L. Alas (1852–1901), whose pen-name was Clarín, was translated into English in 1984.
- 28 See L. Sauer, 'Romantic automata', in G. Hoffmeister, ed., *European Romanticism: Literary Cross-Currents, Modes and Models*, Detroit 1990, 287–306.
- 29 S. Butler, *Erewhon*, London (Everyman's Library) 1951, 144, 145, 147.
- 30 See M. Schneider, *Geschichte als Gestalt: Gustav Freytag's Roman 'Soll und Haben'*, Stuttgart 1980.
- 31 This is the drift of most of the essays in M.I. Finley, ed., *The Legacy of Greece: A New Appraisal*, Oxford 1981, and R. Jenkyns, ed., *The Legacy of Rome: A New Appraisal*, Oxford 1992, even if the limitation of culture to art and literature in the latter volume is debatable.
- 32 See P.J.A.N. Rietbergen, 'Een Europeaan droomt: Novalis tussen Europa, Christendom en Wereld', in his *Dromen van Europa: een cultuurgeschiedenis*, Amersfoort 1993, 255–81.
- 33 A. Corbin, *Time, Desire and Horror: Towards a History of the Senses*, Oxford 1995.
- 34 H. Kaeble, *Auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen Gesellschaft: eine Sozialgeschichte Westeuropas, 1880–1980*, Munich 1987.
- 35 See K. Tenfelde, ed., *Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegung im Vergleich*, Munich 1986, which compares developments in Britain and Germany.

- 36 For the background: A. Corbin, *Le Territoire du vide*, Paris 1988; translated as *The Lure of the Sea: The Discovery of the Seaside in the Western World, 1750–1840*, Oxford 1994.
- 37 For the complexity of Europe's attitude towards nature: K. Thomas, *Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England, 1500–1800*, Harmondsworth 1982.
- 38 For a survey: A. Daumard, *Oisiveté et loisirs dans les sociétés occidentales au XIX siècle*, Amiens 1983.
- 39 See S. Easton *et al.*, *Disorder and Discipline: Popular Culture from 1550 to the Present*, Aldershot 1988.
- 40 Quoted in J.M. Merriman, *The Margins of City Life: Explorations on the French Urban Frontier, 1815–1851*, New York 1991, 67.
- 41 An important introduction to the problems involved is W. Kaschuba, *Volkskultur zwischen feudaler und bürgerlicher Gesellschaft: zur Geschichte eines Begriffes und seinen gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit*, Frankfurt 1988, as well as Van Dülmen, Schindler, eds, *Volkskultur*, *passim*.
- 42 Quoted in G. Schönbrunn, ed., *Das bürgerliche Zeitalter, 1815–1914*, Munich 1980, 826.
- 43 See V. Lidtke, 'Recent literature on workers' culture in Germany and England', in Tenfelde, *Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegung*, 337–62.
- 44 A good biography: M. Marnot, *Joseph Haydn: la mesure de son siècle*, Paris 1996.
- 45 See W. Weber, *The Rise of Musical Classics in Eighteenth-Century Orchestral Concerts: A Study in Canon, Ritual and Ideology*, London 1992; J.H. Johnson, *Listening in Paris: A Cultural History*, Berkeley 1995.
- 46 E.g. R. Scruton, *Modern Culture*, London 2005.
- 47 One of the best analyses of, especially, Schubert's solo songs still remains the one written by the singer who was probably their most convincing performer in the twentieth century: D. Fischer-Dieskau, *Auf den Spuren der Schubertlieder*, Munich 1976. A good biography: P. Guelke, *Franz Schubert und seine Zeit*, Laaber 1991.
- 48 See S. Finkelstein, *Composer and Nation: The Folk Heritage in Music*, New York 1960.
- 49 Quoted in P. McPhee, *A Social History of France, 1780–1880*, London 1993, 125.
- 50 From A. Dru, ed., *The Letters of Jakob Burckhardt*, London 1955, 97; 107–8, 145–8, 150–1, 219–20.
- 51 See A. Briggs, *Victorian Things*, London 1988.
- 52 M. Miller, *The 'Bon Marché': Bourgeois Culture and the Department Store, 1869–1920*, Princeton 1981.
- 53 See G. Vickert, 'The theory of conspicuous consumption in the eighteenth century', in P. Hughes, D. Williams, eds, *The Varied Pattern: Studies in the Eighteenth Century*, Toronto 1971, 253–67.
- 54 See the English translation: J.J. Rousseau, *The First and Second Discourses*, New York 1986, 4–5, 175, 180–1.

- 55 D. Hume, *Treatise on Human Nature*, Oxford 1978.
- 56 J.S. Mill, *Principles of Political Economy*, originally London 1848; Toronto 1965, 753–96.
- 57 For this essay, besides the text of *War and Peace* itself: G. Hegel, *Reason in History*, New York 1953, 43–5, and his *Philosophy of History*, New York 1956, 451. See also: I. Berlin, *The Hedgehog and the Fox*, London 1953, 10–11 and passim. For the general background: A. Wilson, *Tolstoy*, London 1988; A. Knowles, *Leo Tolstoy*, London 1997; A. Briggs, ‘Introduction’ to the Penguin edition of *War and Peace*, London 2005.

Chapter 15

- 1 For a survey, albeit a not always balanced one: A. Crosby, *Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900–1900*, Cambridge 1986.
- 2 D. Arnold, *Environment, Culture and European Expansion*, Oxford 1997.
- 3 See D. Gregory, *Brute New World: The Rediscovery of Latin America in the Early Nineteenth Century*, London 1992.
- 4 See P.J.A.N. Rietbergen, ‘Aan de vooravond van “het Groote Missie-uur”: een onderzoek naar de Nederlandse missiebeweging gedurende de eerste helft van de negentiende eeuw en de rol van “missietijdschriften” daarin’, *Nederlands Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis*, 70 (1990), 75–108.
- 5 R.H. Pearce, *Savagism and Civilization: A Study of the Indian and the American Mind*, Berkeley 1988, 69.
- 6 J. Hector St John de Crevecoeur, *Letters from an American Farmer*, London 1782. Here quoted from the Everyman’s Library, London, edition, 5.
- 7 The following quotations are from *Letters*, 11, 24–5, 13, 41, 41–2, 43–4.
- 8 W. Cather, *O Pioneers!*, New York 1913; Harmondsworth 1989, 301.
- 9 For a general overview see D. Baines, *Emigration from Europe, 1815–1930*, London 1991.
- 10 The novels appeared between 1949 and 1959; G. Eidevall, *Vilhelm Mobergs emigrantepos: studien i verkets tillkomstshistoria, dokumentära bakgrund och konstnärliga gestaltning*, Stockholm 1974.
- 11 See W.C. Davis, *The American Frontier: Pioneers, Settlers and Cowboys, 1800–1890*, New York 1992; J.D. Unruh, *The Plains Across: Emigrants, Wagon Trains and the American West*, New York 1992; and the illustrative volume of eyewitness accounts in *Westward Expansion*, New York 1992.
- 12 U. Sinclair, *The Jungle*, New York 1965, 29.
- 13 The following quotations are from *The Jungle*, 32, 59, 64.
- 14 H. Croly, *The Promise of American Life*, New York 1909, 17–25, passim; 452.
- 15 W. Irving, *The Sketch Book*, London, 2.
- 16 P.E. Lovejoy, *Transformations in Slavery: A History of Slavery in Africa*, Cambridge 1983.
- 17 For a case study: H. Gruender, *Christliche Mission und deutscher Imperialismus*, Paderborn 1982.

- 18 For a survey of British attitudes: R. Robinson, J. Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism*, London 1981.
- 19 F.J. McLynn, *Hearts of Darkness*, London 1992; S. Lindquist, *Exterminate All the Brutes*, London 1997.
- 20 G. Lantzeff, R. Pierce, *Eastward to Empire: Exploration and Conquest on the Russian Open Frontier to 1750*, Montreal 1973; M. Rywkin, *Russian Colonial Expansion to 1917*, London 1987; G. Diment, Y. Slezkine, eds, *Between Heaven and Hell: The Myth of Siberia in Russian Culture*, New York 1993.
- 21 D. Massarella, *A World Elsewhere: European Encounters with Japan in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, New Haven 1990.
- 22 P. Rietbergen, *Nihon door Nederlandse Ogen: the VOC en Japan, c. 1600 – c. 1800*, Amsterdam 2003.
- 23 G.K. Goodman, *Japan: The Dutch Experience*, London 1986.
- 24 For a survey: N. Cameron, *Barbarians and Mandarins: Thirteen Centuries of Western Travellers in China*, Oxford 1989.
- 25 See D.E. Mungella, *Curious Land: Jesuit Accommodation and the Origins of Sinology*, Honolulu 1985.
- 26 See E. Evett, *The Critical Reception of Japanese Art in Late Nineteenth-Century Europe*, Ann Arbor 1982.
- 27 S. Wichmann, *Japonismus: Ostasien-Europa. Begegnungen in der Kunst des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts*, Herrsching 1980. Also: N.N., *Van Gogh and Japan*, Amsterdam 2018.
- 28 Cf. Peter Rietbergen, *Europa's India. Fascinatie en cultureel imperialisme, c. 1750-c 2000*, Nijmegen 2007, especially Chapters 1 and 2.
- 29 See N.A. Silberman, *Digging for God and Country: Exploration, Archaeology and the Secret Struggle for the Holy Land, 1799–1917*, New York 1982.
- 30 Cr. Rietbergen, *Europa's India*, Chapter 6.
- 31 S. Mills, *Discourses of Difference: An Analysis of Women's Travel Writing and Colonialism*, London 1991.
- 32 This, of course, has been the central, though debatable, argument of E. Said, *Orientalism*, London 1978, which he repeated in his *Culture and Imperialism*, London 1993.
- 33 A survey: M. Jacobs, *The Painted Voyage: Art, Travel and Exploration, 1564–1875*, London 1995. See also D. Mackay, *In the Wake of Cook: Exploration, Science and Empire, 1780–1801*, London 1985.
- 34 A. Olearius, *Neue Beschreibung der Moskovitischen und Persischen Reiche*, Leipzig 1656, 184.
- 35 See W. Leitsch, 'Westeuropäische Reiseberichte über den Moskauer Staat', in A. Maczak, H.J. Teuteberg, eds, *Reiseberichte als Quellen Europäischer Kulturgeschichte*, Wolfenbüttel 1988, 153–76.
- 36 Basic reading is the fine study by L. Wolf, *Inventing Eastern Europe*, Stanford 1994; for this: 7–8.
- 37 See D. Chirot, ed., *The Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe: Economics and Politics from the Middle Ages until the Early Twentieth Century*, Berkeley 1989.

- 38 D. Groh, *Rusland und das Selbstverständnis Europas*, Neuwied 1961, 65 sqq.
- 39 For this essay: A. Bettex, *L'invention du monde*, Paris 1960; P. Braunlein, *Martin Behaim. Legende und Wirklichkeit eines berühmten Nürnbergers*, Nuremberg 1992; P. Rietbergen, *Dromen van Europa*, Amersfoort 1994; B. Stuchtey, ed., *Writing World History, 1800–2000*, London 2003; P. Rietbergen, *Europa en zijn werelden*, Nijmegen 2011; C. Stringer, *The Origin of Our Species*, London 2011.
- 40 Cf. F. Solleveld, *The Transformation of the Humanities: Ideals and Practices of Scholarship between Enlightenment and Romanticism, 1750–1850*, Nijmegen 2018.

Chapter 16

- 1 J. Scott, *Siemens Brothers, 1858–1958*, London 1958.
- 2 W. Lautemann, M. Schlenke, gen. eds, *Geschichte in Quellen*, Munich 1980, 825.
- 3 C. Harding, S. Popple, *In the Kingdom of Shadows: A Companion to Early Cinema*, London 1997.
- 4 A good introduction to the period is J. Barzun, *Darwin, Marx, Wagner: Critique of a Heritage*, New York 1958, esp. 38–55: 'The evolution of evolution'. See also R. Olson, *Evolution: The History of an Idea*, Berkeley 1989.
- 5 The study of Darwin has become a veritable industry. There is an avalanche of recent biographies. Instructive is L.S. Bergmann, 'Reshaping the roles of man, god and nature: Darwin's rhetoric in on the origin of species', in J.W. Lee, J. Yaross, eds, *Beyond the Two Cultures: Essays on Science, Technology and Literature*, Ames 1990. *Proteus: A Journal of Ideas*, VI/2 (1989) is entirely devoted to the various aspects of Darwin's life and works.
- 6 See the very perceptive study by S.E. Hyman, *The Tangled Bank: Darwin, Marx, Frazer and Freud as Imaginative Writers*, New York 1962, which has not received the attention it deserves.
- 7 For example: G. Levine, *Darwin and the Novelists: Patterns of Science in Victorian Fiction*, London 1988.
- 8 D. Knight, *The Age of Science: The Scientific World View in the Nineteenth Century*, Oxford 1986, provides an excellent introduction.
- 9 Ch. Fox *et al.* eds, *Inventing Human Science*, Berkeley 1995.
- 10 H.D. Cater, ed., *Henry Adams and his Friends: A Collection of Unpublished Letters*, New York 1970, 499–500.
- 11 P. Costello, *Jules Verne, Inventor of Science Fiction*, London 1978; G. Proteau, *Le Grand Roman de Jules Verne: sa vie*, Paris 1979.
- 12 B. Holm, *Selma Lagerlöfs litterära profil*, Stockholm 1986.
- 13 See Barzun, *Darwin*, *passim*.
- 14 E. Förster-Nietzsche, ed., *Nietzsche's Werke XVI*, Leipzig 1912, 402. It has to be said that a text titled *Der Wille zur Macht: Versuch einer Umwerthung aller Werthe*, as presented by Elisabeth Nietzsche as Nietzsche's chief work, does not exist. What exists is a collection of 'aphorisms', very difficult to interpret. See M. Montinari, 'Vorwort', in G. Colli, M. Montinari, eds,

- Friedrich Nietzsche: *Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe*, 14, Berlin 1980, 1–12.
- 15 See Colli, Montinari, eds, *Fr. Nietzsche: Kritische Gesamtausgabe der Werke*, VI/2, Berlin 1968 [= Fr. Nietzsche, *Also sprach Zarathustra: ein Buch für Alle und Keine*], 33, 8–1.
 - 16 See B. Reardon, 'Ernest Renan and the religion of science', in D. Jasper, T. Wright, eds, *Critical Spirit and the Will to Believe*, New York 1989, 199–205.
 - 17 For example, W. Loth, ed., *Deutscher Katholizismus im Umbruch zur Moderne*, Stuttgart 1991.
 - 18 M. Artola, *Antiguo Régimen y revolución liberal*, Barcelona 1978; L.G. San Miguel, *De la Sociedad Aristocrática a la Sociedad Industrial en la España del siglo XIX*, Madrid 1973.
 - 19 See the texts in Foerster, *Die Idee*, as well as H. Wehberg, *Ideen und Projekte betreffende die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa in den letzten 100 Jahren*, Bremen 1984.
 - 20 See G. Colli, M. Montinari, eds, *Fr. Nietzsche: Kritische Gesamtausgabe der Werke*, VI/2, Berlin 1968 [= Fr. Nietzsche, *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*], 209, no. 256.
 - 21 See J.G.A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition*, Princeton 1975.
 - 22 See M. Elvin, *The Pattern of the Chinese Past*, London 1973.
 - 23 W. Lautemann, M. Schlenke, gen. eds, *Geschichte in Quellen*, Munich 1980, 825.
 - 24 A. Tennyson, 'Locksley hall', in *Poetical Works of Alfred Lord Tennyson*, London 1917, 103.
 - 25 For the case of Britain, which is the best researched: J.M. Mackenzie, ed., *Imperialism and Popular Culture*, Manchester 1896.
 - 26 M. Lowsky, *Karl May*, Stuttgart 1987.
 - 27 R.D. Gray, *Goethe the Alchemist*, Cambridge 1952.
 - 28 A very readable biography has been written by P. Gay, *Freud: A Life for our Time*, New York 1988.
 - 29 A balanced, up-to-date analysis is given by F. Forrester, *Dispatches from the Freud Wars*, Cambridge, MA 1997.
 - 30 See L.B. Litvo, *Darwin's Influence on Freud*, New Haven 1991.
 - 31 H. Adams, *The Education of Henry Adams: An Autobiography*, Boston 1918, 379, 380, 381–2, 383.
 - 32 See the study by H.A. Klomp, *De relativiteitstheorie in Nederland*, Groningen 1997.
 - 33 See H. Hartmann, *Max Planck als Mensch und Denker*, Frankfurt 1953.
 - 34 Chr. Butler, *Early Modernism: Literature, Music and Painting in Europe, 1900–1916*, Oxford 1994.
 - 35 A. Stassinopoulos Huffington, *Picasso, Creator and Destroyer*, New York 1988, ch. 4.
 - 36 See D. Roberts, *Benedetto Croce and the Uses of Historicity*, Berkeley 1987.

- 37 N. Angkell, *The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Powers in Nations to Their Economic and Social Advantage*: London 1911.
- 38 See the very perceptive analysis in: J. Röhl, *The Kaiser and His Court: Wilhelm II and the Government of Germany*, Cambridge 1995, as well as his: *Kaiser Wilhelm II, 1859–1941. A Concise Life*, Cambridge 2014.
- 39 Quoted in R. Wohl, *The Generation of 1914*, London 1980, 240, n. 1.
- 40 For this dossier: M. Foucault, *Les Mots et les Choses*, Paris 1966, and *L'Archéologie du Savoir*, Paris 1969; C. Lasch, *The Culture of Narcissism*, New York 1969; H. Ellenberger, *The Discovery of the Unconscious*, New York 1970; P. Gay, *Freud: A Life for Our Time*, New York 1988; E. Waters, a.o., *Therapy's Delusions*, New York 1999; M. Solms, a.o.a., *Clinical Studies in Neuropsychanalysis*, London 2000; R. Webster, *Why Freud Was Wrong: Sin, Science and Psychoanalysis*, Oxford 2005; G. Makari, *The Revolution of the Mind: The Creation of Psychoanalysis*, New York 2008.

Chapter 17

- 1 In Brecht's final version of 1930, the title was changed into *Das Badener Lehrstück vom Einverständnis*, which better indicated the central theme: man's basic need to accept death.
- 2 G. Blasberg, *Krise und Utopie der Intellektuellen: kulturkritische Aspekte in Robert Musils Roman 'Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften'*, Stuttgart 1984; G.M. Moore, *Proust and Musil: The Novel as Research Instrument*, New York 1985.
- 3 M. Brod, ed., *Franz Kafka, Amerika*, Frankfurt 1953, 38.
- 4 For the background: E. Timms, ed., *Unreal City: Urban Experience in Modern European Literature and Art*, New York 1985.
- 5 The very negative interpretation of Lang's film by Siegfried Kracauer in his *Von Caligari zu Hitler: eine psychologische Geschichte des deutschen Films*, Frankfurt 1979, originally 1949, seems unfounded, induced by Kracauer's wish to detect a growing glorification of totalitarianism in every movie made in these years. Rather, I think Lang's vision to be a generally pessimistic one.
- 6 For the background *Revue du Dix-Neuvième Siècle* 13, 1983, and *Cahiers Victorians et Edwardiens* 31, 1990. Also Th.P. Dunn, R.D. Erlich, eds, *The Mechanical God: Machines in Science Fiction*, Westport 1982.
- 7 J.B. Kerman, ed., *Retrofitting Blade Runner*, Bowling Green 1991, especially in 110–23, as well as the illuminating analyses by J. Douchet, 'La Ville Tentaculaire', N.N., *Cités-Cinés*, La Villette 1987, 61–71; F. Chaslin, 'Dans les villes crépusculaires', *ibid.*, 103–9. See also: Y. Birle, *Profane Mythology: The Savage Mind of the Cinema*, Bloomington 1982, 57–62.
- 8 For Huizinga's reactions: W.E. Krul, 'Moderne beschavingsgeschiedenis: Johan Huizinga over de Verenigde Staten', in K. van Berkel, ed., *Amerika in Europese ogen: Facetten van de Europese beeldvorming van het moderne Amerika*, 's-Gravenhage 1990, 86–108.
- 9 K. Harpprecht, *Thomas Mann: Eine Biographie*, Reinbek 1995.

- 10 H.J. Fügen, *Max Weber*, Hamburg 1991; D. Käsler, *Max Weber: An Introduction to his Life and Work*, Munich 1988.
- 11 See R. Wohl, *A Passion for Wings: Aviation and the Western Imagination, 1908–1918*, New Haven 1995.
- 12 E. Jennings, 'Re-inventing Jeanne. The iconology of Joan of Arc in Vichy schoolbooks, 1940–1944', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 29/4 (1994), 711–34.
- 13 Cf. S. Baranowski, *Strength Through Joy: Consumerism and Mass Tourism in the Third Reich*, Cambridge 2004.
- 14 For the above, mostly B. Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*, New York 1966.
- 15 For a survey of the historiography of this very complex problem see P. Lambert, *The Weimar Republic and the Rise of Hitler*: London 1997.
- 16 Cf. S. Evans, *Forgotten Crimes: The Holocaust and People with Disabilities*, London 2004; also D. Bloxham, T. Kushner, *The Holocaust: Critical Approaches*, Manchester 2004.
- 17 See R.I. Moore, *The Formation of a Persecuting Society*, Oxford 1987.
- 18 Z. Baumann, *Modernity and the Holocaust*, London 1989.
- 19 S. Payne, *A History of Fascism, 1914–1945*, London 1995, and M. Mann, *Fascism*, Cambridge 2004, put the phenomenon in a comparative perspective.
- 20 See, a.o., N. Naimark, *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe*, London 2002.
- 21 R. Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-famine*, Edmonton 1986.
- 22 See, e.g.: J. Walker, 'The Decision to Use the Bomb: A Historiographical Update', in M. Hogan, ed., *Hiroshima in History and Memory*, Cambridge 1996, 11–37.
- 23 A survey: D.W. Urwin, *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945*, London 1995.
- 24 S. Harding, D. Phillips, *Contrasting Values in Western Europe: Unity, Diversity and Change*, Basingstoke 1986; S. Ashford, N. Timms, *What Europe Thinks: A Study of Western European Values*, Aldershot 1992; and the reports of the *European Values Studies Project*, published in Tilburg, the Netherlands, from 1993 onwards.
- 25 For a survey: R. Williams, *Dream Worlds*, Berkeley 1982, 298–384, *passim*.
- 26 E. Durkheim, *Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*, Paris 1912.
- 27 See M. Birman, *All That Is Solid Melts into Air*, London 1982; A. Ross, *No Respect: Intellectuals and Popular Culture*, London 1989.
- 28 See M.A. Bienefeld, *Working Hours in British Industry: An Economic History*, London 1972.
- 29 J.M. Keynes, *Essays in the Art of Persuasion*, London 1931, 365 sqq.
- 30 For a general survey: R. Williams, *Culture and Society, 1780–1950*, London 1961.
- 31 G. Poujol, R. Labourie, *Les Cultures populaires*, Toulouse 1979.

- 32 W.W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth*, Cambridge 1961.
- 33 See P. Brantlinger, *Bread and Circuses: Theories of Mass Culture as Social Decay*, New York 1983.
- 34 J.K. Galbraith, *The Affluent Society*, New York 1958, 139 sqq.
- 35 See P. Yonnet, *Modes et masses: la société française et le moderne, 1945–1985*, Paris 1985.
- 36 See R. Butsch, ed., *For Time and Profit: The Transformation of Leisure into Consumption*, Philadelphia 1990.
- 37 From G. Cross, *Time and Money: The Making of a Consumer Culture*, London 1993, 193 sqq. This perceptive study has been of great value in the writing of this section. Recent data, till 2017: www.statista.com/statistics/269918/daily-tv-viewing-time-in-the-uk-by-age/.
- 38 V. Packard, *The Status Seekers*, New York 1959; W. Whyte, *The Organization Man*, New York 1956.
- 39 See R. Inglehart, *Cultural Shift*, Princeton 1990.
- 40 See P. Blyton, *Changes in Working Time: An International Review*, New York 1985.
- 41 W. Gossin, *Le Temps de la vie quotidienne*, Paris 1974.
- 42 A. Veal, *Sport and Recreation in England and Wales*, London 1979; J. Bishop, P. Higgett, eds, *Organizing around Enthusiasm: Mutual Aid in Leisure*, London 1986.
- 43 J. Dumazedien, *La Révolution culturelle du temps libre, 1968–1988*, Paris 1988.
- 44 Report of the Dutch Bureau for Social and Cultural Planning (The Hague), May 1995.
- 45 This is the argument persuasively sustained by Cross, *Time and Money*, *passim*.
- 46 For the background: L. Tilly, J.W. Scott, *Women, Work and Family*, London 1987.
- 47 U. Hannerz, *Cultural Complexity: Studies in the Social Organization of Meaning, States, Markets, Movements*, New York 1992.
- 48 A penetrating survey: H.J. Gans, *Popular Culture and High Culture: An Analysis and Evaluation of Taste*, New York 1974.
- 49 See ILO, *Yearbook of Labour Statistics: Retrospective Edition on Population Censuses 1945–1989*, Geneva 1990.
- 50 E.J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire, 1870–1914*, London 1987, esp. ch. 5.
- 51 P. Bairoch, *Two Major Shifts in Western European Labour Force: The Decline of the Manufacturing Industries and of the Working Class*, Geneva 1988.
- 52 See J. Rifkin, *The End of Work: The Decline of the Global Labor Force and the Dawn of the Post-market Era*, New York 1995.
- 53 F. Ewald, *L'Etat-providence*, Paris 1986.
- 54 R.C. Allen, *Speaking of Soap Opera*, Chapel Hill, 1985.
- 55 For a survey: M. Mitterauer, *Sozialgeschichte der Jugend*, Frankfurt 1986.
- 56 R. Floud et al., *Height, Health and History*, Cambridge 1990.
- 57 From the *Financial Times*, 11 April 1991, quoted in Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes*, 326.

- 58 Stravinsky, though presenting himself as a ‘cosmopolitan’, was far more influenced by Russia’s musical past than he cared to admit: R. Taruskin, *Stravinsky and the Russian Tradition*, Oxford 1996.
- 59 E.J. Hobsbawm, *The Jazz Scene*, New York 1993.
- 60 A. Gray, J. McGuigan, eds, *Studying Culture: An Introductory Reader*, London 1993.
- 61 The point is much discussed; see, e.g. F. Zweig, London 1961, as opposed to J. Goldthorpe *et al.*, *The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure*, London 1971, although both rely heavily on the somewhat atypical case of Britain.
- 62 For the following see R. Kroes, *De Leegte van Amerika*, Amsterdam 1992.
- 63 For example, R.F. Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization*, New York 1993. For a parallel study: R. Willett, *The Americanization of Germany: Post-War Culture, 1945–1949*, London 1989.
- 64 ‘Cruise Missiles’ Words & Music by John Watts © Copyright 1991 BMG Rights Management GmbH. BMG Rights Management (UK) Limited, a BMG Company. All Rights Reserved. International Copyright Secured. Used by permission of Hal Leonard Europe Limited.
- 65 ‘Berlin’ Words & Music by John Watts © Copyright 1981 BMG Rights Management GmbH. BMG Rights Management (UK) Limited, a BMG Company. All Rights Reserved. International Copyright Secured. Used by permission of Hal Leonard Europe Limited.
- 66 With thanks to my colleague, Dr Remco Ensels.
- 67 ‘History Will Teach Us Nothing’: Words and Music by Gordon Sumner © 1987, Reproduced by permission of G.M. Sumner/EMI Music Publishing Ltd, London W1F 9LD.
- 68 G. Alperovitz, *The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb*, New York 1995.
- 69 See M.J. Nye, *From Chemical Philosophy to Theoretical Chemistry: Dynamics of Matter and Dynamics of Disciplines*, Berkeley 1993.
- 70 Watson himself wrote a highly readable first-hand account: J. Watson, *The Double Helix*, London 1968.
- 71 See A.P. French, P.J. Kennedy, eds, *Nils Bohr: A Centenary Volume*, Cambridge, MA 1985; G. Holton, *Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought*, Cambridge, MA 1988.
- 72 For a very lucid survey: S. Greenfield, *The Human Brain*, London 1997.
- 73 See A.H. Guth, *The Inflationary Universe*, London 1997.
- 74 A layman’s – c.500 pages long – guide through the complexities of the issue is provided by S. Singh, *Big Bang: The Most Important Scientific Discovery of All Time and Why You Need to Know about It*, London 2004.
- 75 See C.P. Snow, *The Two Cultures and a Second Look: An Expanded Version of the Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution*, Cambridge 1964, as well as J.S. de la Mothe, *C.P. Snow and the Struggle for Modernity*, Austin 1992. Significantly, Snow’s text was translated into German as: *Die Zwei Kulturen: literarische und naturwissenschaftliche Intelligenz*, Stuttgart 1967. Also F. Leavis, *Cultures: The Significance of C.P. Snow*, Cambridge 1964, as well as D. Thompson, ed., *The Leavises*, Cambridge 1984.

- 76 J. Valdeon Baroque, a.o., *Judíos, sefarditas, conversos: la expulsión de 1492 y sus consecuencias*, Alcalá 1995.
- 77 For this essay: Y. Samand, ed., *Islam in the European Union: Transnationalism, Youth and the War on Terror*, Oxford 2007; P. Hainsworth, *The Extreme Right in Western Europe*, London 2008; B. Wasserstein, *Barbarism and Civilization: A History of Europe in Our Time*, Oxford 2009; I. Berend, *Europe since 1980*, London 2010; M. Conway, ed, *Europeanization in the Twentieth Century*, London 2010; J. Cesari, *Why the West Fears Islam: An Exploration of Muslims in Liberal Democracies*, London 2013. Also for the Turkey question: *European Commission Eurobarometer*, 66, September–October 2006, 223. For regular surveys about all kinds of topics, including religious feelings: www.gesis.org/eurobarometer-data-service/topics-trends/eb-special-topics/select.

Epilogue

- 1 G. Erler, ed., *J.W. Goethe, Werke*, VIII, Berlin 1984, 77.
- 2 Quoted in W.C. Bark, *Origins of the Medieval World*, Stanford 1958, VII.
- 3 Cf. J. Holslag, *De kracht van het paradijs. Hoe Europa kan overleven in de Aziatische eeuw*, Antwerpen 2006.
- 4 Z. Bauman, *Modernity and Ambivalence*, London 1990.
- 5 E. Levinas, *Totalité et infini*, The Hague 1961.
- 6 P. Brezzi, *Realtà e mito nell'Europa dall' antichità ai giorni nostri*, Rome 1954, 22.
- 7 M. Beloff, *Europe and the Europeans: An International Discussion*, London 1957.
- 8 A. Lemaire, *Twijfel aan Europa: Zijn de intellectuelen de vijanden van de Europese cultuur?* Baarn 1990. The contribution by C. Nooteboom, *De ontvoering van Europa*, Amsterdam 1993, as the reflection of someone who calls himself a 'European' traveller and thinker, is a disappointment.
- 9 M. Rostovtzeff, *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire*, Oxford 1926, 486–7.
- 10 R. Barnett, A. Griffin, eds, *The End of Knowledge in Higher Education*, London 1997.
- 11 See the cases studied in: P. Rietbergen, *Clio's Stiefzusters. Verledenverbeeldingen voorbij de Geschiedwetenschap*, Nijmegen 2015.
- 12 See C.W. Bynum, 'The last Eurocentric generation', *Perspectives*, 34/2 (1996), 3 sqq.
- 13 See P. Manent, *An Intellectual History of Liberalism*, London 1994.
- 14 See the important, 'demythologizing' study by A.S. Milward (with G. Brenner, F. Romero), *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, London 1993, as well as A.S. Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–1951*, London 1984.
- 15 P. Rietbergen, *De Retoriek van de Eeuwige Stad. Rome gelezen*, Nijmegen 2003.
- 16 Most articulate is: J. Rifkin, *The European Dream: How Europe's Vision of the Future Is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream*, Cambridge 2004.
- 17 F. O'Toole, *Heroic Failure: Brexit and the Politics of Pain*, London 2018.
- 18 F. Finchielstein, *From Fascism to Populism in History*, Oakland 2017; M. Anselmi, *Populism*, London 2017.

- 19 F. Fernandez-Armesto, *Millennium*, London 1995.
- 20 Most modern analyses concentrate on the central figure of Jinping Xi, the country's president. See, e.g., K. Brown, *CEO, China: The Rise of Xi Jinping*, London 2016. A study that, amongst other issues, sets China's role in a wider context of rising populism and nationalism is provided by: I. Bremmer, *Us vs Them: The Failure of Globalism*, London 2018.
- 21 E.J. Hobsbawm, T. Ranger, eds, *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge 1983; E.J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge 1990.
- 22 See A. Milward, V. Sorensen, 'Interdependence or integration? A national choice', in A.S. Milward *et al.*, eds, *The Frontier of National Sovereignty: History and Theory, 1945–1992*, London 1993, 1–32.
- 23 This has already been argued by L. Kohr, *The Breakdown of Nations*, London 1957; more recently: Chr. Harvie, *The Rise of European Regionalism*, London 1993.
- 24 See P. Berger, 'Social sources of secularization', in J.C. Alexander, S. Seidman, eds, *Culture and Society: Contemporary Debates*, Cambridge 1992, 239–49.
- 25 For the role of television in the public domain: M. Price, *Television, the Public Sphere and National Identity*, Oxford 1996.
- 26 O. Marquard, 'Moratorium des Alltags: Eine Kleine Philosophie des Festes', in W. Haug, H. Warnung, eds, *Das Fest*, Munich 1989, 684–91.
- 27 An elegant though limited survey written by Josep Fontana, *Europa ante el espejo*, Barcelona 1994, has been translated in several European languages; however, he omits the important north–south and east–west oppositions.
- 28 G. Nonneman *et al.*, eds, *Muslim Communities in the New Europe*, Reading 1996.
- 29 On Guardini: H. Kuhn, R. Guardini, *Der Mensch und das Werk*, Darmstadt 1961. In 1962, Guardini was awarded the Erasmus Prize.
- 30 See U. Hannerz, *Cultural Complexity*, New York 1983. *The Polity Reader in Cultural Theory*, Cambridge 1994, significantly starts with mass communication.
- 31 Cf. J. Carrette, R. King, *The Selling of Spirituality*, London 2004.
- 32 R. Shields, ed., *Cultures of Internet*, London 1996.
- 33 J. Ellis, *Visible Fictions: Cinema, Television, Video*, London 1992, esp. 109 sqq., 270 sqq.
- 34 For a survey of various opinions: F. Webster, *Theories of the Information Society*, London 1996.
- 35 Chr. Jenks, ed., *Visual Culture*, London 1995.
- 36 Ph. Drummond, R. Patterson, eds., *Television and Its Audience: International Research Perspectives*, London 1988.
- 37 S. Dillon, 'Office workers fall short when building a sentence', *International Herald Tribune*, 8 December 2004, 1, 10.
- 38 R. Wilson, W. Dissanayake, eds., *Global/Local: Cultural Production and the Transnational Imaginary*, London 1996.
- 39 This vision was defended by A. Finkelkraut, *L'Humanité perdue*, Paris 1997.